

CONFIDENTIAL SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

BOARD OF INQUIRY - SINKINGS.

H.M.C. SHIPS - R.C.N. FRIGATES

LOSS OF H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD"

ARCHIVES

D/S

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. By
Staff	WITH PAPER JUN 6 1944	5/7	Jan					
Staff	vm	5/7						
Staff		17/8/44						
Staff (on sig)		3.5	g					
Person (Kra)		5/8	H					
Staff (D.D)		7/8	DCR					
Person H.A		8.8.44	E					
Staff request		12.8.44	g					
Person		17/8	Jan					
Person		16/9	SB	18/9	vm		SEP 1944	
Person	SEP 25 1944			9.1.45	Sub.		JAN 12 1945	
Person	FEB 7 1945						FEB 17 1945	
Person	APR 13 1945			15/4/45			APR 24 1945	
Person	170938			18.4.45			JAN 26 1946	
Staff	APR 30 1945			20.1.46	Sub.		FEB 13 1946	
Staff	JAN 28 1946			11.2.46	g		OCT 11 1946	
Staff	OCT 8 1946			10.10.46	SB			
Person	FEB 21 1947						MAR 15 1947	
Staff for D.O.D		5/3	Cam					
Person		14.3.47	g					
Person		17/3		18/3/47	Cam		MAR 19 1947	
Staff (D.O)	DEC 18 1947			20.12.47	SB		DEC 20 1947	
Person	SEP - 8 1952			22.10.52	g		OCT 23 1952	
Person	per request	5/6/63	H					
Person		10.6.63	Cam					

Referred to	Remarks	Taken off Charge
<i>Per request</i>	<i>25.9.44</i>	<i>JAN 12 1945</i>
<i>Case 44A</i>	<i>Per Requisition C.R. APR 13 1945</i>	<i>FEB 17 1945</i>
<i>Per @ H4A</i>		<i>APR 24 1945</i>
<i>Per (a) 170938</i>	<i>APR 30 1945</i>	<i>JAN 26 1946</i>
<i>Staff Dir</i>	<i>Per Requisition C. JAN 28 1946</i>	<i>FEB 13 1946</i>
<i>Staff (a)</i>	<i>Per Requisition C.R. OCT 8 1946</i>	<i>OCT 11 1946</i>
<i>DPR</i>	<i>Per Requisition C.R. FEB 21 1947</i>	
<i>Per (a) 15-3-47</i>		<i>MAR 19 1947</i>
<i>Staff (Soo)</i>	<i>R 18/12/49.</i>	
<i>Staff</i>	<i>PER REQUISITION CR SEP -8 1952</i>	
<i>✓</i>	<i>5-6-68</i>	

Vol.

FOR FRENCH TRANSLATIONN.S. V-39924, PERS.(N) "N"/4.a
N.S.C. 1156-381/65, Vol. 1.

5 March, 1947.

Sir:

Further to my letter of the 27th of February, 1947, the following are particulars of the mishap in which your brother, the late Joseph Jacques Uldege Deslauriers, Stoker First Class, Official Number V-39924, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, lost his life:

At the time of the tragedy his ship, H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD", was returning from the United Kingdom on convoy escort duty. When she was approximately one hundred miles south east of St. John's, Newfoundland, on the 7th of May, 1944, she was torpedoed by an enemy submarine and sunk within a few minutes.

In spite of the extremely low temperature of the water and its oil-covered surface, thirty-eight men were picked-up by ships in the vicinity and taken to St. John's, Newfoundland. Five others, however, were recovered dead. Your brother is one of the 114 men (11 Officers and 103 men) who were listed as missing and of whom no news has since been received nor is there any record that mention was ever made in any of the accounts of the survivors as to your brother's fate. As you are aware an official presumption of his death has now been made.

Attached is a copy of the list, published in the press, of survivors from H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" with the names and addresses of their next-of-kin.

As it is not the policy of this Department to release the addresses of men who have been discharged from the Canadian Naval Forces and as the majority of the survivors have been demobilized it is regretted that their last known address cannot be disclosed.

Yours sincerely,

Encl.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

Brother Jean Daniel s.c.,
Mont-Sacre-Coeur,
GRANBY, Quebec.

MAR 12 A.M.

Ottawa, le 19 mars 1947.

Révérend frère Jean-Daniel, s.c.,
Mont-Sacré-Coeur,
Granby, P.Q.

Mon révérend frère,

Comme suite à ma lettre du 27 février dernier, je viens vous exposer les circonstances qui ont entouré la mort de votre frère, le chauffeur de lère classe Joseph-Jacques-Uldège Deslauriers; matricule V-39924, de la Réserve des volontaires de la Marine royale canadienne.

Lors de la tragédie, son navire, le "Valleyfield", revenait du Royaume-Uni en service d'escorte de convoi. Le "Valleyfield" se trouvait à environ cent milles au sud-est de Saint-Jean, Terre-Neuve, le 7 mai 1944, lorsqu'il fut torpillé par un sous-marin ennemi et sombra en quelques minutes.

Bien que l'eau fût très froide et recouverte d'huile, trente-huit hommes purent être recueillis par des navires qui se trouvaient dans le voisinage et il furent transportés à Saint-Jean, Terre-Neuve. Toutefois, cinq autres furent repêchés morts. Votre frère est au nombre des 114 hommes, comprenant 11 officiers et 103 matelots, qui ont été portés disparus et dont on n'a pas entendu parler depuis. Rien n'indique non plus que les comptes rendus donnés par les survivants aient jamais fait mention du sort de votre frère. Comme vous le savez, pour toutes fins officielles, il est maintenant présumé mort.

Vous trouverez ci-annexé un double d'une liste des survivants du "Valleyfield", liste qui a paru dans les journaux et qui porte les noms et adresses des plus proches parents.

Comme la ligne de conduite du ministère ne nous permet pas de divulguer les adresses des hommes qui ont été libérés de la Marine canadienne et que la majorité des survivants ne font plus partie du service, nous regrettons de ne pouvoir vous fournir leur dernière adresse connue.

Veuillez agréer, mon révérend frère, mes salutations les plus empressées.

Le secrétaire naval,

J. L. W.

PIECE JOINTE

W FMA
For Despatch
Date 20-3
Mail 1803

H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" - SURVIVORS LIST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK, UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT-OF-KIN</u>
TATE, Charles Ian Passman	Lieutenant, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Frederick Lionel Tate, 28 Burton Road, TORONTO, Ontario.
WARREN, Jack Hamilton	Lieutenant, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Olive S. Warren, c/o Lt.Col. E.J. Church, 289 Stanley Avenue, ST. LAMBERT, Quebec.
<u>RATINGS -</u>		
ADDISON, Henry Charles	Able Seaman, V-43906, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Irene Addison, 1115 Arbutus Street, NEW WESTMINSTER, B.C.
ANDERSON, Norman William	Ordinary Seaman, V-51930, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Betty Anderson, R.R. #2, WETASKIWIN, Alberta.
EVERY, William Harold	Stoker First Class,	Mother: Mrs. Mildred Murele Avery, 251 Concord Avenue, TORONTO, Ontario.
BAULNE, Joseph Emile Rene	Able Seaman, V-6893, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Armande Baulne, 138 Leduc Street, HULL, Quebec.
CHIESA, John Delkie	Stoker Second Class, V-57683, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Emma Chiesa, 188 Erie St. East, WINDSOR, Ontario.
DAUBS, William	Steward, V-17836, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Hilda Daubs, 722 Elias Street, LONDON, Ontario.
DEWARE, Nobele Horton	Able Seaman, V-37394, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Nellie DeWare, 222 High Street, MONCTON, N.B.
EDWARDS, William Lawrence	Stoker First Class, V-32836, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Irene McKenzie, 2430-52nd Ave. S. E., CALGARY, Alberta.
ERSKINE, William	Stoker First Class, V-44194, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Marie Erskine, 133 Elgin St. N., HAMILTON, Ontario.
FLUDE, Albert Edward	Ordinary Seaman, V-65093, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Mildred Flude, 493 Clinton Street, TORONTO, Ontario.
GIBSON, Donald Harry	Telegraphist, V-43524, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Frances Gibson, DAWSON CREEK, B.C.
GODWIN, Donald Harold	Ordinary Seaman, V-65029, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Hazel Godwin, 41 South Oval St., HAMILTON, Ontario.
HAMMICK, Laurence Almeric	Signalman, V-30160, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. K. Hammick, 767 Victoria Ave., OAK BAY, Victoria, B.C.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK, UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT-OF-KIN</u>
HOCKING, William Wilberforce	Leading Signalman, V-30627, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Clara Hocking, 1482 Dallas Road, VICTORIA, B.C.
IOANIN, George Albert	Ordinary Seaman, V-49826, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Gladys Ioanin, 905 Milligan Avenue, TRAIL, B.C.
IVY, William Edward	P.O. Telegraphist, V-7580, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Elizabeth H. Ivy, 23 Harcourt Avenue, TORONTO, Ontario.
KAPLAN, Irving Jack	Yeoman of Signals, V-23343, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Nathan Kaplan, 103 Villeneuve St. West, MONTREAL, Quebec.
LAING, Ellsworth Clark	Ordinary Signalman, V-57433, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Gladys Laing, 6093 Quebec Street, VANCOUVER, B.C.
LAVIOLETTE, James Ferdinand	Chief Petty Officer, V-4136, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Fleurange Laviolette, 84-6th Avenue, TIMMINS, Ontario.
LAW, Jack Fraser	Able Seaman, V-31554, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Eva Law, 1125-13th Avenue W., CALGARY, Alberta.
MARTIN, Leslie Frederick	Stoker Second Class, V-65354, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Phoebe Martin, 1380 East 11th Ave., VANCOUVER, B.C.
MUNRO, Edward Donald	Coder, V-49997, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Edward H. Munro, BELLE COTE, Inv.Co., N.S.
MCGREGOR, Alexander Murray	Cook (S), V-47256, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Margaret McGregor, 946-12th Avenue W., VANCOUVER, B.C.
MCLAUGHLIN, Russell Lewis	Telegraphist, V-42102, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Lewis W. McLaughlin, HILLSBORO, Albert Co., N.S.
O'CONNOR, Terrence Patrick	Signalman, V-22656, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Elayne M. O'Connor, 1121 Comox Street, VANCOUVER, B.C.
O'GRADY, Daniel George	E.A. 4th Class, V-32624, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. William O'Grady, 105 Taylor Avenue, KIRKLAND LAKE, Ontario.
PERRY, Roland	Able Seaman, V-33200, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Emile Perry, 5573 Verdun Avenue, VERDUN, Quebec.
RUSS, Clyde	Able Seaman, V-36005, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Elizabeth Russ, 365 East 60th Avenue, VANCOUVER, B.C.
SIEBER, Thomas Joseph	Ordinary Coder, V-55266, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Matthew Sieber, Bishop's Palace, PRINCE ALBERT, Sask.
SNIDER, Richard Samuel	Ordinary Tel (S.O.),	Mother: Mrs. Mae Snider, 10366-92nd Street, EDMONTON, Alberta.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK, UNIT</u>	<u>NEXT OF KIN</u>
TAPSON, Stanley Carson	Stoker 1st Class, V-54278, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. Isobelle Tapson, 117 Alpine Avenue, HAMILTON, Ontario.
SKURDASKAS, Thaddeus Joseph	Leading Seaman, V-5494, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Dora Skurdaskas, P.O. BEAR RIVER, P.E.I.
WHITLOCK, Roy Nelson	Ordinary Seaman, V-47775, RCNVR.	Mother: Mrs. C. Whitlock, Box 485, GAYTOWN, P.E.I.
WILLARD, John Murray	Leading Stoker, V-22547, RCNVR.	Wife: Mrs. Agnes Helen Willard, 50 Ninth Street, NEW TORONTO, Ontario.
YEO, Bertram Thomas	Leading Stoker, V-19752, RCNVR.	Father: Mr. Bertram R. Yeo, 468 Mercer Street, WINDSOR, Ontario.

R. N. RATING

DALEY, Robert E,	Telegraphist, P/JK 40413.
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Department of National Defence
Naval Service

AIR MAIL

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

B-01C-V22656

No.

27th April, 1945

From: Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. "BURRARD",
Vancouver, B.C.

To : The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

T.P. O'CONNOR, Signm., O.N. V-22656

Submitted for the information of the Department in accordance with N.S.H.Q.'s memorandum NSC 11156-381/65, N.S. V-51108 Pers (N), 20th April, is the statement of the above-named rating.

2. O'Connor states that to the best of his knowledge no other surviving rating, senior or otherwise, witnessed Terrence D. Nelson's actions.

Commander, R.C.N. (Temp.).

INC/ej

Enc. 2. G.

OCT 3 P.M.

NOTE: - Posthumous Mention in Despatches Granted
to J.W. Nelson in New Years Honours List.
1.1.46

PA per
DR
See DMHS.
11.2.46.



end 788
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VIB MAIL

LOSS H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD"

Late Terrence D. Nelson - V-51108

Post M. I. N. D.

Re: Valleyfield sinking.

I, Terrence Patrick O'Connor, Signn., V-22656, along with acting Ldg./Tel., Jack Sillers, witnessed Signn. T.D. Nelson stand at the bottom of the escape hatch on board H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" direct and encourage members of crew to safety.

170938

When the torpedo struck, Sillers and myself were first out. In his haste Sillers opened small round hatch. After we climbed through we decided to open the complete hatch as it would hurry the escape. In doing this we noticed Nelson at the bottom of the ladder. Nelson did not tell us what he was doing but it was very clear to see that he was assisting men to escape.

Jack Sillers died after he and I leaped overboard. To the best of my memory (and talking to other survivors) Nelson did not clear the ship. *To my knowledge, no other survivors witnessed Nelson's actions*

Terrence P. O'Connor
(Terrence P. O'Connor,) Signn.,
O.N. V-22656

[Signature]
Witness: (I.N. Collins)
Lieut.(S), R.C.N.V.R.

LOSS H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD"

Late Terrence D. Nelson - V-51108

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other survivors witnessed Nelson's action.

Terrence P. O'Connor
(Terrence P. O'Connor,) Signn.,
O.N. V-22656

I. N. Collins
Witness: (I.N. Collins)
Lieut.(S), R.C.N.V.R.

AIR MAIL

N.S.C. ✓ 11156-381/65
N.S. V-51108. "Pers. (N)".

20 April, 1945.


MEMORANDUM:

Terrence Patrick O'Connor, Signelman, O.N. V-22656

Attached herewith are copies of a letter from the sister of the late Terrence D. Nelson, Signelman, V-51108, ex H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" and the Department's reply, concerning the above-named rating who is now serving under your Command.

It is requested that you obtain a signed statement from O'Connor who witnessed this brave act on the part of Nelson, and also ascertain from him whether there was a senior surviving rating present on that occasion from whom a similar statement could be obtained. In the case of the latter, if he could suggest any names, an attempt will be made to get these statements. If this can be done, the matter can then be taken up with a view to recommending the grant of a posthumous award to Signelman Nelson.

Lab.



The Command ^{ing} Officer,
H.M.C.S. "BURNARD".

✓
B.F.
15/5/45
Pers (N) (HHA)

N.S.C. 11156-381/65

N.S. V-51108 "Pers. (H)".

20 April, 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

Terrence Patrick O'Connor, Signelman, V-22656

N.S.C. ✓ 11156-381/65

N.S. V-51108. "Pers. (N)."

20 April, 1945.

Dear Miss Nelson,


Further to the letter written to you by the Private Secretary to the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, dated 1st February, 1945, I am directed to advise you that the Senior Surviving Officer of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" has been contacted regarding the courageous act of your brother at the time of the sinking of that ship. Unfortunately, all surviving officers were on the ship's bridge at the time the torpedo struck and are unable to confirm Signalmen O'Connor's statement.

The responsibility for making recommendations for all Honours and Awards is, in the first instance, that of the Commanding Officer or in the event of his loss, the next Senior Surviving Officer. In order that the department may have a basis for recommending to His Majesty an award for your brother, Signalmen O'Connor is being contacted and being requested to furnish a signed statement covering the occasion.

You will appreciate, I am sure, that in an action such as the one in which H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" was lost, it is possible that many acts of gallantry on the part of the ships company may go unreported, but nevertheless contribute greatly to the high traditions of the Royal Canadian Navy.

As soon as further information is received, I will notify you promptly.

J.B.
Miss Margaret Nelson,
764 King Street,
London, Ontario.



4477 J.H. Warren, 20/3
From...Lieutenant J.H. Warren, R.C.N.V.R.,
H.M.C.S. "COATICOOK",
c/o F.M.O., Halifax, N.S.

316563

Date...5th March, 1945.

To.....Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ont.

11156-381/65
J.D. 788

Honours and Awards - HMCS "VALLEYFIELD"

Submitted with reference to Memorandum N.S.
C.11156-381/65 V-51108 "Pers.(N)" dated 8th February,
1945.

2. As the senior surviving Officer of H.M.C.S.
"VALLEYFIELD", I have made enquiries, but as both
Lieutenant C.I.P. Tate, R.C.N.V.R. and myself were
on the bridge at the time, I very much regret that
it is impossible for me to confirm or deny the state-
ment made by Signalman Terrence O'Connor, V-22656.

J.H. Warren
(J. H. Warren)
Lieutenant, R.C.N.V.R.
Executive Officer



RECEIVED
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H-8
N.S. C.11156-381/65 ✓
V-51108 "Pers.(N)"

8th February, 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

Honours and Awards -- HMCS "VALLEYFIELD"

Enclosed herewith is copy of a letter from the sister of Signalmen Terrence Dominic Nelson, V-51108, who lost his life at the time of the sinking of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD", together with copy of a press release quoting another member of the Ship's Company, Signalmen Terrence Patrick O'Connor, V-22656.

2. It is requested that you, the senior surviving Officer of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD make a statement, if possible, substantiating this rating's story. If there is truth in the story, a recommendation for a Mention in Despatches (Posthumous) should be made to the Secretary, Naval Board. (Except for the Victoria Cross, a Mention in Despatches is the only award which may be made posthumously).

By order,

SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

Lieutenant J.H. Warren, R.C.N.V.R.,
H.M.C.S. "COATICOOK".

B.F.
Pend (A) (H.A.)
10.4.45

C
O
P
Y

File No. NS. V-51108.

February 1st, 1945.

Dear Miss Nelson,

As Mr. Macdonald is absent from the city,
I am acknowledging your letter of January 28th, regarding your
brother, Terry.

On making enquiries here, I learn that no
recommendation was received for an award for your brother as all
those who were recommended received awards. However, I have asked
the Honours and Awards Committee to look into the matter further
and I shall write you again as soon as I have any further information.

Yours very truly,

(signed) Doris L. Bentley,
Private Secretary.

Miss Margaret Nelson,
754 King Street,
London, Ontario.

C O P Y

764 King St.,
LONDON, Ontario.
Jan 28, 1945.

Dear Sir,-

I was really very surprised when I read of the awards to the members of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD and found no mention of my brother. I and many others think that he at least rates mention.

Enclosed you will find a clipping from our local Newspaper and I have the letter received from Sig. T.P. O'Connor of Vancouver.

It seems to me that there were awards for less gallant action. For instance the lad whom he helped thru to a Carley Float. We are extremely proud of him. So should the R.C.N.V.R. Please answer this letter.

Thank you,

(Signed) Miss Margaret Nelson.

"19- YEAR-OLD SIGNALMAN TERRY NELSON VALLEYFIELD HERO"

How a young London sailor, Signalman Terrance (Terry) D. Nelson, son of Mrs. Helene Blanche Nelson, 764 King street, gave his life so that other shipmates on the frigate Valleyfield could be saved, is related in a letter to the boy's mother by a chum on the ship, Signalman Terrance O'Connor, Vancouver.

The Valleyfield was torpedoed in the Atlantic and went down with a heavy loss of life.

"Terry and I were off watch when the torpedo struck," writes Signalman O'Connor. "We were in our mess at the front end of the ship, and I escaped through the emergency hatch. It was the only way out, and the entrance was packed with men. While I was helping a fellow open the hatch, I could see Terry joking with the boys around him.

"I got the hatch open and the men started to rush for the ladder. Terry stepped in and made them form a single line. He kept them going and in order.

"If they had rushed, no one would have got out. He could have, if he wanted to, been the third man out. But he elected himself to stay behind and organize the escape. He saved many lives as he guided the men to safety, and in doing so he gave his own life. That is the best display of courage and sacrifice you will ever hear about."

Signalman Terry Nelson is missing and has been presumed dead, etc..

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY



PRESS RELEASE
PRESS RELEASE

Handwritten: 6/1/45
RELEASE DATE: TUESDAY, JANUARY 2nd, 1945.

OTTAWA--Gallantry of three ratings who remained on the quarter-deck of the Canadian frigate, H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield", after the ship had been blown in two by a torpedo, and set the depth charges to 'safe, and of another rating with meagre knowledge of swimming who saved three companions are reflected in awards by the King announced today by Hon. Angus L. Macdonald, Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.

The British Empire Medal (Military Division) has been awarded to Able Seaman Joseph Emile Rene Baulne, R.C.N.V.R., of 138 Le Duc Street, Hull, Que.

The citation accompanying the group of awards simply states that they are "For brave rescue work when H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" was sunk on May 6, 1944, but survivors of the sinking told of seeing Able Seaman Baulne personally help three men into a Carley float. He then refused to be taken on board the rescue ship, H.M.C.S. "Giffard" until the others were safely on deck and, after he was taken from the sea, busied himself assisting the sick berth attendant in the "Giffard" in caring for the shocked and injured.

Posthumous mention in despatches honours three ratings who remained on the after portion of the torpedoed ship and rendered the depth charges safe thereby increasing the chances of survival of those who managed to get clear. One of the three, Mervyn H. Wood, of Mount Royal, Que., was mentioned in a list of awards published in November. The current list contains the names of the other two, Leading Seaman David Henry Brown, RCNVR, of Roseland, Ont., and Able Seaman David Edgar Brown, RCNVR, of Eburne, B.C.

Also mentioned in despatches posthumously is Telegraphist Harry Norman, Royal Navy rating, who was taking passage in the

ship, but accounts of the sinking did not indicate the basis of the award.

Mentioned in despatches for the second time is Yeoman of Signals Irving Jack Kaplan, R.C.N.V.R., of Montreal, Que., survivor of the "Valleyfield" whose previous mention was for "good service in attacks on enemy's sea communications."

It is also the second time that Lieutenant Commander Charles Petersen, R.C.N.R., commanding officer of H.M.C.S. "Giffard" has been mentioned in despatches. He won his previous award when serving in the destroyer, H.M.C.S. "Niagara" in 1942. Lieutenant Commander Petersen at the time of his enlistment was residing at 3023 Uplands Road, Victoria, B.C.

Following is the list of awards:

"For brave rescue work when H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" was sunk on 6th of May, 1944."

Posthumous Mention in Despatches

Leading Seaman David Henry Brown, "Valleyfield"

Mother - Mrs. Frances Brown, R.R. #1, Roseland, Ont.

Telegraphist Harry Norman, R.N., "Valleyfield"

Able Seaman David Edgar Brown, "Valleyfield"

Father - Edgar Brown, 201 #5 Road, Eburne, B.C.

Mention in Despatches

A/Lieut. Cdr. Charles Petersen, R.C.N.R., Commanding Officer, "Giffard"

Wife - Mrs. Margaret L. Petersen, c/o Bank of Montreal, Victoria, B.C.

Lieut. Ralph Johnston Flitton, R.C.N.V.R. "Giffard"

Wife - Mrs. Marilyn M. Flitton, 571 Chester Ave., Mount Royal, Que.

Yeoman of Signals Irving Jack Kaplan, "Valleyfield"

Father - Nathan Kaplan, 103 Villeneuve St. W., Montreal, Que.

Able Seaman George John McDonald, "Giffard"

Mother - Mrs. Ethel McDonald, 61 Ball St., Paris, Ont.

Leading Air Fitter Edward George Grinstead, R.N., "Giffard"

Stoker First Class Charles Robert Coleman, "Giffard"

Mother - Mrs. Dorothy Coleman, 3024 Jutland Rd., Victoria, B.C.

-3-

Ordinary Seaman Donald Harold Godwin, "Valleyfield" (Now Sub/Lieut)

Mother - Mrs. Hazel Godwin, 41 South Oval, Hamilton, Ont.

British Empire Medal (military)

Able Seaman Joseph Emile Rene Baulne, "Valleyfield"

Mother - Mrs. Armande Baulne, 138 Le Duc St, Hull, Que.

-30-

RESTRICTED

S. 1320 D
20000M-7-44 (R39)
7570 - S. 1320 D
K. P. 12537

ADMIRALTY
(C) C IN CWA

NAVAL MESSAGE

NSHQ

To: CMMO
CAPT (D) NFLD

From:

REFERENCE C IN C WA'S W.A. 2663/6203 P. OF 5TH SEPTEMBER,
CONCERNING HONOURS AND AWARDS OF VALLEXFIELD AND GIFFARD
THE NAME OF ABLE SEAMAN MERVYN E. WOODS (S.T.) O.N. V-50658
IS RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN THE SECTION HEADED
"RECOMMENDATION FOR POSTHUMOUS MENTION IN DESPATCHES."

CNS
ACNS
DTD
DNI
CNP
MINS
SEC NB
DWT
CSOR
N INFO

042139Z

PASSED TO NFLD AT 050335Z

PASSED TO WHITEHALL FOR U.K. ADDRESS MB AT 050304Z

W/T	T/T	CODE	04/10/44	HP	863
DRAFTED BY PERS (N) (H&A)					
PER MB.					

NAVAL MESSAGE

For use in
 Signal
 Department
 only

DRAFTED BY PERS (N) (H&A)

PER MB.

Originators Instructions:
 (Indication of Priority,
 Intercept Group, etc.)

No. of
 Groups:

TO: ADMIRALTY
 (R) C-IN-C, W.A.

(R) C.N.M.O.
 (R) CAPT. (D) NFLD.

FROM:
 N.S.HQ.

Write
 Across

REFERENCE C - IN - C. W.A.'S	W.A. 2663/6203. P. OF 5 SEPTEMBER, CONCERNING	5
HONOURS AND AWARDS OF VALLEYFIELD AND GIFFARD	THE NAME OF ABLE SEAMAN	10
MERVYN E. WOODS (S.T.), O.N.	V-50658 IS RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN THE	15
SECTION HEADED "RECOMMENDATION FOR POSTHUMOUS MENTION IN DESPATCHES."		20
		25
<i>W.B.</i>		30
		35
		40
		45
		50

System

P/L Code or Cypher

Time of

Operator

Date

Receipt

Despatch

4.10.44

FROM: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WESTERN APPROACHES.

DATE: 5th September 1944.

No. W. A.2663/6203.P .

TO: SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY

(Copies to:-

Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa

Canadian Naval Mission Overseas

Captain (D) Newfoundland (without enclosures)

SUBJECT: HONOURS AND AWARDS -- H.M.C. SHIPS VALLEYFIELD AND GIFFARD.

Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the enclosed recommendations for Honours and Awards to officers and men of H.M. Canadian Ships "Valleyfield and Giffard" for good services performed when the former ship was torpedoed and sunk on 6th May 1944.

2. I recommend the following order of merit:-

RECOMMENDATION FOR DECORATION - H.M.C.S. Valleyfield

Rating

- DSM 1. Joseph Emile Baulne, Able Seaman, Official Number V-6893, R.C.N.V.R.

RECOMMENDATION FOR POSTHUMOUS MENTION IN DESPATCHES

Ratings

- Post M.D. 1. David Henry Brown, Leading Seaman, L.T.O. Official Number V-19206, R.C.N.V.R.
" 2. David Edgar Brown, Able Seaman, Official Number V-51452, R.C.N.V.R.
" 3. Harry Norman, Telegraphist (SO) Official Number P/JX - 427047, R.N.

RECOMMENDATION FOR MENTION IN DESPATCHES.

Ratings.

- M.D. 1. Irving Jack Kaplan, Yeoman of Signals, Official Number V-23343 RCNVR.
M.D. 2. Donald Harold Godwin, Ordinary Seaman, Official Number V-65029 RCNVR.

RECOMMENDATION FOR MENTION IN DESPATCHES -- H.M.C.S. Giffard.

Officers.

- M.D. 1. Acting Lieutenant Commander Charles Petersen, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.
M.D. 2. Lieutenant Ralph Johnston Flitton, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve.

Ratings.

- Mind 1. Charles Robert Coleman, Stoker 1st Class, Official Number V-46725, RCNVR
Mind 2. E. Grimstead, Leading Air Fitter, Official Number FX 99990, R.N.V.R.
Mind 3. George John McDonald, Able Seaman, Official Number V-32867, RCNVR.
- 4. William George Bond, C.E.R.A. Official Number V-12077, R.C.N.
- 5. Howard Moorman Bailey, Leading Sick Berth Attendant, Official Number V-2934 R.C.N.V.R.
- 6. John Martin Armitage, Chief Petty Officer, Official Number 3260, RCN

N.S.C. 11156-381/65
Pers.(N)

16 September, 1944


Dear Mr. Brown,

With reference to your letter of 21 June, 1944, regarding your late son, Leading Seaman David H. Brown, consideration will be given to the grant of a Posthumous Award on the occasion of His Majesty's New Year Honours List.

The newspaper clippings which you enclosed are returned herewith.

I have read with interest and pride of the gallantry of your son at the time of the disaster of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD", and take pleasure in enclosing two excerpts from Royal Canadian Naval press releases which tell of his courage and selflessness. It is hoped that these may offer you some measure of consolation in your great sorrow.

Yours very truly,



Deputy SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

Mr. H. Whitcomb Brown,
R. R. #1
Roseland, Ontario

encl:

Despatched by
Sec. N. B.

Date 18/9/44
Time 1530

RESTRICTED
NAVAL MESSAGE

From:
NSHQ

To: AVALON
FONF
COPC
NADEX

C IN C GNA
STADACONA

PRESUMPTION OF DEATH HAS BEEN MADE FOR "VALLEYFIELD"
CASUALTIES TO DATE 7TH MAY, 1944. NEXT OF KIN HAVE BEEN
INFORMED. AVALON TO FORWARD REPORTS OF DEATH AND SERVICE
DOCUMENTS.

CNS
ACNS
DOD
DSB
DNI
D OF P
GNP
MINS
CSOR
N. INFO

021646Z

PASSED TO HALIFAX AND NFLD AT 022351Z

PASSED TO COPC AND NADEX AT 030237Z

T/T CODE 2-9-44 PL 00452

DRAFTED BY N.P.R. (PAYMR. LIEUT. T.F. HEARD)

FILE NOS: N.S. 4160-381/65
30-17-1 PERS. (N)

DLR:RN

1 August, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum.

A copy of a memorandum addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, after the sinking of the "VALLEYFIELD" is forwarded for your information.

2. The contents of this memorandum are brought to the notice of ships working up at Halifax but it is considered that the importance of the procedure referred to in paragraph 4 of the above memorandum should also be stressed during the sea working up periods at Bermuda.

By Order.

Deputy SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

The Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. "SOMERS ISLES".

DW.T.

AUG 1 1944

DLR

Despatched by
Sec. N. B.

Date *3/8/44*
Time *1450*

NAVAL SERVICE

MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO.

LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)

SecNB

For dispatch

For (w)

For info + ans N.A.
vide folio flagged (one)

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For summary
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8/1 B Aug 1/1917

[Signature]

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DWT reg

AUG 1 A.M.

DMC:HH

11156-331/65 Vol. 1 (Staff)

29th June, 1944.

SECRETMEMORANDUM:

With reference to the sinking of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD, one of the main points is that subsequent to the torpedoing the action taken was not such as to lead to the detection of the U-Boat.

2. It is inevitable that there should be some confusion after a torpedoing at night or in bad visibility and that a period will elapse when it is difficult for anyone to be sure of what is happening.


3. It is considered that the advantage to the U-Boat resulting from this confusion, can be reduced if the Senior Officer present takes decisive control and organizes the remaining ships quickly.

4. Therefore, the Department considers that during work-ups stress should be laid upon the procedure to be followed when the Senior Officer's ship sinks or is otherwise put out of action, and further, the need for exercising this procedure should be drawn to the attention of all operational groups.


Despatched by
Sec. N. B.

.....
Date 5/7/44
Time 1730.

Commander-in-Chief,
Canadian Northwest Atlantic.



BY ORDER,


 SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

Start/Tactic
same. h. with
29/6.

R. R. I. Roseland,
Ontario

June 21/44

Sub. Lt. J. Bucke

Dear Sir,

I have been advised by the Naval Chaplain to supply you with any information I have, regarding the last actions of my son Ldg. Imm. David H. Brown V 19206, who with two other ratings, removed the primers from the depth charges, when H. M. C. S. "Valleyfield" was torpedoed and sunk on May 6, of this year.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter written to my wife by Lt. C. J. T. Tate, who was officer of the watch at that time, and doubtless knows whereof he speaks. I have spoken to one of the survivors whose home is in Windsor,

Stoker Chiesa, and he told me that whilst clinging to a barley he was "quite sure he saw David on the quarter deck working at those depth charges".

I have also enclosed some newspaper clippings, which may be helpful, though I imagine the Naval authorities would have all the incidents tabulated.

May I say David was our only son, who served in the Canadian Navy over four years, he received his

I

good conduct stripe, last fall, before going to Halifax, and finally gave his life in the successful attempt to render harmless the depth charges, which were his care.

There would have been no survivors if one had exploded, as the ship was under, in 5 minutes, and all would have been within the range of its explosive force.

Trusting you will give this information due consideration,

I remain

Yours truly

D. Whitcomb Brown.

NAVAL SERVICE

MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO.

LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)

~~D. J. A. F.~~ Referred please & may
the file be returned
for action by D. J. A. F. on
para 1 - below.

D. J. A. F. noted. J. D. J. A. F.
86.6.44

24/6

© DWT
6

Lecties to write memo
to Cin C. C. N. A. - R. K. A.


27-6

B

D. J. A. F.

(NAVAL SERVICE)

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: C.N.S. 

The main points, as I see them, of this unfortunate affair are as follows:-

- (1) By order of the Senior Officer, ships ceased to zig-zag in spite of the fact it was a clear moonlight night.
- (2) The action taken after "VALLEYFIELD" was torpedoed was not such as to lead to the detection of the U-boat.

2. With reference to (1), C. in C., C.N.A. has already issued instructions regarding the need to zig-zag under conditions favourable to attack by U-boat.

3. With regard to the second point, it is ^{known} ~~un~~avoidable that there be some confusion after a torpedoing at night or in bad visibility when no one can be quite sure what is happening. However, it is essential that the Senior Officer present take decisive control of all ships immediately and organize them to the best of his ability to carry out an efficient hunt for the U-boat. In this connection, attention is invited to Para. 6 of the Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" 's report in which he says that

"It so happened that GIFFARD was first on the spot and since circumstances had combined to place her first in possession of the complete picture, while the other vessels were returning at top speed, GIFFARD assumed command."

4. There should have been no doubt in anybody's mind as to who would assume command in the event of loss of the Senior Officer.

5. It is impossible to inculcate in training schedules exercises envisaging all types of emergencies, but it is proposed to issue a memorandum to C. in C., C.N.A. instructing him to stress the need of exercising groups during their work-ups in procedure to be followed in the event of the ship of the Senior Officer being sunk or otherwise put out of action.

OTTAWA, 23rd June, 1944.

Approved
L. J. Jones
 C.N.S. 23/6.
W. Heery
 Captain, R.C.N.,
 A.C.N.S.

MEMORANDUM TO A.C.N.S.:

The circumstances were unusually favourable to the U/B and unfavourable to the escorts in that:-

- (a) the U/B found itself by chance in the path of the escort group.
- (b) the visibility was such that the U/B could have seen the escorts at least 8000 yds. away, silhouetted against the moonlight. The listening range on U/B hydrophones depends on water conditions - it should hear five escorts at 8000 to 10,000 yds. under average listening conditions.
- (c) "FRONTENAC's" radar set was out of operation and the "VALLEYFIELD's" RXC was reported to be of little use. Thus the radar coverage between "VALLEYFIELD" and "FRONTENAC" was incomplete.
- (d) the presence of considerable ice would make it difficult to distinguish a stationary U/B, even if all radars were efficient.

2. Torpedoes could, therefore, have been fired by the U/B at distances up to 8000 yds. (probably closer). The ticking noise (bearing 65° red) is difficult to explain. This is not the sound of an air torpedo nor is it anything like the propeller sounds of a U/B. It possibly could have been the sound of the motors of the U/B. If such were the case, the torpedo was fired from a comparatively short distance away.

3. A minor point about radar arises out of the Proceedings. Captain (D) states that the range of 271Q on a trimmed down U/B is 6000 yds. Operational data collected elsewhere, indicates that the average range of 271Q on a U/B is more likely to be about 5000 yds. The C.O. of "GLIFFARD" stated that he considered a U/B (trimmed down) could be picked up at 8000 yds. and the radar operator on the same ship 24,000 yds. These statements show a somewhat exaggerated idea of the capabilities of 271Q.

O T T A W A, 15th June, 1944.

JHEJ
D.O.R.

NAVAL SERVICE

DMC:BH

N.S. File: C.11156-381/65 Vol. 1 (Staff)

Memorandum to D.W.T.
A.C.N.S.

Board of Inquiry
H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD

STAFF	INITIALS	Date
3 C. N. S.		
2 A.C.N.S.		
D.J.A.F.		
D.W.T.		
1 D.O.D.		
7 D. of P.		
4 D. N. I.		
6 D. T. D.		
4 D.S.D.		
5 O.I.C.		
HYD.		
INDEX		
REFER TO		

- Terms of the Inquiry - "The loss of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD and the death and injuries of certain officers and ratings on board the said ship at the time."
- The minutes of the Board have appended to them
 - Statements made by C.O., H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON, the Executive Officer (Lieut. Kerr) and the Officer of the Watch (Lieut. J. Russel-Brown) who could not be present before the board.
 - Report of Proceedings by Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. GIFFARD.
 - Statement by Lieut. Warren (a survivor of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD) who also appeared before the board.
- A digest of some of the relevant facts.
 - At 2340 explosion was heard by C.O., H.M.C.S. GIFFARD 2343 course was altered towards VALLEYFIELD 0001 GIFFARD made "close me" to remaining ships 0008 GIFFARD made "VALLEYFIELD torpedoed" to remaining ships.
 - Ships were in line abreast 4,000 yards apart in the sequence
HALIFAX FRONTENAC VALLEYFIELD GIFFARD EDMUNDSTON steaming at 13 knots.
 - GIFFARD made a short Asdic and Radar search and at 0029 informed the other ships that she was picking up survivors and ordered EDMUNDSTON to carry out observant with the other ships.
Captain (D) Newfoundland notes: "The lack of a plot from GIFFARD gives reason to doubt the efficiency of her short Radar search to detect the submarine it is noted that even GIFFARD would not have reached the scene before 0001P and that the other ships had not turned before this time".
- A/Idg. Smn. Donald Henry Brown, L.T.O. V19206
Ord. Smn. David Edgar Brown, S.T. V51452
A.B. Mervyn E. Woods, S.T. V50658

OPERATIONS	
POD	
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SPD	
SMC	
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lost their lives. They are reported to have been seen going aft to withdraw the primers from the depth charges. The Findings of the Board and Captain (D) Newfoundland remark on this act.

(over)

5. Pages 3 and 4 of the Report of Proceedings from GIFFARD describes many other acts of gallantry.

6. Captain (D) Newfoundland notes that the board is not required to "investigate the conduct of the hunt which followed, but it is thought that the loss of the Senior Officer of a Group will inevitably produce a certain degree of confusion. On this occasion much valuable time was lost before the situation was appreciated".

F.O.N.F. remarks: "The Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. GIFFARD should have realized the ships of the group were well placed to order "Close and carry out Observant anti clockwise round VALLEYFIELD (or my own position) as soon as he knew that something had happened to H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD. It is considered that in this way there was a very good chance that the U-Boat would have been detected by H.M.C.S. HALIFAX. It is difficult to understand why, having realized that something had happened at 2343, as shown by his altering course towards VALLEYFIELD at that time, the Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. GIFFARD made no signal to institute a search for the enemy until 0001, a matter of eighteen minutes later."

In this connection it is noted ^{a)} that GIFFARD while steaming towards a flare in the water attempted to raise VALLEYFIELD by V/S and R/T and that the signalling was pointed at 2354P.

(b) GIFFARD's first indication that the explosion was due to torpedoing and not the result of an accident was the fact that VALLEYFIELD could not be raised by V/S or R/T and that radar contact was fading.

It is thought that the difficulty in quickly appreciating a situation of this kind is pointed up in the case of the torpedoing H.M.S. WOODPECKER of E.G.2 where the S.O. of the Group in H.M.S. STARLING 4,000 yards on WOODPECKER's starboard beam, was on the bridge when two flares were sighted, followed by an explosion and 3 lesser explosions. S.O., E.G.2 remarks: "I was extremely slow to appreciate what had occurred and it was not until a signal came from WOODPECKER reporting herself torpedoed that I realized."

D.W.T.

D.W.T./TACTICS

OTTAWA,
9th June, 1944.

Copy

Monifieth, Baysville, Ontario
c/o F.M.O., Halifax

Dear Mrs. Brown:

I am sorry I could not write sooner, but you will understand I have been pretty busy getting things squared away since leaving the hospital.

Your son David was in my division in the "Valleyfield" and I told all my boys that if anything should happen to them, I would write their parents. I deeply regret the cause for my writing now.

David was one of the very best men we had on board. He fulfilled an extremely responsible position as L.T.O. with eagerness and skill. He was one of the hardest workers, and could be called upon at any hour of the day or night to do a job. His continual cheerfulness endeared him to all his officers and men alike. The S.T.'s in his mess thought very highly of him.

Because of his tremendous capacity for work and his unfailing reliability, I wanted him to go before the board for his commission, but he preferred first to get his P.O. rating. On three separate occasions I asked him to reconsider this, assuring him that at any time he wished I would put in as strong a recommendation for his commission as I could. The Captain and First Lieutenant both concurred in this matter. I am sure he could have made an excellent officer had he so desired.

His ability as a leader was clearly shown in the able manner in which David organized his S.T.'s.

You have probably heard the heroic story of how three men sacrificed their lives by going back aft on the "Valleyfield" to remove the primers from the depth charges, so that they would not explode as the Ship went down.

It has been pretty definitely ascertained that one of those men was your son. That was an epic of heroism, and I am proud to be able to say I knew such a man that gave his life so that his shipmates might be saved.

To you I want to extend my most sincere sympathies, and those on behalf of the entire surviving Ship's Company.

Yours very sincerely,

C. I. P.

~~CH~~ Tate
Lieut., R.C.N.V.R.
ex - H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield"

SECRET

II

FONF-060-4-126

The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

(Copy to: The Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Navy
Halifax, N.S.

The Captain (D) Newfoundland, St. John's

Submitted for the consideration of the Department are Minutes of Proceedings of a Board of Inquiry, together with the original shorthand notes. The findings of the Board are concurred in generally.

2. The remarks of the Captain (D) Newfoundland are concurred in.

3. The Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" should have realized the ships of the group were well placed to order "Close and carry out Observant anti clockwise round "VALLEYFIELD" (or my own position") as soon as he knew that something had happened to H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD". It is considered that in this way there was a very good chance that the U-Boat would have been detected by H.M.C.S. "HALIFAX". It is difficult to understand why, having realized that something had happened at 2343, as shown by his altering course towards "VALLEYFIELD" at that time, the Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" made no signal to institute a search for the enemy until 0001, a matter of eighteen minutes later.

4. It is observed that no specific finding is made to the effect that the death of the Officers and ratings concerned was a direct result of the Service, but from the nature of the loss this can be presumed.

5. The Captain (D) Newfoundland has been directed to prepare recommendations for honours and awards as appropriate.

6. It is not intended to convene a Court Martial on the surviving officers.

Naval Offices,
St. John's, Nfld.
31st May, 1944.

(C.R.H. Taylor),
Commodore, R.C.N.,
FLAG OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND

INDEXED IN C.B.
By

STAFF	INITIALS
1 C.N.S.	
2 A.C.N.S.	
3 D.I.A.F.	
4 D.W.T.	
5 D.O.D.	
6 D.O.P.	
7 D.N.I.	
8 D.T.D.	
9 D.S.D.	
10 O.I.C.	
11 H.Y.D.	
12 S.L.C.S.	
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REFER TO	

SECRET

FORM 100-1-100

The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

(copy to: The Commander-in-Chief, Canadian
Fleet, R.C.N.

The Captain (D) Newfoundland, R.C.N.

Submitted for the consideration of the Department
are findings of a Board of Inquiry, together with
the original supporting notes. The findings of the Board are
summarized in paragraph 1.

The remarks of the Captain (D) Newfoundland are
summarized in paragraph 2.

3. The Commanding Officer, R.C.N. "ALBATROSS" should have
realized the ship of the group were "ALBATROSS" and
and carry out observation and checkmate "ALBATROSS" (or
my own position" as soon as he knew that something had happened
to "ALBATROSS". It is considered that in this way
there was a very good chance that the U-boat would have been
located by "ALBATROSS". It is difficult to understand
why having realized that something had happened at 2345, as
shown by his listening course towards "ALBATROSS" at that
time, the Commanding Officer, R.C.N. "ALBATROSS" made no attempt
to initiate a search for the enemy until 0001, a matter of
thirteen minutes later.

It is observed that no specific finding is made as
to the effect that the death of the officers and ratings concerned
was a direct result of the service, but from the nature of the
loss this can be presumed.

The Captain (D) Newfoundland has been directed
to make recommendations for honours and awards as appropriate.

It is not intended to convene a Court Martial on
involved officers.

Commander, R.C.N.
THE OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND



MINUTES OF BOARD OF ENQUIRY CONVENED AT 1430 ON 10TH MAY, 1944, TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE LOSS OF H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" AND THE DEATH AND INJURIES OF CERTAIN OFFICERS AND RATINGS ONBOARD THE SAID SHIP AT THE TIME.

PRESENT:

Acting Captain Somerville Wentworth Davis, - PRESIDENT OF THE
Royal Canadian Navy. BOARD

Lieutenant Commander Francis O'Brien Gerity,)
Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.)
Lieutenant Commander (g) William Gillies Ross,) MEMBERS
Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve.)

WITNESS - Lieutenant Commander Charles Peterson, Royal Canadian
Naval Reserve - Commanding Officer, His Majesty's
Canadian Ship "GIFFARD".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

1. Q. I have here a statement which I understand is your report of proceedings. Do you identify it?

(Report passed to Lt. Cdr. Peterson for perusal)

A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. That is your report of the occurrence?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Is there anything else you can think of you wish to add to this report?

A. No, sir, everything I know is there.

4. Q. What were the Radar and Asdic conditions at the time?

A. Radar, sir, was perfect as far as my own ship was concerned but Asdic seemed to vary with the different ships - I did not think they were very good.

5. Q. Did you hear any of the report in H.E.?

A. No, sir.

6. Q. None at all?

A. Not a single report.

7. Q. What were the weather conditions?

A. Bright, clear, moonlight night, there was almost a full moon.

8. Q. Any ice?

A. Yes, sir, a very great deal of ice on all sides.

9. Q. The pancake stuff?

A. Yes, sir, we picked it up at 25 or 26000.

Q. Passing through it continuously?

A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. How long?

A. We had been all afternoon and all evening.

12 Q. Were you in station at the time of the occurrence?

A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. What do you expect to get on a trimmed down conning tower with Radar?

A. 8000 yards.

14 Q. Have you had that in A/S.P.'s?

A. No, because we lacked being able to carry out A/S.P. in really good weather.

15 Q. Was there any ice present at the time of the occurrence?

A. At that moment on Radar - no.

16 Q. Could you estimate how far North of the Gulf Stream you were at this time?

A. No, I wouldn't like to guess.

17 Q. Did you have much difficulty in getting survivors onboard?

A. Yes, sir, great difficulty.

18 Q. Can you describe some of them?

A. The first few cases - say, the first half dozen - were covered with oil and could do practically nothing of themselves. With the survivors at first there had been practically no hangovers on them at all; the latter cases were all stretcher cases practically; cases of paralysis from the effects of the cold water oil fuel (the temperature of the water was 32). I'd like to say that several of the survivors were wearing life jackets with the straps unfastened and loose. In the water these jackets were floating around their shoulders like water wings; they certainly kept them afloat but they gave us nothing to lash a line to.

19 Q. Was there any evidence of strangulation from the belts being up there?

A. No, sir.

20 Q. Are there any suggestions you can make with regard to improving life saving conditions?

A. Yes, I have. I have already sent it to Captain "D". It is a piece of rope cut to fit a man's waist, with an Inglefield Clip to each end. In this is spliced an eye probably six inches in diameter. The job could be done in probably 20 minutes. It could be worn day and night. I made one myself and also made a rule in my ship that every man has to have one.

21 Q. Did you see any of those rescued that did not have their life jackets fastened?

A. Three only. They were wearing them when they came in. They couldn't get the flap open. You have to open the flap of

- A. (ctd.)
your pocket to get at the hook. That was impossible for them in the water. Many of the early survivors hooked themselves onto rafts and couldn't get off again, and had to be cut free.
22. Q. How widespread were these survivors?
- A. Probably all within half a mile.
23. Q. I think you said in your report that there was very little in the way of life saving material released from the ship.
- A. Yes, sir, the sea boats did not get away.
24. Q. What about rafts?
- A. There were rafts enough to accommodate all survivors in the water. Very few men were floating in the water. Some might have hopped in the water without life jackets but the majority of those that did get away were on rafts.
25. Q. From that you formed what conclusion?
- A. That practically every one who got away was an upper deck man and that the balance were the ones that died in the ship.
26. Q. You mentioned in your report that 3 of them died shortly after you got them onboard.
- A. Yes, sir, in about 5 minutes.
27. Q. Have you any idea about what time they were picked up?
- A. Yes, sir, about 0100P. They were the latest.
28. Q. What about those other 2 that were brought in?
- A. They had passed away on arrival.

WITNESS WITHDREW

WITNESS - Lieutenant Eric Theodore Pate Wennberg, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve - Commanding Officer, His Majesty's Canadian Ship "FRONTENAC".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

29. Q. Will you tell us what you know of what occurred on the night of 6th May, 1944?
- A. I had left instructions with the Officer of the Watch to steer the course of 001 at 13 knots - 4000 yards by the beam of "Valleyfield". At 2215, I was informed by the Officer of the Watch that an iceberg had been sighted directly ahead and that he was altering course 20 degrees to pass it and avoid it. I was sitting in my cabin at approximately 2340 when I heard what sounded to me like a single depth charge dropped by an escort within a few miles. I immediately called the Officer of the Watch and asked him if there had been any signals to the effect that an escort was about to drop a depth charge and I was told no. I was then informed that a plume of black smoke was observed over "Valleyfield". As it had been my experience that after dropping charges the boiler room usually makes smoke, I wasn't surprised and didn't at the time entertain thoughts of there having been any torpedoing. At approximately, I might say, midnight, the Officer of the Watch reported to me that Radar was unable to contact the Senior Officer - that is my SW2C Radar - and that the Senior Officer had failed to reply to R.T. signals, that escorts had been calling the Senior

(ctd.)

Officer on R.T. for the last few minutes and there had been no reply. Then I proceeded directly to the bridge. I received no orders but at 0010 I altered course to 096, and at 0023 I sent a signal to "Giffard" - "Request instructions". I might say that I was actually at the time unaware of "Giffard's" position. I wasn't at any time in contact with "Giffard" or with "Edmundston". A signal from "Edmundston" to "Giffard" which I received, and actually read "Return to last known position" was actually called out to the bridge as "Returning to last known position", and I therefore had the impression that the "Edmundston" had returned to last known position and "Giffard" was still actually proceeding ahead. Having no orders, as I say, I had altered 90 degrees feeling it impossible to continue ahead, and yet not knowing why, I had not been ordered to close. Later I discovered that apparently "Edmundston" was acting as Senior Officer, and when I finally reached the position of the torpedo, closely astern of "Halifax" it appeared to me that both "Edmundston" and "Giffard" were picking up survivors and that "Halifax" was about to do the same thing. I therefore sent a signal to "Giffard" -

"Intend screening and Hunting"

and I carried out around the position, later being joined by "Halifax". At no time did I pick up asdic contacts. At 0135 I was ordered by "Giffard" to join her, which I had a little difficulty to do, being confused as to which of the echoes I had was "Giffard". At about 0200 I joined "Giffard" and received orders to proceed with her to St. John's. Approximately half an hour later I was detached to return to the position of the sinking where it was pointed out I still had SW2C and was not quite helpless. I would say I was far from helpless but my SW2C sets cannot be considered as effective for detecting something on the surface except at short range. Although conditions were good we had quite a great deal of difficulty in maintaining contacts. We couldn't hold them over 5000 yards.

30. Q. What Radar sets do you carry?

A. 271Q and SW2C. The 271Q was out of action.

31. Q. How did you find conditions?

A. Conditions should have been perfect, but the set was not operating.

32. Q. What about Asdic conditions?

A. Asdic appeared to be good - I mean the transmissions could be heard going out very clearly. In what direction, of course, I couldn't say. They might have been going on the surface and they might have been diving deep, but certainly I didn't hear any echoes at the time, but I think they were probably going out fairly good.

33. Q. Any other craft observed beyond the group you were with?

A. Yes, sir. There was an aircraft passed at approximately 2310 on the course of 265, and we sighted a ship $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile away. It was reported as a ship but I think probably it was ice. That was at 2100.

34. Q. What time did you reach the bridge yourself?

A. I would say about 1 minute after 12 o'clock.

35. Q. Were you still on the course 001 at that time?

- Q. Yes, sir.
36. Q. What were the weather conditions, including visibility?
- A. Visibility was good, there was almost a full moon. Visibility was just about 4000 yards.
37. Q. Could you see clearly without glasses?
- A. No, I wouldn't say. I think if you knew just exactly where to look you could possibly see without glasses, but with glasses I think it was very visible.
38. Q. What was the bearing and altitude of the moon?
- A. The bearing would be approximately 180 and I would say around 50 degrees.
39. Q. What time was it when you came on the bridge?
- A. I would say approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of midnight. I am not sure.
40. Q. What look-out stations have you on the starboard side?
- A. One lookout on the starboard side of the bridge, and the thrower's depth charge stand, and a look out on the Pom Pom platform.
41. Q. There is a signal here from "Giffard" addressed to you - the time of origin is 0301Z. Did you receive that?
- A. It was not addressed to me.
42. Q. What I am actually trying to find out is when you turned to close position.
- A. At 0026.
43. Q. What time did you actually arrive in sight of the other vessels?
- A. I was in sight of "Halifax" at that time - but I would say approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour later. At 4 minutes to 1 we commenced operations.
44. Q. You said you thought you had sighted a ship?
- A. There is a note in the log here. It was reported to me as an echo at $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile when the alteration of 20 degrees to Port was made to avoid. The Officer of the Watch would probably know. This was before the torpedoing.
45. Q. I thought you said you had sighted a ship.
- A. That was at 2100. We definitely sighted an iceberg at 2215. I am not sure whether this one at 2100 is a ship or an iceberg although it was noted in the log as a ship.
46. Q. Was any attempt made to identify that as a ship?
- A. Apparently not. I don't remember that being reported to me - that's why I think it was probably an echo that was picked up and thought to be a ship.
47. Q. Was the aircraft identified?
- A. No, I am quite sure it wasn't - not by us anyway.
48. Q. What information did you have that there was a submarine near?

- A. I was aware that a submarine was within 100 miles or so off the position.
I should explain that we were only operating SW2C intermittently - 10 minutes on and 10 minutes off.
- Witness Withdrew -

WITNESS

Lieutenant William Wyness MacColl, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

49. Q. You were the Officer of the Watch onboard H.M.C.S. "Giffard" during what time on the night of 6th May?
- A. From 2000 to 2400.
50. Q. Will you tell us what occurred during your watch relative to the sinking of "Valleyfield"?
- A. At 2340 the Coxswain and myself were on watch. We both happened to be looking at the "Valleyfield" at that time with binoculars and a plume seemed to come out of the water when I heard the explosion. I couldn't see what it was - it was very blurred. Before I had time to report it, the Captain sang out to me asking what the explosion was; then just after that there was some black smoke coming out of the funnel and she started falling astern till I couldn't see her very well at all.
51. Q. At what time did she appear to drop astern?
- A. Practically right away after the explosion, sir, I can't be positive of the time.
52. Q. What did you observe after that?
- A. We had been trying to contact by V/S and R.T. and somebody had replied to our signal but it didn't make any sense. The next thing we saw was black spots on the water when we were steaming towards her, and more lights.
53. Q. Did you have any reports of any contacts before this, from Asdic?
- A. No, sir, we just had Radar contacts of aircraft and icebergs.
54. Q. Both of which you identified?
- A. The aircraft flew right over us - right over our stern. She did not identify herself to us.
55. Q. Do you know if she did to anybody?
- A. She flew over "Valleyfield" then and flashed a searchlight down.
56. Q. About what time was that?
- A. About 2250. We made a signal on it to the Senior Officer.
57. Q. Had you seen any surface craft?
- A. Yes, sir, a small ship. I saw a port side light just about 2110, it passed close to "Valleyfield" just on the other side of "Valleyfield".
58. Q. Could you identify her?

58. Q. No, I thought first she was a sailing craft, just burning sidelights.
59. Q. You did not see the hull and sail?
- A. No, sir.
60. Q. Could you see "Valleyfield" clearly without glasses?
- A. Not clearly, you could distinguish her, but not clearly.
61. Q. Did you have any Radar contacts during the watch?
- A. Yes, quite a number of them.
62. Q. How many sets were you operating?
- A. We only had one - just the 271Q.
63. Q. Was it in good order?
- A. It was absolutely perfect - it was giving excellent results.
64. Q. Did you form any conclusion about whether "Valleyfield" had been torpedoed or mined?
- A. I just thought torpedoed.
65. Q. What time did you complete picking up survivors?
- A. I couldn't give the exact time, but it was 0200 when we started steering away.

(Paragraphs 2,3, & 4 of Report of Proceedings of Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "Giffard" read and signed by Lieut. MacColl, as confirmed.)

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - John Martin Armitage, Chief Petty Officer, Official Number 3260 - Coxswain - His majesty's Canadian Ship "Giffard".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

66. Q. Your name?
- A. John Martin Armitage, C.P.O., 3260.
67. Q. I want you to read over paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of your Commanding Officer's Report of Proceedings.
- (Report passed to C.P.O. Armitage for perusal).
68. Q. Have you any comments to make on that, or do you confirm the statements as made there?
- A. Yes, sir, I confirm them.
69. Q. They are as you observed them?
- A. Yes, sir.
70. Q. Can you give us any idea as to the general conditions of the survivors. Was there anything in particular you noticed about them?
- A. Yes, practically all the survivors lifebelts were not buttoned up on them. They could have saved a lot more I believe if they

- (ctd.)
had been properly done up.
71. Q. Are you fitted with a dip net?
A. We were, sir.
72. Q. What happened to it?
A. There was one man that was capable of getting up onboard. We got him in it, and then 2 others grabbed hold of the net and they wouldn't let go. So we found it impossible to use it at all.
73. Q. That was on this occasion?
A. Yes, sir.
74. Q. So you gave it up after that?
A. They left a man with it. He tried to get these fellows pulled forward and with the oil on his hands he couldn't keep hold of the net.
75. Q. You found because it got covered with oil fuel it was impossible?
A. With the added weight of the three men. It would be practical if there was just one man in the water, but in a case like that bringing more than one man in, I don't think it is practical at all.
76. Q. What happened to the net?
A. It was lost astern.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - John H. Erickson, Able Seaman, Official Number V-19507 -
Radar Operator, His Majesty's Canadian Ship "GIFFARD".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

77. Q. Your name?
A. John H. Erickson, A.B., V19507.
78. Q. What are your duties?
A. Radar Operator on the 271.
79. Q. You were on watch the night of the 6th May?
A. That's right, sir.
80. Q. During what hours?
A. 10 to 12, sir.
81. Q. What contacts did you observe during that watch?
A. Well, sir, the only thing we had was the ships that were with us.
82. Q. Who were they?
A. The "Frontenac" was off our port side - "Valleyfield" off the port side, and "Edmundston" was off the starboard side.
83. Q. You were keeping definite contact with them?

83. A. Yes, sir, in an all-round sweep, sir.
84. Q. Any other contacts picked up?
- A. No, sir.
85. Q. No other contacts at all?
- A. No, sir.
86. Q. No other surface vessels besides these three you mentioned?
- A. No, sir.
87. Q. Any aircraft?
- A. I didn't pick any up, the other operator did.
88. Q. What hours were you actually operating?
- A. 2300 until the time of action stations.
89. Q. How were conditions during your part of the watch - Radar conditions?
- A. Alright, sir.
90. Q. What range would you expect to trim down a submarine on your set?
- A. Under good weather conditions you are lucky at 24000, sir.
91. Q. Did you have any false echoes at any time?
- A. No, sir.
92. Q. Any side echoes?
- A. No, sir.
93. Q. Have you got a P.P.I.?
- A. No, sir.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Manlius Cornell Bull, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, Officer of the Watch, His Majesty's Canadian Ship "FRONTENAC".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

94. Q. You were Officer of the Watch onboard HMCS "Frontenac" from what period - on 6th May, 1944?
- A. From 2000 to 2400.
95. Q. Will you tell us what occurred in reference to "Valleyfield"?
- A. The first evidence was the explosion that occurred at approximately 2340, and at the time it seemed to be a depth charge. We thought "Valleyfield" had fired a depth charge. Our lookout reported at the time that there was a show of white behind "Valleyfield". Everybody thought it was a depth charge. Just prior to that our Radar Operator had picked her up on one of the sweeps and reported her as being approximately 4000 yards. At about 2350 and 2355 a report came through from W/T that "Halifax" and "Giffard" had been trying to pick up the Senior Officer for a few minutes on their R.T. but couldn't do it, and then we realized something serious was the matter.

96. Q. During that time did you observe anything else?

A. Yes, sir, there was some flashing from that direction of the Senior Officer. As soon as I observed it I called the signalman; he came out and looked in that direction and reported that he thought he saw the letters "AS", which means "wait". It wouldn't mean anything to us because we hadn't flashed him. Then we stood by and waited for a signal to come through to explain this depth charge and we thought there may be some trouble and we could get some instructions.

97. Q. What did you observe after that?

A. The only observation made of "Valleyfield" was that she made a plume of smoke at that time, right after the explosion, and it occurred to me she was smoking from her funnels, which sometimes happens after a depth charge has been dropped.

98. Q. Did you observe any other craft - surface or air?

A. Yes. I don't remember the time exactly, but about an hour before, I saw what looked like a corvette and it seemed to me it came across "Valleyfield's" bow, and approached us. When I first observed it it was about $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile away. It was bearing at 065. I watched it and it seemed to turn then and go down our starboard side.

99. Q. What makes you think it was a corvette?

A. It looked like a corvette - I watched it through my glasses.

100. Q. Was it showing lights?

A. No, lights.

101. Q. You didn't attempt to identify it?

A. No, sir.

102. Q. See any aircraft at all?

A. Yes, I saw one aircraft - I am not quite sure of the time - it was flying a course of 265.

103. Q. Could you identify it?

A. No, I couldn't, sir.

104. Q. You didn't see any markings?

A. No, sir. They flashed the light down on us as they went over. They went almost directly over us and then bore off slightly ahead of our beam.

105. Q. Do you know whether it was an air plane or sea plane?

A. A flying boat, sir.

106. Q. Going back to the surface craft, are you quite satisfied in your own mind that it was a craft as large as a corvette?

A. Yes, I am, sir.

107. Q. Of that construction?

A. Yes, sir.

108. Q. You feel quite confident it couldn't have been a submarine on the surface?

I am positive it wasn't, sir, from what I saw.

109. Q. There were no indications of any sail?

A. Not that I could see, sir.

110. Q. What was the visibility?

A. It was very good. I'd say about 10 miles.

111. Q. Could you see "Halifax"?

A. Yes.

112. Q. With the naked eye?

A. No.

113. Q. Could you see "Valleyfield"?

A. Not with the naked eye.

114. Q. What was the position of the moon?

A. About 115.

115. Q. What altitude?

A. I think about 25 degrees.

116. Q. When you heard this explosion, did you sweep around with the glasses?

A. No, I was looking ahead all night with my glasses, but I looked at "Valleyfield" as the explosion occurred.

117. Q. Did you notice anything but smoke?

A. Just smoke.

118. Q. What sort of glasses are you supplied with? Are they large?

A. Yes, sir.

119. Q. Who makes them?

A. I don't know.

120. Q. What lookouts did you have on the starboard side?

A. We had a starboard lookout on the bridge and we had a station on the Pom Pom platform.

121. Q. Are these equipped with binoculars?

A. Yes, sir.

122. Q. What kind?

A. The same type.

123. Q. 7 x 50?

A. I don't know, sir.

124. Q. Large or small?

A. Large. We have 2 types of binoculars - 4 large pairs and 2 small.

125. Q. Had you any information of a submarine when you took over the watch?

- A. Yes, sir, the last signal we had about that was that there was one operating within 150 miles of the Avalon peninsula.
126. Q. Did you see any signal concerning aircraft operating in the area?
- A. No, sir.
127. Q. Had you received any signals about Spanish Trawlers operating in the area?
- A. No, sir.
128. Q. When you heard the explosion did it occur to you there might be a submarine close to you?
- A. No, the explosion seemed to be very small.
129. Q. At that visibility, do you think a submarine could have passed 2000 yards, or possibly 3000 yards on the ship's side without being seen?
- A. Not very likely.
130. Q. What time were the action alarms rung?
- A. They were sounded, I am not quite sure of the time, but it was after the Captain arrived on the bridge.
131. Q. When you say you were sweeping with the SW2C, does that mean you were only operating every 10 minutes?
- A. Yes, sir.
132. Q. Did you keep the set on continuously?
- A. Yes, but we just looked every 10 minutes.
133. Q. Do you think SW2C is capable of picking up a submarine?
- A. Yes.
134. Q. Have you ever seen it do that?
- A. No, but I think it is capable of picking up a submarine on the surface.
135. Q. At what distance?
- A. 4000 yards, I would say.
136. Q. Any particular reason why you were only transmitting every 10 minutes?
- A. Yes, our Radar Set was broken down and the Captain had asked permission from the Senior Officer to use it intermittently, and we decided on an interval of 10 minutes.
137. Q. Do you know why?
- A. To prevent as much as possible from attracting submarines.
138. Q. Do you know what G.S.R. gear is?
- A. No, sir.
139. Q. Did you get a Radar report on the surface craft you saw?
- A. I don't believe I did. I don't think so.

140 Q. You say you could see "Valleyfield" at 4000 yards and you say this surface craft came within 1500 yards, so you could be quite certain if this was a corvette or not?

A. That's what it looked like to me, sir.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Richard H. Brown, Able Seaman, Official Number V-44323, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "Giffard".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

141.Q. Your name?

A. Richard H. Brown, A.B., V-44323.

142.Q. What are your duties?

A. Asdic rating, sir.

143.Q. Were you on duty on the night of 6th May, 1944?

A. Yes, sir.

144.Q. During what hours?

A. From 11 to 12.

145.Q. Were you continuously on duty during that hour?

A. Yes, sir.

146.Q. Did you obtain any asdic contacts during that time?

A. I never heard a thing until the explosion.

147.Q. Did you obtain any contacts on the ships in company?

A. I got an echo once in a while.

148.Q. Except for that you didn't?

A. No, sir.

149.Q. What was the range in the day?

A. About 2500 yards.

150.Q. What did the explosion sound like to you?

A. About the same as a depth charge to me.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Commander Charles Peterson, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve - Commanding Officer, His Majesty's Canadian Ship "GIFFARD".

RECALLED.

151.Q. In your signals you report "Valleyfield" as having been torpedoed. On what did you base that conclusion?

A. Partly, I suppose, through being submarine conscious and considering it the safe thing to do, I considered it was a torpedo; but I considered it confirmed by the survivors as I approached them in the water. I heard their voices a long way off. On a still

(ctd.)

night voices do carry a long ways on the water. I switched on the loud hailer and asked "Were you torpedoed" and they answered "Yes". I said "Which side" and they said "Port side". I later made a signal to the effect that "Edmundston" was left in charge of the party.

152. Q. You stated here you carried out a short Radar search, could you tell me what that search consisted of?

A. Yes, I steamed past the survivors first, steering approximately 240, zig-zagging, and turned to the South about 180 after about 10 minutes running. The remaining ships in the group were coming in from the North. The duration of the entire search would probably be 25 minutes, but that of course is approximate.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Maurice Faulkner Oliver, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, Commanding Officer, His Majesty's Canadian Ship "HALIFAX".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

153. Q. Your name?

A. Oliver, Maurice Faulkner - Lieutenant, RCNVR.

154. Q. Are you the Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "Halifax"?

A. Yes, sir.

155. Q. Will you tell us what you know of what occurred on the night of May 6th, 1944, in reference to the sinking of the "Valleyfield"?

A. At 2355P, the Officer of the Watch called down and asked if I would come to the bridge as he considered "Valleyfield" astern of station, and he requested he be granted permission to alter the course to the starboard in order to close "Valleyfield". I went on the bridge and at that time I received a signal by R.T. from "Giffard" ordering me to close in, which I did. At that time we were endeavouring to get contact with "Valleyfield" and the Radar operator reported "Valleyfield" had disappeared from scan. A subsequent investigation gave us an echo on the scan which we thought was "Valleyfield" but turned out to be "Giffard". I proceeded in accordance with "Giffard's" signal to close, and on closing in was ordered to carry out operation "Observant" around the wreck.

156. Q. Did you hear any explosion?

A. No, sir.

157. Q. Do you know of anybody on your ship that did?

A. Yes, the Officer of the Watch heard a faint explosion but didn't report it to me.

158. Q. About what time?

A. 2340.

159. Q. Did you pick up any Asdic contacts?

A. One, which was the contact to "Edmundston". "Edmundston" at that time was stopped.

160. Q. At what time was that approximately?
A. 0155P.
161. Q. What were the characteristics of the contact?
A. Firm contact, no doppler, no movement. Believed to be the wreck of "Valleyfield".
162. Q. Did you obtain any other contacts?
A. No, sir.
163. Q. Did you obtain any other Radar contacts other than the ships?
A. No, sir.
164. Q. What was your impression of the weather conditions?
A. Weather conditions were perfect for picking up contacts by Radar, and perfect Asdic conditions also.
165. Q. Did you observe much ice?
A. Prior to the sinking we had quite a lot of ice.
166. Q. How long prior?
A. Throughout a period of 4 hours before the sinking we had numerous echoes on icebergs by Radar.
167. Q. Was there anything to indicate to you what caused the sinking?
A. No, sir.
168. Q. Did you observe any survivors?
A. Yes, sir.
169. Q. Did you effect any rescue?
A. No, sir.
170. Q. What were the general conditions surrounding these survivors?
A. I would say they were floating in the water, all of them supported by life jackets. They were calling to us to pick them up. I saw a whaler in the water about 75 feet away, presumably from "Edmundston", going to pick up these survivors.
171. Q. Did you observe anything unusual about their equipment?
A. Yes, none of the lights on their life jackets were burning. I believe the reason of that was their hands were too cold to insert the plug.
172. Q. What type of Radar are you fitted with?
A. 271Q.
173. Q. Would you expect to pick up a trimmed down submarine, by Radar, at 6000 yards?
A. No, not trimmed down.
174. Q. Have you had any ranges with A.S.P.'s?
A. Not with our present 271Q.

175. Q. Were you able to see the next ship in the station quite easily without binoculars?
- A. Yes.
176. Q. What time did you arrive at the scene of the sinking?
- A. About 0035.
177. Q. Did you notice the bearing and altitude of the moon?
- A. No.
178. Q. It was bright moonlight?
- A. Yes.
179. Q. Did you get a V/S or Radar contact with any surface craft prior to this, other than ships in company?
- A. No, sir.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant James Edward Colby, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "HALIFAX".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

180. Q. Your name?
- A. James Edward Colby, Lieutenant RCNVR.
181. Q. Were you on watch onboard "Halifax" on the night of 6th May, 1944?
- A. Yes, sir.
182. Q. Between what hours?
- A. 2300P to 0300P on the 7th.
183. Q. Will you tell me what you know of the sinking of the "Valleyfield"?
- A. As I came on watch I found the ship a bit astern of station. "Valleyfield" was bearing 65 degrees on her starboard bow and approximately 4¹/₂ miles away; "Frontenac" was in the same bearing, approximately over 2 miles away. The original speed was 12 knots but the ships were actually making a bit more than that - about 13 knots - and as I took over, revolutions were 140 on the engines and I increased it to 160 to regain station and that was the speed that was on until the Captain came to the bridge and took over. At approximately between 35 and 40 minutes past the hour, I heard what I thought was a depth charge, very muffled, but it was difficult to tell just what it was as we were about 9600 yards away at the time.
184. Q. What direction did it come from?
- A. I couldn't fix it. It was on the starboard side.
185. Q. What do you measure 9600 yards away" from?
- A. From the last Radar bearing of the "Valleyfield". I thought it was either "Giffard" or "Valleyfield" that dropped a depth charge. I asked if there had been any R.T. traffic and there had been none at that time. The course of the convoy was

(ctd.)

ool degrees and our gyro happened to be 3 degrees high so I steered 3 more degrees on that to take up station on the "Valleyfield" and then used my station from that. When this happened I increased the closing to 20 degrees and intended to close until I could see "Valleyfield". At the time of the explosion I could see "Frontenac" through the glasses, and it was my intention to close until I could see "Valleyfield" to see what was happening. I thought that there would be an R.T. message shortly, and it was very shortly after that that the R.T. called the bridge and informed me that - I was quite busy at the time but I thought he informed me that - "Giffard" had been asking "Edmundston" if she was in Radar touch with the Senior Officer; the Second Officer of the Watch happened to be the group Radar Officer, and he said she asked if she was in Radar touch. We called the Senior Officer but got no response then, so I called the Captain to the bridge and informed him that "Giffard" had been trying to get in touch with the Senior Officer without success. The last Radar bearing I had from the Senior Officer was approximately 40 minutes past the hour and at approximately 47 minutes past the Radar Operator reported to the bridge that "Valleyfield" had gone off the scan. Very shortly after that W/T called and gave a message from "Giffard" which said "Join me immediately". The Captain was on the bridge at the time. Then following right after that came a message from "Giffard" "Valleyfield torpedoed - Am picking up survivors". After I received the first message the Captain told me to ring action stations and we closed up action stations immediately.

186. Q. Do you recollect the bearing and altitude of the moon?

A. About 177 degrees.

187. Q. Altitude?

A. I didn't check that.

188. Q. Do you know whether it was high?

A. Yes, I think it was quite high.

189. Q. The visibility?

A. The visibility I should say was very good.

190. Q. Could you see "Frontenac" clearly?

A. I wouldn't say clearly - we were slightly over 2 miles away. I had to sweep over the area a bit before I could definitely pick "Frontenac" up.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant (SB) Douglas Leighton Smith, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "HALIFAX".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

191. Q. Your name?

A. Smith - Douglas Leighton, Lieutenant (SB) RCNVR.

192. Q. Are you a Radar Specialist?

A. Yes, sir.

193. Q. Were you the group specialist for C.I Group?

- A. Yes, sir.
194. Q. Were you accommodated in "Halifax" on the night of 6th May?
- A. Yes, sir.
195. Q. Were you on the bridge?
- A. Yes, sir.
196. Q. Between what hours?
- A. 2300 until we secured action stations.
197. Q. Would you say "Halifax's" Radar was in first class condition?
- A. No, not first class.
198. Q. At what range would you expect it to pick up a trimmed down conning tower?
- A. I would suggest about 5 or 6000 yards.
199. Q. Would you say it was too much to expect at a range of 7600 yards, not searching?
- A. Yes, I think so.
200. Q. When did you last see "Valleyfield's" Radar?
- A. Just before leaving here.
201. Q. What type is it?
- A. Type R.X.C.
202. Q. Has it always worked well?
- A. It has never worked well to my knowledge.
203. Q. Do you know if it was in operation at 2340 that night?
- A. To my knowledge it was. I have no reason for believing otherwise.
204. Q. Is it greatly troubled with side echoes?
- A. Yes.
205. Q. In this formation, in line abreast, would you expect to be troubled with side echoes?
- A. Well yes, but the formation has no affect on the side echoes.
206. Q. You expect to be uniformly troubled with side echoes, irrespective of formation?
- A. Yes.
207. Q. Is it possible for an R.X.C. to be in apparently efficient operation and apparently capable of missing a target at short range?
- A. How small a target?
208. Q. Trimmed down conning tower?
- A. At what range?

209. 2500 yards.

A. I think the set would be capable of trimming down a conning tower at 2500 yards under the conditions as they were that night.

210. Q. Had you had much ice about during the early part of your watch?

A. We had no ice reported on my watch.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Gordon Patterson, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve - First Lieutenant - His Majesty's Canadian Ship "GIFFARD".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

211. Q. Your name?

A. Patterson - Gordon, Lieutenant RCNVR.

212. Q. Will you tell us what you observed in reference to the difficulties or otherwise in picking up survivors, their conditions, and so on?

A. Yes, sir, I experienced the same difficulty as probably everyone else, at a time like this. It's been written time and time again - the fuel oil in the water, the difficulty of handling the men, and the cold water making them in a condition they could hardly help themselves. The element of time, I can't say a word about. I didn't know what it was until the action bells went. It was just simply trying to get them in as quickly as we could because I realized the Captain was very concerned with the amount of time we spent stopped. With the exception of two they all had to be helped onboard, with the result that many of my men went over the side and secured lines to them. It was only a matter of minutes and they couldn't tell the survivors from our own ship's company. The amount of oil on them increased the work and made it more difficult. Then the decks became covered with oil, and then hallways, mess decks. We managed to get some sand down from the fire buckets and that helped considerably in keeping our footing on the decks. I can't tell a great deal about the starboard side, as I had my hands full getting the boat away and these 2 floats on the port side. The Coxswain needed a great deal of assistance too. There were quite a number hanging on and hooked on to the Carley floats. Many of them had lifebelts on, and many of them were apparently right out of the mess deck and in some cases completely naked. They suffered the worst, of course, they were in fairly bad shape when taken aboard. Two that I know were actually dead - corpses - when they brought them on the deck. There were at least 5 on the last float that couldn't do a thing for themselves; 2 of those, after they did arrive - proved to be dead.

213. Q. Do you know the names of the 3 who died after they were brought onboard?

A. No, sir, I couldn't tell you that.

214. Q. Did you notice any of these life saving lights on the survivors?

A. That was one point that made me go to the bridge on action being rung and not the Quarter Deck which was my station. I jumped out of my bunk and I came on deck and I saw these lights in the water; I realized there was an attack being carried out so instead of going to the Quarter Deck I went up to the bridge. The Captain was there and informed me then he suspected "Valley-

(ctd.)
field" had been torpedoed.

215. Q. Did many of the men have their own personal life lights - these battery things?
- A. Yes, some did. I noticed several had them clipped on their shoulders like in the merchant service.
216. Q. The type supplied is on the hat, isn't it?
- A. I didn't recall any being brought in wearing hats.
217. Q. Did you notice the explosion of "Edmundston's" hedge hog projectiles?
- A. Yes, sir.
218. Q. You wouldn't say it troubled anybody?
- A. No, sir.
219. Q. Was anybody saved with a dip net?
- A. Yes, sir, that was one of the first things I did when the order was given to pick up survivors. I detailed a Leading hand and a number of other hands to use it. Evidently three men took hold of it the same time and they couldn't get them aboard. I wasn't present at the time, I had gone forward to get the boat away - the Coxswain was left in charge.
220. Q. You have only one boat?
- A. Yes, sir.
221. Q. It is a dinghy?
- A. Yes, sir.
222. Q. You left it behind?
- A. Yes, sir.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Ralph Johnston Flitton, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "Giffard".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

223. Q. Your name?
- A. Ralph Johnston Flitton, Lieut. RCNVR.
224. Q. Will you tell what you know of what occurred after action stations were sounded?
- A. I went to my position - the A/S Hut on the bridge. I didn't know the story - I went straight to my station. I don't know how long it was before I stuck my head in the Asdic Hut to see a couple of lights which appeared like calcium flares but proved to be the lights fitted with these R.C.N. life jackets. I asked the Captain if I would be required further in the Hut or should I go below and help the men on deck, and he said to carry on. I went down to the boat deck to the First Lieutenant and the Coxswain. The First Lieutenant said "get the boat ready" and he

(ctd.)

went up top. When it was ready, Mr. Patterson gave the order (there were 4 men and myself) to slip from the bridge. We rowed towards a carley float with some men on it. From this float we picked up three men and then we picked up another 2 men from a mass of debris, then 1 man from more debris, and we pulled back to the ship to get them onboard. We came alongside the starboard side and the men on the starboard side began to throw my boat's crew lines which they made fast to the men in the boat. One of my boat's crew and myself in the stern were tying lines which they had been throwing from the ship around some men on a carley float between us and the ship's side. The man that was with me went on the float and passed the last man off the float into my boat and from there onboard. When my boat was empty we drifted astern and picked up one man under the counter clinging to hammocks that were all tied into a float. We went further astern to investigate another float and debris but could find nothing. Then I came onboard "Giffard" and made the boat fast and then I believe "Giffard" went ahead to go alongside another carley float.

225 Q. What did you observe of the conditions of the survivors and their life saving equipment?

A. Their condition was quite good - they were speaking intelligibly. Three were useless and couldn't help themselves at all. Two could manage to keep out of our way when rowing. One man in the bow thought he was still on the raft and started to scream. Outside of that everything was alright. The last man picked up was very cold and stiff but outside of that was alright. They seemed to be in all stages of dress - one fellow had nothing but shorts and singlet and lifejacket on - two had what are called zoot-suits - and another had just dungarees and a life-jacket. Everything was absolutely covered with oil.

226 Q. Did you pick up any survivors without life-jackets?

A. No, I didn't. We had quite a bit of difficulty in getting them aboard because of the difficulty in handling and grasping them. They couldn't help themselves and their clothing was hard to grasp.

227 Q. Were their life jackets all buttoned up?

A. I couldn't say. I know they had difficulty getting them out of the boat into the ship. Whether that was the reason or not I don't know. Some of them didn't I know, because I noticed when we were taking them from the floats that it would have been a lot easier if they had had them fastened. Two didn't have them fastened and we had to put a noose around their shoulders.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Howard Norman Bailey, Leading Sick Berth Attendant, Official Number V-2934 of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "Giffard".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

228 Q. Your name?

A. Howard Norman Bailey, L/S.B.A., V2934.

229 Q. What was the first you knew of the sinking of the "Valleyfield"?

A. When the action stations rung I dressed and went to Sick Bay to my action station. I stayed there until somebody told me to stand by as they were picking up survivors. I went to the

(ctd.)

bridge to get permission from the Captain to get my morphine. I went back to Sick Bay and got the hot water bottles out and my emergency supplies and my splints and tourniquets etc. It wasn't long after that the first number came aboard. I went to the forward mess deck and collected blankets and hammocks to provide some accommodation for these first survivors - I think it was 3 or 4 that were landed from the starboard flank. All these lads were walking, but in a dazed condition and suffering from nothing more than exposure and a slight case of shock. I just carried on from there the rest of the time, with medical treatment, etc.

230.Q. Can you tell the Board the names of any of those brought onboard alive that died later?

A. No, sir.

231.Q. Do you know anybody who does?

A. No, sir.

232.Q. Have you any suggestions for better handling of such cases - any equipment that might be of value?

A. All I can say is that after we brought survivors onboard the transporting of them was very difficult because of the oil on the deck, and I found the Neil Robertson stretchers very useful.

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant (N) Jack Hamilton Warren, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED

233.Q. Your name?

A. Jack Hamilton Warren, Lieutenant (N) RCNVR.

234.Q. I have a statement here which I understand is your report of the sinking of the "Valleyfield" on May 6th, 1944. Do you identify it as your statement?

A. I identify that as my statement.

235.Q. Have you anything to add to it?

A. Only the names of the S.T.'s who rendered the depth charges safe and lost their own lives in doing so.

236.Q. What are the names?

A. Acting Leading Seaman David Henry Brown, L.T.O., Official Number V-19206; Ordinary Seaman David Edgar Brown, S.T., Official Number V51452; Able Seaman Mervyn E. Woods, S.T., V50650.

237.Q. Anything else you wish to add to this statement?

A. I would like to point out the good work done by the men. In particular - Ordinary Seaman D.H. Goodwin, V65029 who got S.A. Burton, V36182 out of the water by taking him on his back. Also Yeoman of Signals Kaplin, whose cheerfulness in the water and his interrogation of the survivors onboard.

238.Q. Where were you at the time?

A. I was on the bridge. I was in the Chart Room at first, but 5 seconds after the explosion I was on the bridge. The ship had already broken then.

Q. (Next page)

239. Q. Did you have any indications or evidence of a submarine being in the vicinity?

A. The H/F D/F report that was all. We had the disposition of the submarine for several days and were aware a submarine was in the vicinity of the Avalon peninsula.

240. Q. Did you get any impression of whether a torpedo had struck underneath the ship or otherwise?

A. Yes, because I was thrown about one foot off the deck on a vertical line, so I imagine she struck below the water line.

241. Q. Would you say that an R.X.C. set was capable of missing a stopped, trimmed down conning tower at 2000 yards?

A. Very definitely yes - my last experience with this off Bermuda has proven it.

(Paragraph 5 of Commanding Officer "Giffard's" Report of Proceedings signed by Lieutenant Warren in confirmation, except as otherwise indicated in evidence).

- WITNESS WITHDREW -

WITNESS - Lieutenant Charles Ian Passman Tate, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "Valleyfield".

CALLED AND CAUTIONED.

242. Q. Were were you at the time of the explosion?

A. On the bridge. I was Officer of the Watch.

243. Q. Do you confirm this statement?

(Report of sinking of HMCS "Valleyfield" by Lt. J.H. Warren, RCNVR and Lt. C.I.P. Tate, RCNVR - passed to Lieut. Tate for perusal).

A. Yes, sir.

244. Q. Is there anything you wish to add to it?

A. No, sir.

245. Q. In your statement you refer to a fast ticking effect you had about 2340. Can you give more information on that?

A. I happened to be looking at the Captain's bearing on the bridge just to check the Operator's sweep. I noticed he was playing around about Red 60, with fast H.E. I heard this ticking sound over the loud speaker which was turned on and I immediately asked the Operator what it was, and immediately told him to investigate from 250 to 290 degrees. He started to investigate and about 2 seconds later the torpedo struck.

246. Q. Have you ever heard such an effect before?

A. No, sir. That's why I thought it might possibly have been fish; then I thought it might also be a submarine electric motor because it sounded like something at a distance.

247. Q. Had you observed any other surface craft besides ships in company, during your watch?

No, sir. A point just occurred to me - In Commanding Officer "Giffard's" report, they say they saw a small craft pass down close by "Valleyfield" about 2100 which was just about the time I came on watch, and I believe in that report she had her running lights on. As I recall, it was too light for running lights then, and I certainly did not see it. It was not reported to me when I took over the watch.

248. Q. You did not see any vessel or small craft?

A. No, sir.

249. Q. Did you have any ice in your watch?

A. For about the last 2 hours we sighted several icebergs and a few growlers.

250. Q. Did you see any ice just prior to 2340?

A. Well I can't remember exactly. There were several icebergs reported various times.

251. Q. Do you recollect what the bearing of the moon was?

A. I think it was roughly about S.S.E.

252. Q. Remember the altitude?

A. Roughly 45 degrees.

253. Q. Was there a column of water thrown up by the explosion?

A. Yes, I saw that, it must have been when I was in the water. I think it was when I was on the raft - I saw this column of steam and smoke and all that sort of thing go up, in a straight column up.

254. Q. Were you absolutely sure you were hit on the Port Side?

A. Well, no, except for the fact we got the H.E. on the Port Side, and it seemed to me the explosion was on the Port Side, but I couldn't be sure.

255. Q. Could it have been underneath the ship?

A. I don't think so, sir, I thought it was ~~under~~ a little way below the water line, but that was a very fleeting impression.

256. Q. Were Asdic conditions good?

A. Excellent.

257. Q. Was the Radar working well?

A. Not on 2 particular bearings early in the watch. One was out 30 degrees and the other out 25 degrees. I could see by checking on the beam ~~of the~~ corvettes.

258. Q. Would you say from your experience of R.X.C. that it was possible to miss a stopped, trimmed down conning tower at 2000 yards?

A. I'd say yes.

259. Q. How many lookouts did you have on the Port Side?

A. Just one.

260. Q. Did he have binoculars?

- Yes, sir.
261. Q. What kind?
- A. 7 x 50.
262. Q. Was the visibility good?
- A. Excellent.
263. Q. Could you see the nearest escort clearly without binoculars?
- A. Yes, sir.
264. Q. This aircraft that flew over - can you tell me anything about that?
- A. It flew from starboard to port, across our stern, at approximately one mile. I could just pick it up without my binoculars.
265. Q. Could you identify it?
- A. No, sir.
266. Q. Did it make a recognition signal?
- A. No, sir, not to us.
267. Q. Do you know if it did to anybody?
- A. No, sir.
268. Q. Did you attempt to challenge it?
- A. No, sir.
269. Q. Did he illuminate any of the group?
- A. I didn't see him do so. Apparently he did, but it was not reported to me.
270. Q. Did you have any information from the Command about the presence of a leigh light aircraft in the area?
- A. No, the first I knew of it was when it was reported by one of the escort groups.
271. Q. Would you have been in a position to know definitely whether this signal had been received?
- A. Yes, sir.
272. Q. As far as you know, no such signal was received?
- A. That's correct, sir.

(Paragraph 5 of the Commanding Officer,
HMCS "Giffard's" Report of Proceedings
signed by Lieutenant Tate in confirm-
ation, except as otherwise indicated
in evidence.)

DUPLICATE

SECRET

Subject

TORPEDOING OF H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD

From CAPTAIN (D), NEWFOUNDLAND.

Date MAY 21 1944

No. 301-368

To FLAG OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND FORCE.

Submitted:

Consideration has been given to the minutes of a Board of Enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the torpedoing of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD and to the Reports of Proceedings from H.M.C. Ships EDMUNDSTON, GIFFARD, NEW GLASGOW and TIMMINS. The latter reports are very incomplete in some respects and all except that of TIMMINS (which is irrelevant) lack Track Charts and navigational data. It is understood that EDMUNDSTON has forwarded a plot and Recorder Trace to the Flag Officer Newfoundland Force but that they have not yet been received. Consideration has been given to information from Staff Officers trained in A/S, RADAR, Tactics and to the observations of the Commanding Officer, H.N.M. Submarine O.21.

2-. The following is a summary of the conditions obtaining immediately before VALLEYFIELD was torpedoed at about 2340P on 6th May, 1944, in position approximately 40° 03'N. 52° 24'W:

- (a) Ships were in line abreast at intervals of four thousand yards in the order (from port to star-board) HALIFAX, FRONTENAC, VALLEYFIELD, GIFFARD and EDMUNDSTON. In this connection it is observed that HALIFAX was at a distance of nine thousand six hundred yards from VALLEYFIELD on a bearing of 261° coming up to regain her proper station. The course of the Group was 001°, speed thirteen knots. No zig-zag was in progress.
- (b) RADAR Ranges (picking up range) of a trimmed down conning tower moving slowly were as follows:

HALIFAX	6,000 yards
FRONTENAC	Nil
VALLEYFIELD (Type RXC)	?
GIFFARD	6,000 yards
EDMUNDSTON	6,000 yards

Note.- FRONTENAC was intermittently transmitting on Type SW2C which can be detected by GSR.

- (c) Prior to 2340P numerous pieces of ice of varying sizes had been encountered.
- (d) The bearing of the moon was 176°, altitude 40° and objects were clearly visible with binoculars at four thousand yards.

3-. VALLEYFIELD was torpedoed on the port side subsequently splitting into separate halves which sunk within an interval of three minutes.

4-. It is considered that the attack could have been carried out in one of the following ways:

- (a) The submarine fired from a position about eighteen hundred yards bearing 290-300° from VALLEYFIELD after having observed the approach of the Group and remained trimmed down on the surface, taking advantage of the presence of ice in that vicinity. It was not detected by RADAR as it was beyond the ranges noted above. No subsequent detection of the submarine was possible by the immediate search which followed.
- (b) The submarine was in the position given in (a) above but, having observed the approach of the Group whilst surfaced, submerged and whilst stopped ascertained the course and speed of the Group by accurate hydrophone bearings. A periscope sighting shot was made possible by the light of the moon.

5-. ESCAPE.- Escape in both cases was made to the rear moving at slow speed on the surface until clear. The ticking noises heard by the Officer of the Watch of VALLEYFIELD were the electric motors as the submarine manoeuvred to escape after firing. The submarine was capably handled by an experienced Commanding Officer who most probably realised that the hunting vessels could not overtake. The lack of a plot from GIFFARD gives reason to doubt the efficacy of her short search to detect the submarine in case (a) or (b), the RADAR scan probably being saturated with echoes from wreck, rafts, other vessels, etc. It is noted that even GIFFARD would not have reached the scene before 0001P and that the other ships had not turned before this time. Lack of a plot or trace from EDMUNDSTON gives rise to doubt as to the result of her first Hedge Hog attack, bearing in mind the time, 0108P and the fact that the wreck was in two portions. Naval Service Headquarters' signal timed 091645Z giving H/F D/F German, Naval inigma, 117 Group bears out the evidence that escape was made good.

6-. CONCLUSION.-

- (a) It is obvious from the available evidence that there must have been some relaxation of vigilance in a group detached and homeward bound. This appears to have affected watchkeeping standards in C. 1 Group.
- (b) In spite of the presence of numerous icebergs, the fact that the group had known of the presence of the submarine should have resulted in the zig-zag being maintained.
- (c) The position of GIFFARD was an unenviable one and it is felt that most Commanding Officers would have stopped at considerable risk to themselves to pick up survivors, who could not be expected to survive much longer in water of

6-. (c) (cont'd.)


this temperature. From all available evidence it appears that GIFFARD was the only ship in a position to prevent the escape of the submarine.

7-. The findings of the Board are concurred in generally with the following observations:

- (i) The finding that relatively few, if any, survivors could have been picked up had primers not been withdrawn is not concurred in. VALLEYFIELD had been issued with Mark VII^{XX} and Mark IX^{XX} pistols and these were originally set to safe. Only in the event of defective workmanship is there any risk of these pistols firing when set to safe and then only in depths greater than three hundred feet. The gallant men who withdrew primers were probably unaware of the depth of water and therefore the foregoing is not thought to detract one iota from their heroism.
- (ii) It is felt that FRONTENAC with defective RADAR should have been stationed at Asdic sweeping distance from VALLEYFIELD and HALIFAX closed in to RADAR sweeping distance from VALLEYFIELD.

8-. The Board was not required to investigate the conduct of the hunt which followed, but it is thought that the loss of the Senior Officer of a Group will inevitably produce a certain degree of confusion. On this occasion much valuable time was lost before the situation was appreciated. The withdrawal of FRONTENAC (Answer to Question 29) for half an hour was an extremely grave error of judgment.

9-. The answer to Question 137 is not understood, an escort group unhampered by a convoy should use every endeavour to attract, seek out and destroy U-boats.




(J.M. Rowland),
A/CAPTAIN, R.C.N.

....II

12th May, 1944.

Sir,

We have the honour to report that in accordance with your instructions, we have held a full and careful investigation into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" and the death and injuries of certain Officers and ratings onboard the said ship at the time.

It is the opinion of the Board that H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" sank as a result of an explosion at about 2345P on 6th May, 1944, in latitude approximately 46° 03' N., 52° 24' W.

It is further the opinion of the Board that this explosion was the result of a torpedo fired from an enemy submarine, down moon, on the port bow of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield".

It is observed that as a result of the explosion H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" immediately broke in two, and it is considered this indicates either -

(a) heavier than normal war head,

or

(b) the use of a magnetic pistol.

It is considered that this submarine at the moment of attack was trimmed down and stopped, and escaped detection due to the following reasons:

- (a) A very experienced Captain took advantage of the situation offered by the presence of numerous bergs, growlers, and smaller pieces of ice.
- (b) It is observed that the Radar Set in H.M.C.S. "Frontenac", in position 4000 yards on the port beam of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield", and slightly astern of station, was inoperative. Intermittent transmitting watch was, however, being kept on set SW2C, which offered little possibility of submarine detection.
- (c) It is observed that in evidence submitted by surviving Officers of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" that this vessel was fitted with Radar, type R.X.C., and this set is notoriously unreliable in submarine detection.
- (d) At 2030P zig-zag was negatived and H.M.C.S. "Frontenac" and H.M.C.S. "Halifax" were astern of station and outside distance at the time of explosion. In this respect it is observed that only the general position of a submarine in the area was known to C.I.

It is considered that the majority of the deaths occurred at the time of the explosion, relatively few of the personnel having escaped from the ship before she sank.


It is believed the majority of those who did escape owe their lives to -

- (a) the self-sacrificing efforts of- A/Ldg. Smn. Donald Henry Brown, L.T.O., V-19206; Ord. Smn. David Edgar Brown, S.T., V51452; A.B. Iervyn E. Woods, S.T., V50658. - by their action in


(Statements of the Commanding Officer, Officer of the Watch, and First Lieutenant of His Majesty's Canadian Ship "EDMUNDSTON" were submitted by Lieutenant Commander F.O. Gerity, R.C.N.R., who stated they had been made and witnessed in his presence.)



.....
(Francis O. Gerity),
Lieutenant Commander,
Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.



.....
(William G. Ross),
Lieutenant Commander (g),
Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve.



.....
(Somerville W. Davis),
Acting Captain,
Royal Canadian Navy.
PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD.

rendering depth charges as safe and withdrawing the primers, at the cost of their own lives. Without this action relatively few, if any, survivors could have been picked up.

- (b) The prompt action and complete disregard of their own safety exhibited by the Commanding Officer and ship's company of H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD".

The five deceased men, appended in list A of Flag Officer Newfoundland's 080134Z, died as a result of exposure in the water of temperature approximately 32 degrees F. between the hours 0010P and 0200P of 7th May, 1944.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Board are in unanimous agreement on the following recommendations:-

- (a) The commendation of individuals given in the Report of Proceedings by Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. "Giffard" are concurred in, and it is further noted that the actions of the ratings named in evidence given by Lieutenant J.H. Warren, R.C.N.V.R. of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield", are most highly commendable and considered to be worthy of posthumous recognition.
- (b) That the life saving appliances fitted and issued in H.M.C. Ships warrants further consideration.

It is noted that the vessel mentioned in paragraph 2 of H.M.C.S. "Giffard's" report appears to have been H.M.C.S. "Timmins" or "Agassiz" as given in the report of surviving Officers of H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield".

The report of the illumination of the "Valleyfield" by Leigh light aircraft, given in paragraph 3 of "Giffard's" report is not confirmed by the Officer of the Watch of "Valleyfield" who is a survivor.

The information given in NSHQ's signal 091645Z/5/44 is considered to confirm the opinion of the Board that H.M.C.S. "Valleyfield" was torpedoed.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servants,

Francis O. Gerity
.....
(Francis O. Gerity),
Lieutenant Commander,
Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.

W.G. Ross
.....
(William G. Ross),
Lieutenant Commander (g),
Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve

S.W. Davis
.....
(S.W. Davis),
Acting Captain,
Royal Canadian Navy
PRESIDENT THE BOARD

Subject

REFERENCE TORPEDOING AND SINKING OF H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD AND
RECOVERY OF SURVIVORS

From COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.C.S. GIFFARD.

Date 8th May, 1944.

No.

To CAPTAIN (D), NEWFOUNDLAND.

44°13'N *JP*

JP At 1430P, 6th May, 1944 in latitude ~~46°03'N~~ longitude 52° 26'W. C. 1 Group was relieved by W4 Group, detached from Convoy ONM 234, set course for St. John's, Newfoundland Course 001° speed 13 knots using zig-zag number 10 and ships disposed in single line abreast to starboard in sequence of HALIFAX, FRONTENAC, VALLEYFIELD, GIFFARD, EDMUNDSTON distance apart of ships 4,000 yards. Senior Officer (Commander) J. Byron, D.S.C., R.N.R. in VALLEYFIELD (A/Lieutenant-Commander D.T. English, R.C.N.R.). H.M.C.S. FREDERICTON the remaining member of the Group was absent having been detailed to escort independently a merchant ship from Convoy ONM 234 proceeding to St. John's with engine trouble. Weather strong N.E. wind and rather rough sea, visibility good. Numerous icebergs were met of all sizes. From about 1700P until 1900P various evolutions were carried out, (depth charge patterns fired, starshell rocket flares, etc).

2-. At 2030P zig-zag number 10 was negatived in accordance with C. 1 Group 062011. The weather steadily moderated and from 2200P onwards we were proceeding in a moderate ground swell and almost no wind. H.M.C.S. FRONTENAC's RADAR type 271Q had been out of action since 2138P and she was left with a RADAR type SWIC with effective range up to 2½ miles. ALL RADARS were busily employed with innumerable echoes at varying ranges, the vast majority of which turred out to be icebergs. At 2110P a small surface craft showing bow lights was observed to pass through our formation close to VALLEYFIELD.

3-. At 2250P an aircraft was detected by RADAR bearing 090° 20 miles closing rapidly. The aircraft was reported, (GIFFARD's 2255P to C.1). The aircraft flew low over GIFFARD, was sighted consider Canso and illuminated VALLEYFIELD with searchlight.

4-. At 2340 the Commanding Officer, GIFFARD while in his cabin, heard an explosion not at all consistent the usual torpedo explosion, being much sharper with a definite crack to it. Other Officers and men also heard this explosion and similarly described it. He immediately called the bridge. The Navigating Officer, Lieutenant W.W. Maccoll, R.C.N.R. was in charge of the bridge with the Coxswain, Chief Petty Officer Armitage, R.C.N., acting as second Officer of the watch. Both Navigator and Coxswain were at that moment looking at the blurred outline of VALLEYFIELD through binoculars and observed a column of what is now considered water or spray, rising above VALLEYFIELD amidships to about twice the height of her bridge. This was reported to the Commanding Officer, GIFFARD and he immediately gave instructions to attempt contact VALLEYFIELD by V/S & R/T. Meantime VALLEYFIELD was observed to fall astern and this was confirmed by RADAR bearings; black smoke which did not persist was also observed to pour from VALLEYFIELD's funnel.

Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 read and 2--

confirmed

C.P.O. John Armitage

3260

Maccoll & Armitage

MacColl. Lt. acva.

At 2343P (3 minutes later) course was altered towards VALLEYFIELD. At 2345 RADAR reported echo growing fainter and calcium flare was observed in the water, which was at first thought to be VALLEYFIELD answering GIFFARD's V/S signal. GIFFARD steamed towards flare, still trying to raise VALLEYFIELD by V/S & R/T, but this was abandoned at 2354P. An R/T signal was received from H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON who had heard GIFFARD attempting to raise VALLEYFIELD asking "are you in RADAR contact with VALLEYFIELD". GIFFARD's reply was a signal to all ships (0001P) "close me". Followed 0008P by "VALLEYFIELD torpedoed". At this time EDMUNDSTON was the nearest escort and his range and bearing were passed to him --- 340° 7 miles (GIFFARD's 0013P refers). GIFFARD's 070315Z Priority Emergency was then made to St. John's Naval W/T Station, this being the nearest operational authority ("VALLEYFIELD torpedoed and sunk 046° 03 minutes north and 052° 24 minutes west").

sw late
front, acva

5-. The Commanding Officer, GIFFARD considers that an immediate reconstruction of the tragedy is very necessary, and here it is based on first hand information from survivors which included VALLEYFIELD's A/S Control Officer, Lieutenant C.I. R. Tait, R.C.N.V.R. who was on the bridge, the Navigating Officer Lieutenant J.H. Warren, R.C.N.V.R., who was in the Chart Room and various key ratings who were on watch, but whose names are not readily available as all survivors are in hospital and should not at this moment be harassed by further questioning. It was a clear bright moonlight night, the moon bore 180° which means exactly astern and was almost full. Due to the close proximity of icebergs of all sizes all lookouts were right on their toes. In VALLEYFIELD the A/S Control Officer noticed the oscillator pointer of the Captain's bearing indicator suddenly steady on a relative bearing red 65 (296 (T)), and heard a ticking noise similar to an echo sounder but faster. He asked the Asdic Operator what he had and even as the Operator replied, the Torpedo struck the port side amidships. The Operator on H/F D/F Watch picked up the tail end of a signal off frequency, tuned it in, and was torn from his set by the explosion even as he attempted to report it. VALLEYFIELD broke in half immediately, the bow and bridge settling rapidly and disappearing altogether in two minutes. By some miracle a few men escaped from the forward messdecks. To those who remain^{ed} including our very fine Senior Officer, whom we affectionately called "a brain" the end must have been mercifully swift, those men on watch in the boiler rooms would have died on the instant and never known anything; similarly all those immediately over and next to the explosion would have been instantly killed. Among these was Surgeon Lieutenant C.E. Irvine, R.C.N.V.R., who had nursed the Commanding Officer, GIFFARD through an illness all the way across the North Atlantic and been transferred from GIFFARD to VALLEYFIELD 53 hours previously. The Commanding Officer, GIFFARD having then been permitted to get out of bed for the first time. "The doc" had transferred to attend an urgent case in VALLEYFIELD and this very fine Officer conscientious to a degree, had decided to sleep in the Sick Bay with his patient. He died therefore in a manner which does credit to the highest traditions of his profession.

MacColl. Lt. acva.

The stern of the ship floated but was practically a wash for two or three minutes more then disappeared. No depth charges exploded two S.T.'s having rendered all charges safe; this is considered to be a splendid show, particularly since by doing so they were unable to get clear and so by giving up their own lives they preserved the lives of their brothers-in-arms floating in the water. It must be remembered that the depth of

the water was 45 fathoms and depth charges exploding in this shallow water would have wrought havoc: perhaps even to those intent upon their rescue. The names of these two S.T.s will I hope be available later from survivors now in hospital. In the passing of our Senior Officer the North Atlantic lost a fine escort Commander and we, who knew him, lost a friend.

6-. It so happened that GIFFARD was first on the spot and since circumstances had combined to place her first in possession of the complete picture, while the other vessels were returning at top speed, GIFFARD assumed command.

GIFFARD first steamed past the survivors, having streamed "CATS" previously and carried out a short Asdic and RADAR search in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the enemy, meanwhile detailing by signal the other ships of the Group to positions from which to carry out "observant". A more extensive search could only have been made by GIFFARD at the expense of valuable lives in the water, the temperature of which was 32° f. and it was crystal clear that any rescue work undertaken would have to be done immediately and the consequent stopping of engines with attendant risk of destruction by torpedo accepted. ✓

GIFFARD informed all ships of her intentions to pick up all survivors and the following precautions were taken. EDMUNDSTON who also wished to pick up survivors was requested to lower his seaboot only, instructing it to bring any survivors found to GIFFARD (all relevant signals are attached). This he did and then all ships except GIFFARD proceeded to hunt. GIFFARD then double-banked all lookouts and kept either her bow or her stern pointed towards the moon throughout so that her silhouette would be a small target as possible. A/S and RADAR carried out All-round sweeps. Float after float was closed, the first survivors being picked up at 0010P. 7th May.

The work of rescue was made immeasurably difficult by the great quantities of oil which surrounded and covered the entire scene; even the first survivors picked up were practically incapable of helping themselves since they were incapable of obtaining firm holds anywhere and the later survivors were in a state which practically amounted to paralysis. The answer was obvious and GIFFARD's men needed neither instruction nor explanation; over the side they went on to floats and rafts working sometimes, partly immersed themselves until the survivors were in almost the same state as the survivors and had to be hauled aboard numb and as heavily coated with fuel oil as any other, it being almost impossible to distinguish survivors from rescuers in appearance. GIFFARD's decks, alleyways and messdecks soon became a mass of fuel oil and hands were detailed to spread sand. Throughout the entire proceedings all engaged on rescue work displayed a splendid spirit and the survivors themselves (those of them who could speak) proved by their questions and comments that any thought of self was furthest from their minds. The most oft repeated remark was "where is the Captain?" or "have you got the Captain yet?". There was scarcely a man picked up who did not ask this. It would appear that Lieutenant Commander D.T. English, R.C.N.R. had been seen clinging to a float but it is clear that he was in poor shape when last seen and undoubtedly succumbed in the water. No finer tribute than that contained in the remarks of his own men could be or has been paid to any Captain of one of His Majesty's Ships. At such a time when all present proved themselves worthy of wearing His Majesty's uniform it is difficult in the extreme to observe individual acts of distinction since everyone was willing and eager; yet there are some instances which must not be allowed to pass without comment. GIFFARD's Officers displayed both energy and initiative taking charge of various parties of men. One Officer, Lieutenant R.J. Flitton, R.C.N.V.R. taking away the dinghy and recovering no less than eight

survivors returning alongside only when exhausted covered with oil and almost unable to hold on to the oars. One of the boat's crew Stoker First Class R. Coleman, R.C.N.V.R. ^{O.N. V18723} doing ~~trojan~~ work and by his untiring efforts in the boat and afterwards onboard contributed in no small measure to the success of the boat's venture and also setting throughout an inspiring example of cheerfulness and tenacity which his shipmates were not slow to remark on.

The Leading Sick Berth Attendant, H. Bailey, O.N. V2939 R.C.N.V.R. particularly distinguished himself, this being his first voyage at sea. His untiring efforts throughout the night resulted in no survivors being placed on the dangerously ill list on admittance to hospital. Practically every survivor was a stretcher case and two were found to be dead as they were lifted aboard, three others passing away within a few minutes of their being rescued; these were amongst the last to be picked up. This rating is highly recommended.

Chief Petty Officer J. Armitage, O.N. V3260, R.C.N. proved the pillar of strength to the First Lieutenant throughout, taking over job after job, handling all efficiently and setting a splendid example to the men. His initiative and leadership during the operation and throughout the ensuing night have commanded the admiration of all onboard. The First Lieutenant, Lieutenant G.H. Patterson, R.C.N.V.R. was never at a loss and in multiplicity of jobs which followed almost disproved the old saying that a man cannot be in two places at once.

Able Seaman G. MacDonald, O.N. V32867, R.C.N.V.R. and Leading Air Fitter E. Grimstead, O.N. F/X 99990, R.N.V.R., the latter borne for passage were amongst those who went over the side without a second's hesitation and set a magnificent example which others were not slow to follow. These signs of leadership are most strongly recommended by the Commanding Officer.

One other rating who was a survivor deserves special mention. He is Able Seaman J. BAULNE, O.N. V6893, R.C.N.V.R. and was observed alongside with about seven other survivors. He remained in the water disregarding all offers to bring him onboard until he was certain all his shipmates had been saved and there were no other survivors in or near the float. Such an act calls for endurance and pluck of no mean order. Indeed throughout the whole period of rescue such remarks as this were often heard, "never mind me just now, grab so and so" and "I'm alright for a while get so and so".

7-. At 0200P, 7th May GIFFARD's search for survivors was complete and it is considered that there were no others in the water. However GIFFARD's dinghy was cast adrift at the datum point, it being considered that there might conceivably be some one who might make such shelter as it provided. The possibility is most remote.

GIFFARD then made a signal instructing the remaining ships continue to search for the enemy while GIFFARD proceeded to St. John's, Newfoundland with all possible dispatch. Since some of the survivors were in poor shape, Chief E.R.A. W. Bond, O.N. V12077, R.C.N.V.R. was requested to do his best with the engines. A considerable number of defects made high speed a cause for anxiety but the Engine Room staff produced no less than 184 revolutions until our arrival off St. John's. Engine Room personnel, though mostly out of sight and doing a job which is often unspectacular are the very back-bone of any ships efficiency and nothing gave the Commanding Officer greater confidence than the knowledge that all would be well below.

His. Nelson *Atty. 2-1-72*
Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. GIFFARD.

TOP SECRET

COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES

To: All Ships

From:

C 1

Join me in position 'S'

<u>System</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
2410	1708Z	E.C.	6-5-44

To: All Euclids

From:

Euclid

Go

<u>System</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
2410 Kc/s	1711Z	E.C.	6-5-44

To: General

From: C 1

Take up organization number two four
in single line abreast to starboard in
sequence of Halifax Frontenac Valleyfield
Giffard Edmunston Course 001 distance
apart of ships two miles speed 12 knots

<u>System</u>	<u>Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
Lite	P/L	1739Z	Hotston Gingell Bonnell	6-5-44

To: General

From: C 1

Commence Zigzag diagram number ten at 1530

1451P

<u>System</u>	<u>Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Despatch</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
Lite	P/L	1755Z 1756Z		Hotston Gingell Bonnell	6-5-44

To: General

From: C1

Anyone who cannot keep up hold up your hand

1608P

<u>System</u>	<u>Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Despatch</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
Light	P/L	1912Z	1914Z	Gingell	6-5-44

Copy of Naval Messages

To: General

From: C1

In the hours of the T.B.S. the Commodore asked me to thank you all for looking after his convoy so nicely. I replied with a few well chosen words and said I wished all our convoys were as easy to shepherd for which I thank you all again.

1705

System	Code or Cypher or P/L	TOR	TOD	Operator	Date
Light	P/L	2105Z	2110Z	Campbell Gingell Bonnell	6-5-44

To: C1 Your 1705Z is much appreciated

From: Giffard

2225Z

Light	P/L	1926	Bonnell	6-5-44
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To: General

From: C1

Cease zigzag at 2030 and resume mean course

2011

Light	P/L	2318Z	Gingell	6-5-44
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To: C1

From: Edmundston

Surface craft detected by radar bearing 030° 3 miles.

2330Z

R/T	CEC	2331Z		6-5-44
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To: C1

From: Edmundston

My 2330Z Friendly

105	P/L	2339	L.H.	6-5-44
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To: Giffard (R) Edmundston

From: C1

Your 19570 If you lose visual touch with Edmundston ask for bearing and distance as necessary

2021

(Radar broke down)

Light	P/L	2355Z	Hotston	6-5-44
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To: Giffard

From: C1

Fire a 10 charge pattern with cruising watch. Go.

TOR 2106

R/T	P/L	2106Z		6-5-44
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TOP SECRET

Copy of Naval Messages

To: Cl

From: Giffard

Depth Charges have knocked out my Radar am attempting repairs No luck yet.

1957P

System	P/L Code or Cypher	TOR	TOD	Operator	Date
Light	P/L		2300Z	Bonnell	6-5-44

To: Giffard

From: Edmundston

S.O. bears from me 268° 7,200 yards

Light	P/L	0600Z	Hotston	6-5-44
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To: Cl (R) Edmundston

From: Giffard

Radar fit for service.

2105P

Light	P/L	0005Z	Hotston	6-5-44
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To: Cl

From: Giffard

Please check Radar range with me.

Reply 4,800 yards

Light	P/L	0610Z	Hotston	6-5-44
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To: Cl

From: Frontenac

Radar type 271 out of action

R/T	CEC	0028	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	------	------	--------

To: Cl

From: Giffard

Surface craft detected by Radar bearing 040-21,000 yards.

0050Z

Light	P/L	0052Z	Hotston	6-5-44
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To: All Ships

From: Cl

Iceberg bearing 340 degrees distance 3 miles.

0100

R/T	CEC	L.H.	7-5-44
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TOP SECRET

Copy of Naval Messages

To: All Ships

From: C1

Iceberg bearing 055 degrees distance 5 miles.

<u>System P/L Code or Cypher</u>	<u>TOR</u>	<u>TOD</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
2410	CEC	0133Z	L.H.	7-5-44

To: C1

From: Giffard

Iceberg 025-5 miles.

0126Z

105	CEC	0134	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	------	------	--------

To: C1

From: Giffard

Unidentified Aircraft detected by Radar bearing 090 degrees
12 miles

0155Z

R/T	CEC	0157	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	------	------	--------

To: Valleyfield

From: Giffard

(First signal made after
torpedoing)

Is there anything wrong

Called from 0245⁰ till 0254⁰

This message was not passed - could not raise Valleyfield

R/T	F.C.	L 11		7-5-44
-----	------	------	--	--------

To: Giffard

From: Edmundston

Are you in Radar contact with Valleyfield

R/T	P/L	0300	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	------	------	--------

To: Halifax Edmundston Frontenac

From: Giffard

Close me

0301Z

R/T	P/L	0303	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	------	------	--------

To: All Ships

From: Giffard

Valleyfield torpedoed

0308Z

R/T	F.C.	0309	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	------	------	------	--------

To: Giffard

From: Edmundston

Returning to last known position

R/T	P/L	0311Z	L.H.	7-5-44
-----	-----	-------	------	--------

Copy of Naval Messages

To: Edmundston

From: Giffard

You bear 340 degrees 7 miles

System	P/L	Code or Cypher	TOR	TOD	0313Z Operator	Date
R/T	P/L			0314Z	L.H.	7-5-44

Emergency

To: St. John's Naval W/T Station

From: Giffard

Valleyfield torpedoed and sunk 046° 03' N 052° 24' W

070315Z

3290 Kc/s F.C.

0328

7-5-44

L-461
ImportantIntercept Group
26

To: C1 (R) FONF NSHQ

From: C in CCNA

Your 06 2346 Advise position, course and speed of
ONM 234 and time you detached.

070315Z

A

Cypher

0420

Campbell
McGuigan

7-5-44

To: All Ships

From:

Giffard

Am picking up survivors

R/T

F.C.

0329Z

L.H.

7-5-44

To: Edmundston

From: Giffard

Picking up survivors carry out observant

Light

P/L

0330Z

7-5-44

To: Frontenac (R) Halifax

From: Giffard

You bear 350 degrees 7800 yds Halifax 002 degrees
95 00 yds.

R/T

Self evident code

0336Z

L.H.

7-5-44

To: Giffard

From: Edmundston

Am coming in to pick up survivors.

Reply:

Would rather you lowered a boat and carried out
observant

Light

P/L

0345Z 0350Z

R.C.

7-5-44

Copy of naval messages

To: All Ships

From: Edmundston

Am attacking with hedgehog

System	P/L Code or Cypher	TOR	TOD	Operator	Date
R/T	CEC		0357	L.H	7-5-44

To: Edmundston

From: Giffard

If you see any survivors let me know

Light	P/L		0400Z	R.C.	7-5-44
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COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES.

TO: All Ships

FROM: EDMUNDSTON.

Good hedgehog attack results.

<u>System</u>	<u>P/L Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>R/T</u>	<u>C E C & P/L</u>	<u>Despatch</u>	<u>L.H.</u>	<u>7-5</u>
		0405		

L-464
IMMEDIATE

Intercept Group
36

TO: C1 W2(R) CinCCNA NSHQ

FROM: FONF

Commence operations SALMON using 046° 03'N, 052° 24'W
as datum point.

070403z

<u>Cyphering</u>	<u>Recyphering</u>	<u>Initials of</u>	<u>Time of</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>or Coding</u>	<u>or Recoding.</u>	<u>Cypher or Coder.</u>	<u>receipt</u>	
<u>Cypher</u>	<u>A</u>	Campbell, McGuigan	<u>0220</u>	<u>7/5/44</u>

TO: GIFFARD

FROM: FRONTENAC

Intend screening and hunting.

0403z

<u>System</u>	<u>P/L Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>R/T</u>	<u>F/C</u>	<u>0408z</u>	<u>L/H</u>	<u>7-5</u>

TO: HALIFAX

FROM: FRONTEANG

Me too.

<u>System</u>	<u>P/L Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>DATE</u>
<u>R/T</u>	<u>P/L</u>	<u>0417z</u>	<u>L.H.</u>	<u>7-5</u>

TO: FRONTENAC

FROM: HALIFAX.

Am carrying out observant

0410z

<u>System</u>	<u>P/L Code or Cypher</u>	<u>Time of receipt</u>	<u>Operator</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>R/T</u>	<u>F.C.</u>	<u>0412z</u>	<u>L.H.</u>	<u>7-5</u>

COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES.

TO: HALIFAX

FROM: GIFFARD.

Am picking up survivors carry out observant round me.

System	P/L Code or Cypher	Time of receipt	Operator	Date
Light	P/L	0415z	R.C.	7-5-44

IMMEDIATE.

TO: FONF (R) CinCCNA, NSHQ, E.G.C1

FROM: S.O.EG W2

My position, course and speed 045° 33' 053°24' 035°14'

070430z

Book or Table to be used for		Initials	T.O.R.
Cyphering or Coding	Recyphering or Recoding	or cypherer	
Code	K	or coder	070710z/5

TO: GIFFARD

FROM: HALIFAX.

On completion of OBSERVANT shall I screen you.

0430z

System	P/L Code or Cypher	T.O.R.	Operator	Date
R/T	F.C.	0432z	L.H.	7-5

IMMEDIATE.

TO: NEW GLASGOW (R) EDMUNDSTON, C1, W2
CinCCNA, NSHQ.

FROM: FONF

Proceed with upmost despatch to join groups C1 and W2
conduct operation SALMON with 046 03N 052 24W as datum point.
EDMUNDSTON S.O.

070437

Book or table to be used for		Date
Cyphering or coding	Recypher or Recode.	
Cypher	A.	7-5

TO: HALIFAX

FROM: GIFFARD.

Join EDMUNDSTON to continue search I am returning to
St. John's with survivors.

0459z

R/T	F.C.	T.O.D. 0503	L.H.	7-5
-----	------	-------------	------	-----

TO: ALL SHIPS

FROM: HALIFAX.

Message I464 concerns you.

(re: I464 Commence Operation SALMON -)

R/T P/L T.O.R. 0506z L.H. 7-5

IMMEDIATE.

TO: FONF (R) A IG 302

FROM: GIFFARD.

Have picked up 38 survivors 5 dead. Some in bad shape.
Returning St. John's forthwith. Have detailed EDMUNDSTON, HALIFAX
and FRONTENAC to continue search. My position course and speed
046 03N 052 24W 000 Speed 12.75.

070511z

Cypher A Cooper 7-5

TO: ALL SHIPS

FROM: GIFFARD.

Aircraft bearing 100 degrees 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles

0513z

R/T FSB T.O.D. 0515z L.H. 7-5

C.P

TO: EDMUNDSTON (R) W2 C1 CinCCNA, NSHQ

FROM: FONF.

My 070403 assume duties of S.O. of combined groups C1 and W2
LEIGH LIGHT CANSO call sign ADVG on 3925 Kc/s now in area.

Neg. T.O.O.

T.O.R. 0519

Cypher S. Cooper 7-5

COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES.

O-P

TO: EG C1, EG W2, NEW GLASGOW (R)
CinCCNA, FONF

FROM: NSHQ

Reference U-Boat hunt vicinity 046 03N 052 24W. H/F D/F
guards should be kept with priority on series 2 lines 1 and 2.
All bearings of U-boat considered close to be passed to AIG 302
priority emergency.

070520 z

Cypher S. Cooper 7-5

TO: GIFFARD/

FROM: FRONTENAC

INT R CinCCNA's 070315z.

REPLY -- Message received being decoded now.

Light P/L T.O.R. 0530z T.O.D. 0534z R.C. 7-5-44

TO: A/C

FROM: EDMUNDSTON.

Patrol area to depth of 20 miles.

R/T C.E.C. T.O.R. 0532z L.H. 7-5

TO: EDMUNDSTON

FROM: GIFFARD

VALLEYFIELD was struck on port side by torpedo fired
from 290°.

0546z

R/T F.C. T.O.D. 0553z L.H. 7-5

TO: GIFFARD

FROM: FRONTENAC

I have a switch that is good for 2½ miles.

Light P/L T.O.R. 0600z R.C. 7-5-44

COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES.

4751 IMMEDIATE

TO: C1 W2 NEW GLASGOW (R) CincCNA
NSHQ

FROM: FONF

Until further orders ships addressed to be designated
W11 repetition W11.

(2) 2 Hudson aircraft will operate in area datum point
continuously from first light to last light, 7th May.
Collective call sign COK repetition COK on 6666 kc/s.

070603z

Cypher A Cooper 7-5

TO: FRONTENAC

FROM: GIFFARD

Have you any survivors Reply --- No.

Light P/L T.O.R. 0624z T.O.D. 0620z R.C. 7-5-44

TO: GIFFARD(R)W11,CincCNA NSHQ

FROM: FONF

Your 070511 not to W11 approved. Indicate ETA St. John's
Newfoundland as soon as known.

070643z

Cypher A T.O.R. 0445 7-5-44

IMPORTANT

TO: FONF (R) CAPT(D) X.D.O. CincCNA
NSHQ, W11

FROM: GIFFARD.

ETA 071300z

070820z.

CODE K Cooper 7-5
?

TO: FONF(R) CAPT(D)

FROM: GIFFARD

14 stretcher cases. 5 bodies. Request permission to
enter.

1215z

Light P/L T.O.D. 0919 Bonnell 7-5-44

COPY OF NAVAL MESSAGES

TO: GIFFARD

FROM: X.D.O.

Keep clear until 3 merchant vessels sail.

0951

Light P/L T.O.R. 0945 Bonnell 7-5-44

TO: GIFFARD

FROM: FWSS

Proceed to enter.

Light P/L T.O.R. 0940 Bonnell 7-5-44

REPORT OF SINKING OF H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD", 6TH MAY '44.

Escort Group C-1 consisting of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" (S.O.), H.M.C.S. "FREDERICTON", H.M.C.S. "HALIFAX", H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD", H.M.C.S. "FRONTENAC" and H.M.C.S. "EDMUNDSTON", sailed 27th April, 1944, from Londonderry to escort ONM.234.

Convoy escorted without incident until "FREDERICTON" was ordered to detach and proceed independently to St. John's with one straggler. On May 4th, convoy encountered heavy fog which lasted until the morning of May 6th. A rendezvous was effected at noon of the 6th May with Local Escort Group. C-1 then proceeded independently to St. John's. Escorts were disposed in line abreast two miles apart, speed 12 knots, in the following order: H.M.C.S. "HALIFAX", H.M.C.S. "FRONTENAC", H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD", H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" and HMCS "EDMUNDSTON". Ships were zig-zagging in accordance with Zigzag Diagram No. 10 on a mean course of 001 (T). Throughout the day escorts were exercised in various evolutions by Commander Byron, R.N.R. (S.O.). All evolutions were completed by 1930 Convoy Time (plus 3). At 2030 (plus 3), ceased zigzagging and steered mean course. Weather conditions at the time of attack - bright moonlight, clear sky, no sea, slight swell. Visibility - 8 miles. Slight wind from the southwest force 2. C.A.T.S. had not been streamed until time of torpedoing by any escort. Radar was sweeping beam to beam through the bow; A/S sweeping 80° to 80° relative, range of the day - 3000 yards, conditions excellent.

Encountered H.M.C.S. "TIMMINS" and H.M.C.S. "AGASSIZ" carrying out an A/S sweep at approximately 2100 (plus 3). About fifteen minutes later one L.L. Fitted Aircraft passed one mile astern of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD".

At 2130 (plus 3) the first ice was sighted and various iceberg contacts were reported throughout the evening. At 2340 (plus 3) fast, quiet ticking hydrophone effect was heard by Lieutenant Tate, R.C.N.V.R., Officer of the Watch, through the A/S Loudspeaker bearing Red 60. A/S Operator was ordered to investigate from 2500 to 2900. Duty S/D Russ commenced investigation when torpedo struck port side midships. The ship immediately broke in half at No. 2 Stoke Hole and the forward part of the ship rolled to starboard. "Action Stations" was immediately rung and the Officer of the Watch endeavoured to ring up the Engine Room to tell them to get out. Two rings were heard on the "Action Stations" bell before the power failed. No answer from Engine Room. The Captain and the Navigating Officer reached the bridge from the Chart Room within 6 seconds of the explosion. The Captain ordered "Man boats and carley floats". The forward part of the ship then rose and began sinking vertically. The ship was abandoned without apparent panic. Meanwhile, after part of the ship began to slide under, forward part foremost. It is estimated that the forward half of the ship sank within two minutes and the after part within six minutes. There was only one survivor from the after part. It is considered that a large percentage of the crew were unable to reach the deck. Signaller Hammick released the only available carley float. About three others were blown clear. Survivors held on to hammocks, kitbags, etc., until such time as they reached carley floats.

There were no underwater explosions heard nor did the boilers blow after the initial explosion. Depth charges had been set to "safe", primers - home. It was later reported that two Seaman Torpedomen were seen going aft to withdraw primers. This would contribute to the absence of

depth charge explosions. The two Seaman Torpedoman were not identified and were not among the survivors.

H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" closed and circled the wreck for possible sign of U-Boat, then commenced picking up survivors. Remainder of ships carried on operation "observant".

Leading Telegraphist Daley reported when in HMCS "GIFFARD" that a close transmission had been heard by H/F D/F a few moments before torpedo struck. Only the last few groups were heard before control gave QSA 5 (I hear you Strength 5). The U-Boat was transmitting off frequency. Operator Daley was unable to obtain a bearing but was about to 'phone the bridge when the torpedo struck.

Great credit is due to H.M.C.S. "GIFFARD" for its fine work in picking up survivors and for the way in which they were looked after on board.

We regret deeply the loss of our Captain, Lieutenant Commander English, our Senior Officer, Commander Byron, R.C.N.R., and our fellow Officers and men. They were fine leaders and good shipmates.

Signature *W. Warren*

Rank... *Lieut. (r.) R.C.N.R.*

Signature..... *am. Tab.*

Rank..... *lieut. r. c. n. r.*

Date..... *13th May 1944*

ACTING LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER RAIFFE DILLON BARRETT, ROYAL
CANADIAN NAVAL RESERVE, IN COMMAND OF H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON.

At approximately 0255Z on the morning of the Sunday the 7th May, I was called by the Officer of the Watch who informed me that he had heard an explosion at 0235Z, that H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD had subsequently dropped astern and could not now be detected by RADAR and that H.M.C.S. GIFFARD was calling H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD by R/T and was receiving no answer.

I hastened to the bridge and ship's course was altered to the last known course of VALLEYFIELD.

On arrival at the scene, GIFFARD was picking up survivors. It was seen that a number of life ~~boats~~ ^{rafts} were at some considerable distance from GIFFARD so I ran in to pick up the survivors.

My whaler under the command of the First Lieutenant investigated several dead bodies and rescued six survivors who were immediately put on board GIFFARD for transportation to St. John's.

During time that whaler was being lowered I contacted what I ~~then~~ believed to be a submarine echo and carried out an attack.

R. D. Barrett

(R.D. Barrett),
A/Lieutenant-Commander, R.C.N.R.
in Command.

Statement made in the presence
of Lieutenant-Commander F. Gerity,
R.C.N.R.

F. Gerity

Witness

LIEUTENANT DAVID FLEETWOOD KERR, ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL VOLUNTEER
RESERVE, FIRST LIEUTENANT OF H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON.

I make the following statement bearing in mind the provisions of King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Article 488(9).

The first thing we headed for were lights. We saw two rafts, the first one had six men. They were holding lights in their hands and shouting. I warned them not to jump into the boat in case of upsetting. They were quite sensible and told us to come alongside. A couple of the men were in very bad shape and were brought in first.

While bringing men off raft, I heard what I thought to be Pom-Pom and assumed submarine was on the surface. It turned out, however, to be Hedgehog firing. A sharp explosion was felt in the boat.

Covered in oil, two men had no life belts. I had difficulty in getting them in as they were helpless.

Finally we got all men aboard the whaler and looked for my own ship but could not see her so went to GIFFARD which was coming towards us. Hailed her and were told to come alongside.

After some time GIFFARD proceeded ahead slowly and picked up men on second raft. Had great difficulty on board GIFFARD due to oil and swell. Was asked by the Captain of the GIFFARD if we wanted a rest, if so, to tie up alongside. I however, thought it would be easier to shove clear and just rest in the boat.

Then proceeded in search of more survivors, saw much wreckage, including an over-turned whaler and many small objects which we could not tell whether they were men or wreckage. Dragged one body out which was face down but as it was about half an hour or more since leaving the ship I considered him dead as water was 34 so proceeded on search of possible men on rafts. All bodies we saw appeared to be face down in the water although the life belts were canting men forward on the face.

Returned to ship and was told to continue searching but did not sight anything more except wreckage.

Finally returned to ship and were hoisted inboard.

The only thing we could go by in the boat due to swell were lights and they attracted our attention and we went to them first.

David Kerr.

(D.F. Kerr),
LIEUTENANT, R.C.N.V.R.

Statement made in the presence
of Lieutenant-Commander F. Gerity,
R.C.N.R.

F. Gerity

Witness

LIEUTENANT J. RUSSEL-BROWN, ROYAL CANADIAN NAVAL VOLUNTEER
RESERVE OF H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON.

The following is my statement relevant to the loss of H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD, having in mind the provisions of King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Article 488(9).

I was in charge of the middle watch aboard H.M.C.S. EDMUNDSTON at 0235Z on Sunday morning, 7th May, 1944. At 0235 I heard an underwater explosion on an approximate bearing of 270° , our course was 001° , speed 13 knots, line abreast H.M.C. Ships HALIFAX, FRONTENAC, VALLEYFIELD, GIFFARD and EDMUNDSTON 2 miles apart. I took the explosion to be a depth charge. The explosion was reported to me by the signalman, A/S on duty and lookouts as depth charge.

At 0245Z, RADAR operators reported being unable to pick up H.M.C.S. VALLEYFIELD but reported last bearing as 230° , 10,000 yards.

While conducting RADAR search for VALLEYFIELD, RADAR reported H.M.C.S. GIFFARD still in station and I could see GIFFARD through the binoculars but was unable to see VALLEYFIELD who was four miles distant.

RADAR then reported GIFFARD dropping astern her station at which time I called the Captain to give a report of proceedings. While at the same time GIFFARD was trying to contact VALLEYFIELD by R/T as was EDMUNDSTON and FRONTENAC without success.

The Captain came to the bridge immediately and took charge of subsequent proceedings.

At 0255Z with the Captain in charge, we altered course to 270° to proceed to join GIFFARD. The weather throughout the entire watch had been calm and clear, with a high, brilliant moon about 35° on the port bow.

On taking over the watch I was made aware of the fact that there was a submarine within 150 miles range of us.

J. Russel. Brown
Lieut RCNVR

(J. Russel-Brown),
LIEUTENANT, R.C.N.V.R.

Statement made in the presence
of Lieutenant-Commander F. Gerity,
R.C.N.R.

[Signature] *[Signature]*
Witness

SECRET

Office of Flag Officer Newfoundland

9th May 194 4

MEMORANDUM.

You are to assemble ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in the conference room
of the New Administration Bldg., St. John's, Newfoundland, at 1430
xx 10th May, 1944

as a board of inquiry whereof Acting Captain S.W. Davis, R.C.N. (Ty)
of ~~xxxxxx~~/U.N.C.S. "AVALON".....

is to be president and hold a full and careful investigation into the circumstances attending the loss of H.M.C.S. "VALLEYFIELD" and the death and injuries of certain Officers and Ratings on board the said ship at the time.

calling before you such witnesses as are necessary to enable you to form a correct conclusion.

2. The inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with the directions contained in King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, Chapter XI.

3. The report of the board is to be accompanied by the minutes of evidence taken, and is to contain an expression of opinion on the merits of the case as disclosed by the evidence, including a statement of the causes of the occurrence.

4. The questions in the minutes are to be numbered consecutively, and the name and rank or rating of each witness are to appear at the head of each page of his evidence.

5. The report and minutes are each to be signed by the members of the board, and are to be in triplicate.

6. The original report is sent herewith for the purpose of the inquiry, and is to be returned with the report of the board, together with this memorandum.

7. XX
XX
XXXXXXXXXX.

9. A shorthand writer has been detailed from the office of
Captain (D) Newfoundland

To: Acting Capt. S.W.Davis, R.C.N. (Ty)

of H.M.C.S. "AVALON"

Lt. Car. W.G. Ross, R.C.N.V.R. (Ty)

of H.M.C.S. "AVALON"

Acting Lt. Car. F.O. Gerity, R.C.N.R. (Ty) FLAG OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND.

of H.M.C.S. "AVALON"

The Flag Officer Newfoundland,
ST. JOHN'S,
Newfoundland.

FONF. 60-4.

24th December, 1943.

MEMORANDUM.

BOARDS OF ENQUIRY

In amplification of the instructions given in paragraph 1 of Form S.1360, I wish to bring to the notice of officers concerned my views on the conduct of Boards of Enquiry.

2. The task of a Board of Enquiry is usually to investigate some occurrence which has been brought about by a failure of personnel, material or organisation. The main object of the investigation is to obtain such information as will enable us to guard against a repetition of the same, or a similar, occurrence. This means that we must find out who, if anyone, was responsible for the failure and whether the fault lies inside or outside the ship itself; it may be with some authority or department, or civilian firm, or some individual in the ship.

3. Unless specifically so ordered it is not the duty of a Board of Enquiry to propose disciplinary action but, for the reasons given above, it is essential that their Finding should specify in detail what persons in the ship (under the general responsibility of the Commanding Officer) were responsible for what happened and the precise degree in which each acted incorrectly or failed to act. This is a matter which is frequently glossed over or not clearly pressed to a definite conclusion; it is, however, important that he who has failed should be left in no doubt how and where he went wrong, so that he may profit by the experience and act correctly on a future occasion. If on the other hand the Board reach the conclusion that no person in the ship was in any way responsible for the occurrence they must clearly state this opinion in their Finding.

4. It is directed that members of Boards of Enquiry investigating accidents, losses of stores, &c., before coming to any conclusion which imputes blame to any person, should consider carefully:-

- (i) Whether his apparent fault was due to negligence or inexperience or both.
- (ii) Whether, having regard to his previous experience in similar operations, it was reasonable to entrust him with that particular duty.

The Board's opinion on these points should be included in their Finding.


2.

5. It is also an important part of the duty of every Board of Enquiry to make recommendations for the future prevention of similar occurrences.

6. The President of each Board of Enquiry convened in this Command will be furnished with a copy of this memorandum attached to Form S.1360, both of which are to be included in the minutes.

7. Specific attention is drawn to:

Naval Order 1730	-	Re: Admissable Evidence.
Naval Order 2658	-	Re: Medical Officers' Evidence.
Naval Order 2251	-	Re: Correct Names.
Naval Order 3074	-	Re: General Directions.


(C.R.H. Taylor)
Commodore, R.C.N.,
FLAG OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND.

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: FONF

From: GIFFARD

EMERGENCY

VALLEYFIELD torpedoed and sunk 046 03 N 052 24 W.

T00 07 0315z/5/44

GRS. 11
NO FLEET CODE
W/T 7 Rec'd by St. John's.
DAW
DIST. 1,4,5,9,60
TOR 07 0329z: TOC 07 0330z
Passed to NSHQ & CINCCNA AT 07 0345z
Rec'd over LOVE B'cast at 07 0357z
DIST: 1 4 5 9 60

S. 1320H
15,000M-5-42 (4534)
N.S. 815-9-1320H

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: FONF (R) CAPT (D)

From: GIFFARD

SECRET

14 stretcher cases 5 bodies. Request permission to enter.

T00 07 1215/5/44

P/L
DAW
DIST. 1 4 5 9 60.

S. 1320H
15,000M-5-42 (4534)
N.S. 815-9-1320H

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: FONF (R) C IN C CNA CONNAV ADMIRALTY
ACIC C IN C WA NSHQ CAPT.(D) ARGENTIA
COM (D) WA HQCC

From: HMCS GIFFARD

SECRET IMMEDIATE

Have picked up 38 survivors 5 dead. Some in bad
shape. Returning St. John's Nfld. forthwith. Have detailed
HMCS EDMUNDSTON HMCS HALIFAX FRONTENAC to continue search.
My position course and speed 46° 03'N 52° 24' W. 000° 12.75.

T00 070511Z/5/44

Gr. 50
NC A
W/T
Dist. 1,4,5,9,60
TOR 070618Z TOC 070635Z
Rec'd by St. John's W/T
Dist: 1 4 5 9 60

NAVAL MESSAGE

To:

CINCCNA (R) NSHQ

FOR APPROVAL
TOP SECRET

From:

FONF

FROM PRELIMINARY INTERROGATING SURVIVORS IT APPEARS VALLEYFIELD WAS
TORPEDOED AT 0210 7TH MAY AMIDSHIPS THE PORT SIDE AND BROKE IN
HALF, THE BOWS SINKING IN ABOUT THREE MINUTES AND THE STERN
APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES LATER. GROUP WAS IN LINE ABREAST,
SHIPS TWO MILES APART, VALLEYFIELD CENTRE SHIP. ZIG ZAG WAS
NEGATIVED AT 0100/7. UNIDENTIFIED H.E. RESEMBLING PORPOISE
NOISES WAS HEARD BEARING RED 60 IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EXPLOSION.
WEATHER CLEAR BRIGHT MOONLIGHT U-BOAT BELIEVED TO HAVE FIRED
FROM UP MOON POSSIBLY OUTSIDE OF WING SHIP. ONLY OFFICER SURVIVORS
LIEUT. J.H. WARREN AND LIEUT. C.I.P. TATE.

TOO 07 1625z/5/44

TOC 07 1702

DIST. 1 4 5 9 60

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: NCCNA (R) CONNAV ADMTY ACIC CINCWA
NSHQ FONF CAPT.(D) ARGENTIA
COM (D) WA HQCC CAPT (D) NFLD.

From:

HMCS EDMUNSTON

SECRET IMMEDIATE

Explosions heard at 0235 and VALLEYFIELD subsequently missed. On closing position A/S contact to having movement and doppler this contact was attacked with hedgehog at 0357 in 50 fathoms of water and resulting explosions occurred too early to have been from bottom. Contact gained later and attacked with hedgehog proved by debris to be VALLEYFIELD and FRONTENAC carried out observant until W-2 group joined. My 070811z not to all addressees refers. All times GMT

REC'D BY ST. JOHN'S

T00 07 1254z/5/44

GRS 117 NC S T/P

BR. DIST 1 4 5 9 60

TOR 07 1736z TOC 07 1815z

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: 1 W 11 EG C 5 EG W 7 (R) AIG 375

From: NSHQ

SECRET EMERGENCY

BY D/F of 117 group enigma message at 1612z on 10935 kc/s

U-boat (German) in 43 20' N 53 30' W accuracy 60 miles.

T00 09 1645z/5/44

GRS 47 NC S T/P

BR. DIST. 1-5 9 11 16 22 27 60

TOR 09 1732z TOC 09 1750Z

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: (R) CAPT. D ST. JOHN'S W 11

From: HMCS EDMUNDSTON

SECRET • IMPORTANT

Area searched and wreck located. Soundings taken.

No evidence of S/M now proceeding ST. JOHN'S NF.

T00 09 1636z/5/44

ERS. 32 NC A W/T 31

REC'D BY ST. JOHN'S NF

BR. DIST. 1-5 7 9 13 22 27 60 16

TOR 09 1731z TOC 09 1745z

NAVAL MESSAGE.

S 1320 i
500M-8-42 (5810)
N.S. 815-9-1320 I.

To: CINCWA (R) FONF NSHQ ADMTY

FROM: CINCCNA

TOP SECRET

Following is a resume of facts reference sinking of VALLEYFIELD.

2. Ships were in line abreast two miles apart positions from port to starboard, Halifax, Frontenac, Valleyfield, Giffard, Edmunston. Course 003 degs. 13 knots.
3. Ships were not zigzagging cats were not streamed. Transmitting watch was being kept investigating are 250-290. VALLEYFIELD was torpedoed port side amidships at 0210 7th May. H.E. was heard in VALLEYFIELD bearing red 60, 20 seconds before explosion. Ship broke in half bows sinking in two minutes stern in about five after primers withdrawn.
4. EDMUNSTON closed position gained contact with movement and doppler and carried out attack with HH at 0357 in 50 fathoms. Resulting explosion considered too early to have been bottom. Another contact attacked later proved by debris to be wreck of VALLEYFIELD.

First contact considered by EDMUNSTON to have been submarine.
5. HALIFAX and FRONTENAC carried observant around EDMUNSTON. GIFFARD picked up survivors and proceeded ST. JOHN'S.

T00 09 1517z/5/44

GRS 263 GY X FO
BR. DIST. 1 4 60 chits.
TOR 09 1856z TOC 09 2003z

H. Q. 27

DEPARTMENT
OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE
NAVAL SERVICE
CANADA

N. S.

Enclosures

5000-Oct. 1-19-Reg. S. 7218

M. Walsh

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

**Reporter's
Note Book**

No. 710

CO. Huffer

11 Oct. ^{Charles} Peterson Ranch - 2003

9. 22 ✓ 10 10 10 6 2

3 1 1 1 1 1

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4 copies

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1 1

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1 1 1 1 1

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1 1, 1 1 1 1

6 1 - 1 1 - 1 1

Radon was perfect as far as my own shirt was concerned. There was a long race and a couple of things.

Now about

0

ardie

seemed to

vary with different

shirts

but

didn't

think

they

were

very

good,

1 1 0 0

①

~~Heading -~~

~~Page 24~~

~~Signal for page 10~~

~~Check on A.S.P.A.~~

Maurice Fahlkner Oliver
Comma.

9 ± e e } 0 0 1

did you hear anything of this report in
— ✓ 2 6 L \ H E

1 ~

2 0

3. } L

what were the weather conditions

6 L C ~
Bright clear moonlight night almost a full moon
↓ ✓
2 0 \ L

yes in a very great deal of ice
C ~ \ 1 → 0 e
on all sides

1 0
the pancake stuff

* C ~ } 2 9 0 25 / 26000

Passing thru it continuously

6 0 L }

yes in

C ~
How long

we had been all afternoon & all evening
3 0 9 } — 0 ~

(H) 0 0 ~ on 4th

* L L 6 1 0 0

Were you in station
at the time of the occurrence

8 0 0 0 L L d

(2) gas on the starboard.

\ 0 2 - - \ ASP
) 1 - 8 L 7 - h
 - SP. \ C / <
 o SP. 1.2 - 6

was there ice present at the time of the
 C - 2 on occurrence

at that moment on radar
 { 1 }

Could you estimate how far north of the Gulf
 stream at the time

no I wouldn't like to guess
 7 5 1 -

Did you have much difficulty in getting survivors

onboard
 { proper great difficulty }

5 7 1 2

The first few cases say first 1/2 dozen

of those they were swamped 1/2

with out could do

nothing of themselves
 2 10

walk
the survivors at first there had been ^{no payovers} ~~hand holders~~

* on the at all the later cases
were all stricken cases practically
cases of paralysis from effects of the
cold water and fuel (the temperature
of the water was 32)

I'd like to say that several of the survivors
were wearing life jackets with the straps unfastened
and loose. In the water these jackets were
floating around their shoulders like water
wings & certainly kept them afloat

* but gave us nothing to lose a line
to!

was there any evidence of any strangulation from
the belts being up there
no pin

Any other observations you can make to improve life
sailing conditions

* It is a piece of rope cut to fit a man's
waist with an English knot to
each end which can be worn ^{again} spliced
down and up


19. 208. 1
 20. 208. 1
 21. 208. 1
 22. 208. 1

A.	3	0
----	---	---

* 1 5 2 - 4 9 0 1 -
2 - 4 0 0 6 -

Handwritten practice sheet for cursive letters on lined paper. The letters are arranged in rows and columns, with some letters crossed out by a diagonal line. The letters include:

- Row 1: u, c, y, v, b, e, a, h, hook
- Row 2: e, s, i, j, r, z, 4, 9
- Row 3: k, n, m, l, o, s
- Row 4: o, 2, w, L, v
- Row 5: l, 3, a, 5, r
- Row 6: x, 4, t, —, o, 7
- Row 7: 2, x, r, —, @, 5, o
- Row 8: v

Q. 

A. ϕ 0 ∞ $\frac{1}{2}$ 6

3



6

$$0 \sim - \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{-}$$

Change position of moon: 180.

1. Gm - - - 4 - - -
- 00W - - - 2 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 6 - - - 4 - - - 2 - - -
- - - 2 - - - C - - - 1 - - - 4 - - - 1 - - -
- - - 7 - - - - - - - C - - - 5 - - -) - - - x - - - C - - -

- - - 2 - - - 7 - - - - - - - 1 - - - 0 - - - 1 - - - 4 - - -

C - - - 5 - - - 9 - - - 8 - - - 5 - - - 1 - - - C - - -

- - - 6 - - - 1 - - - 6 - - - 4 - - - 1 - - - 5 - - - 2 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 7 - - - 0 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 6 - - - 1 - - - 0 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 6 - - - 7 - - - 0 - - - x - - - - - - - 2 - - -

- - - 6 - - - 6 - - - 0 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 00W - - - 1 - - -

- - - 6 - - - 0 - - - C - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - Sen off - - - 7 - - - 6 - - - SW 2 - - - C - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - Sen 2 - - - 0 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - RT - - - 7 - - - 0 - - - 2 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - RT - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - 0 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

- - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

(9)

allowed

unaware

L-096 - - - 0023

subbor "E"

6 - - - 1 - - - C - - - 20

1 - - - 0 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - -

G o u - 7 c giff
 / c Edmuntston x y
 - 9 d Edm. - giff ^{rental net}
 - 4 - 26 -
 " - 9) br" c
 26 - e - 4
 " - 9) br"
 - 7 ~~o~~ - 4
 - Ed. o 9 -
 9) br - giff c v
 26 br o , ~~+~~
 - 4) o e e
 - o 90° v c 2
 - 6 o - 2)
 b . o) 5 - 12
 2 - 2 - 2 Ed c
 2 e sen 2 -
 2 - br o 2
 2 o Halbur c 2
 2 - 2 Ed 9 giff c
 2 9 - o Halbur
 c 6 - 4 7
 4 - giff " ^{intend screening}
 and hunting - 6 e
 10 - br 2 4 1 2

Handwritten notes on lined paper:

0135 C 1 diff
- 8 n - o -
- w h y e -
o z o c diff
e e i - 3 v
h z - u a o o
m o - y a z
7x ob0200 . d diff
- u o - b c n
- u l x g i w /
n e - m - o - b r
o y l e d e e.
v o swze - ()
) w . o e \ o w
l b z v h l i e
z \ z h L i t
o v (x so i n
k l = o) . l f
o - v - h v
- y > - e i p
c v o q 5000
o s o - a 5000 ✓
c o - b y

6 5 2 0 4

2710 - SW 2C

2710 C 0 0 2

C 5

0 2 2 2

A 2 2 2 2 L 2 2
2

6 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

6 2 2 2 2 2

0 2 2

C 5

- C 2 2 2 2

L course of
265

2 2 3 10

2 3/4 2 2 2 2

172 d - C 2100

6, 6, 1, 1, 2

e 6 1 { 9 12 28

✓ V L L 001 020 U

C S

6. 1 - 2 in 2004

4 c. 1 c. 1 f

$\frac{1}{2} \times 4000 = 2000$

1 2 3 4 5

1. 50, 7.3 22

45 (- 10 16)

7.6 5/12 1 C^hre

z z y y

GC/h - free or

270 — . 66

 $\frac{1}{5.00}$

64 / 10224

$C \mid \frac{1}{2}, 0 \mid C \rightarrow e) \cap$

1 6 6 2 9 2

6 ~~6~~ 1 line 2

1 2 3 4

I l a } e o ↓
 — — e — p — stand
 1 — 1 a — b b

- 6 8 9 10

6 + 7 = 13

6 6 1

$$6 \times 38$$

• 77

4 - *crucifera*
 5 0 Le 6

C

03012 midnight 040

2 2 1 ✓ - 2

11 ✓ 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

e e - 2' = 6 - 1.0 f - f =

6 c - 26 7 - 12 br

o 0026

6 c - 26 7 1 2 o

o w

e 1 2 o 7 2 o 1

e 6 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ / 1 1

o 8 5 - I 1 2 o

4 5 - I

(B) 1 5 o 2 o o 2

1

2 2 1 1 2 2

2 2 2 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ o 6

o 20 - 2 2

6 - 2 00W 1 2

1 1 2 1 - 2 2

1 2 1 1 1 1

2 o 1 o o 2

2 2 2 2100

22 15

e 1 1 2 1 I o 2100

6 1 / 1 2 o

2 2 1 1 2 1

c b a h - - -

e
w) - - - -

h - - - - -

d - - - - -

T - -

c - - -

e) - - - -

(A) b - - - -

- - - -

e - - - -

h - - - -

- - - - -

sw 2 c - - - -

10 - - - x

Maccoll, Wm. W. Lt. Rear.

0 - 00 W 1 L 06 L

2000 - 2400

1 - 6 2 - 06

9 - 3 0 8 5

2340 - X - 6

1 6 2 2

7 3 2 2 2

4 3 2 2

to 3 2 2

e 0 6 3 6 2

1 2 2 2

1 2 2 2

2 3 2 6 3 6

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2

1

to 1 - 29 - 12
to 10 - 2 - 10
13 1 by 5

6 - 12 9 -
2 - 1 - 2 - 1 1/2 -
RT - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

1-2

→ 1 2 3 - - 4

n v q w r -

vol - w r -

Q 6 6 6 C -

A 6 2250 e b y oo

→ 6 - 7 6 - -

Q S.O.

o l u y k

C u . b 7 . u - L

w r 7 6 2110 d

le - 8 6 5 w

o 8 w

Q d o y n

A 7 - e h n C . sailing craft

just floating
7 w r e b sidelights

Q 0 7 - 1/4 8 7 -

n 2 } bearing
7 8 - 8 } sail

A 7 w

6 C - C L y u o p a
 e
 - C C v a 6
 9 Z e o i
 L - 1

Q. f u s v s 6 ^{glasses}
 A. 7 v , o i z 1 i v

Q. what was the position of the valley then
 6 C - b o s r -
 10 2 -
 altitude

A. 20°

Q. - o \ v o b i
 of use
 o e - e

A. C 7 p o

Q. o o v 6 q u

A. 2 p o i 2 7 i p

Q. C - 1 1 o

A. e i s l e h
 x v - r a d y s e t C

69.9% h

o 1 o 6 o 2 4 4
c 5

Q. o 2 6 '10 6 c val
o 4 4 1 6

A. 1 2 4 6

Q. 6 c 2 4 6 9 1

A. 1 2 6 0 - 2 1
1 2 0200 1 2 4
2 6

Q. 6 c - 4 6 0 6 d m e
1 2 4 6

A. 1 2 4 6 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 1

er [3]

John Martin Armitage, C.P.O., 3260

4 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 b r

26-

Q. 

8. (A) 0 1 2 3 4

A. 25 - 26. 6. 65


employ yourself on

~~hang action stations~~

ryged

nets

on the port side + the on the starboard
 side then we helped with the loads



Q. 2 6 ~ 6 00 00
 3 in 0 00

A. 1. 2. Practically all the survivors lifebelts weren't pulled
 up on their. They could have saved a lot
 more & better if they had been properly done up

are you filled with a dip net

Q. 1 2 4 2

A. 3 1
 what happened to it

Q. 6 2 capsule

A. 2 1 0 4 0 4
 9 2 1 1 2 2 00
 2 0 0 2 - 1 5 5
 1 2 4 2 - 2 00

Q. 1 2 2

A. 1 2
 so you gave after that

Q. 1 2 9 2 2 2

A. 3 1 . 4 C 2 3 4 - 4
 - 2 3 4 5 -
 4 5 6 7 8 9
 4 5 6 7 8 9
 - 4 - 5 6 7 8 9
 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 2

Q. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
 because
 full
 with

A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
 practicable
 there was
 bringing

Q. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
 A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Radaw Operator
 John H Erickson V19507 A.B. - Cant

1

Q. All below.

Q. 0 1 1 6 - 2 5 6^{1k}

A. 6 6

A. 10 - 12

Q. 6 1/2 - 1/2 - 2 - 6

Q. 6 6

A. 6 - 2 271

A. 1 - 2 3 4 5 6 was the

shirts that were with us
who were they

Q. () off port side

A. - front C 9 L

Valley 9 - front side Ed

C 9 -

Q. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
in an all round sunset sun

Q. 6 5 1/2 1/2 9

A. 2 3

Q. 2 2

A. 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Valley

5 1 6 7 8 9

Grouse

Q. 6 - C - 9

A. 2350

1 2 3 4 5

Q. ~~1 2 3 4 5~~ ~~no other surface vessels besides these 3 you mentioned~~ → 3 0

A. 2 3 aircraft

Q. 6 7 8

A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 the other operator did

Q. 6 7 8 9 10

A. 2300 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Q. 6 7 8 9 10 part

A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Q. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

A. if you are lucky at 24000

Q. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 all round

A. C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2340

2350 - 2400
false echoes

Q. 1 6 8 2 8 2 6 C

A. 2 5

Q. 6 side echoes

A. 2 5

Q. 8 L PPI

A. 2 5

Manlius
Cornell

00W Frontenac - laut

Manlius Cornell Bull Mt. VR

from what period

Q. 0 00W 7. 8 6 J

{ 8 - 12

A. { 2000 - 2400

C 5

Q. 1 6 6 0 1 0 6 2

1 5 ~ 8 6 7

A. - 4 2 6 C - to

2 0 6 2340

— or C 7
— 7
— 2 7 all

2 8 C or

EC. 206 h Vall

7 20 2 7

1 7 9 1 I 0

9
switched sets
Pencils

1 2 1 2 2

4000

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2

2350-55' 2 2 2 2

1 2 2 2 9

2350-55'

2 2 2 2 2

2 W/T 2 Halfp 1

esifford 2 2 2 9

S.O. for a few 2 2 1 - RT

1 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 - 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2 2 2 rooms

the signalman

AS

it wouldn't mean anything to us because we
hadn't flashed him

to explain this depth change and
there may be some points & we would
get some instructions

plume of smoke

smoking funnels

surface or
air about an hour

it seemed to me it came
across
vally below

1/2 3/4 0 6 mile
 0 65 2 1 collision

hearing then

it seemed to turn then and go
 down ~~own~~ starboard side ~~green~~

Q. 6 0 7 2
 A. 2 1 1 6
 6 2 4 1

Q. C 0 5

A. 1 1

Q. 0 7 1 1 1 1

A. 1 1

Q. 0 0 1 1 0

A. C 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 1 1 1 1 1 0 265

Q. 1 0 1 1

A. 1 1 1 1

Q. 1 0 0 1

A. 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1
 1 1 1 1 1 1

B a u - ~ 1 a 9
o o d

Q. -) < e ✓ h / u u
A. e f s

Q. f b ~ e L / 1 u
d a b - e . L e
1 e L

A. c e s

Q. o e
A. c s

Q. o v) i n 3 \ h' s
L e

A. e b y u s d o . u

Q.) z o o o

A.) e 9 u s

Q. ^(A) 6 C - M

A. e \ 1 o 10 6

Q. f u o x

A. c

Q. e e 9

A. ,

Q. 10 8 5

A. 1 1 a p 9

Q. 6 C - b n o r

A. - r C n d 115

Q. 6 5 2

A. - 7 6 25°

Q. 1 0 5 r t o n - 7 e
C r

A. 1 e h o o 2 4
r 1. h o 8 5 L
t o n

Q. 1 2 1 4

A. just smoke

2 1 1 7

Q. 6 1 0 1 5 2 C

h 8 1 5 1

1 1

A. C 5

Q. (6)

A. 5)

Q. 6 8 1 4 7

A. 2 5 7 6 4 4

2 2 2 2 6 6 7 7

Q. 1 2 3 4 5

A. C 5

Q. 6 7

A. L 7

Q. 7 x 50

A. 1 5 7 5

Q. 1 1 6

A. 1

2 2 6 0 7 4 1 L
- 2 6 7 5 0 1 0
6 L

Had you

Q. 1 6 7 0 7 7 0 0

A. C 5

- 7 7 0 0 1 0 7
1 1 6 150 6 7
0 7 7 7
an alone hemisala

Q. 1 6 6 7 7 7 0 0

operating

Q *drawers* *spanish*

A

Q there might
to you

A

Q 2000
3000

A

Q

A

Q

Q sweet

A set on

Q

A

I

①

craft L . b c < surface
L o saw
- r k: - - - 3 u

o 1 6 25 - o 2
o 4000 - o 1 u
L L L 1500 ✓

A 6 6 - L i 2 Q. As you could
gute use 7 u { committed
C u

Brown Richard W. AB, V44323.

6 8 6

. 27 25

6 1 - L 2 o 6 1* 6

C u

- 6 u

2 11-12

6 1/2 1 - - - /

C u

o 2 6 27 1/2 -

o u

1) 5 4 5 - 4
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3

1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
12 13

6 7 - 8 9 -

6 2500 4

6 0 0 2 0 0 2 5

0 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

6 7 8 9

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

6 7 8 9 10

88 9

4 - 6 6 2 0 5 5

0

A.C. . 2 4 - 5 5

3 EP 240 zigzagging - 5

2 180 1 10 5

3 - 4 5 6 7 8

1 2 3 4 5 6

2 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ds 0 0 See light 4 5

1 2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Oliver, Maurice Finkner, Lt. Cmdr

1-00 0x

CW

Cautioned

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 0 6 6¹¹ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 355P -00W 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Val
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- and 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 scan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

6 2 c 4 y

- 1 - 1 ver

c o - h e q

4 3" e - much

- ✓ v to

7 m

- > o y 2 - -

c o o w - h to

1 - c - 2

6 6 c

2 3 4 0

- 9 v m 1/2

T, ~ c - p - Edm.

Edm o o c 8

o 6 c c o 2

~~0247~~ ~~0255~~ ~~0255~~ 0155P

6 r - 2 o 1/2

2 1/2,) doppel

2 6 x h 7 - p o Hall

1 2 3 4 5

5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

2

25

6 0 4 5 / 1 2

$\subset$ $\supset$ $\cap$ $\cup$ $\setminus$ $\sim$ $\equiv$

$\frac{1}{2} \quad | \quad \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}$ als in

③

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

$\sigma = 1.200$

D- y ✓

Handwritten notes on lined paper, possibly a calendar or a list. The text is written in cursive and includes:

- 1. 1
- 2. 2
- 3. 3
- 4. 4
- 5. 5
- 6. 6
- 7. 7
- 8. 8
- 9. 9
- 10. 10
- 11. 11
- 12. 12
- 13. 13
- 14. 14
- 15. 15
- 16. 16
- 17. 17
- 18. 18
- 19. 19
- 20. 20
- 21. 21
- 22. 22
- 23. 23
- 24. 24
- 25. 25
- 26. 26
- 27. 27
- 28. 28
- 29. 29
- 30. 30
- 31. 31

1 2 2 1 2 1 2

C - 2 - 7 - 0 6 9 -

43

25

Handwritten notes on lined paper, possibly a page from a notebook. The text is written in cursive and includes the words "b", "c", "d", "e", "f", "g", "h", "i", "j", "k", "l", "m", "n", "o", "p", "q", "r", "s", "t", "u", "v", "w", "x", "y", "z".

C

→ > ~ 7
) ~

6 1 - 4 ~ 2 → ~

0 0 - 1 ~ 6 0 0
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
~ 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ranges
d o u g C B P P
1 < / d 2719

r o n u - t n l n

) o o b
C

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o - 1 o b - 2 - 5

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Witness withdrew

First Lieutenant

Patterson, Gordon H JR "Huffard"

battered

9 1 6 0 5 9 2
1 1 2 1 9 1

C 5 1 1 2 2 9
its been winter time
time again the fuel oil
in the water the diff of handling
the men and the cold water made
them in a condition they could hardly help
~~themselves~~

a word I didnt know what
it was until the action well went

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10816012

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$\phi - \tan \phi = \text{Ed}$

hedge 7/10/19 E

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25

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274 - - -

2. 0/1 - e - 1

$$\sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{3}} \approx 0.816$$

no 1 2 3 4

$$z \geq (-2, -1)$$

— + 7 2 3 —

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^{James}
W. W. Withers

Ht. Ralph Johnston F. Linton V R

Centroned

Bufford

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- 2 20 7 1 - 2

- 4 2 6 2 1

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- 2 7 1 calcium flower

- 1 2 7 - 6 1

- 2 Ren 2 2 2

- 2 2 1 1 2

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- 2 1 1 1 1 1

- 2 1 1 1 1

[Handwritten notes on lined paper, mostly illegible due to cursive script and crossing lines.]

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W. W.

L/S.B.A. V 2934 ^{difficult} ^{our and man} # N. Bailey - Cant

6 C - h o o o v
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 2 9 v e z y
 - 4 d h o h - L
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 - d - o e n n
 - 6 s e z v - 7 keys
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 - h ? l 2

collected blankets & hammocks

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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stretchers

8 - Neil Robinson

CO

First Lt

statements of POW ~~and~~ of Edman

~~Residence~~ submitted by Lt Cdr

Genita

~~and~~

(2 1 0 4 6)

in his presence

Lt. Jack Hamilton Warren, (N) V.R. 076160

Valleyfield

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2 2 - 0 2
- 2 0 0 5 T R 2 2 2
1 2 2 2

6 / - 2

David Henry

A/L/Amr Brown LTO V19206

O/Lm David Edgar Brown ST V51452

A/B Mervyn E. Woods ST V50658

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L { A.H. Godwin ord Am V 65929 } L 6

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1 9 Bermuda e 2 C

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10 - 6 e

(Re T.B.S. 9 NSF)

Charles Law Passman State Lt VR
o a 2 o for 071790 valleyfield

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
8 9 10 11 12 13 14

9 10 11 12 13 14

Para 50 C.O. Gibb C.O. 65
e 1 Lt. Warren & Lt. Tate
 $\frac{1}{2}$ + e 06 65 -

2-3-1-2-1-2
 full
 death
 HMCs
 over on - 00

This is the opinion of the Board that Valleyfield
 sank as a result of an explosion at about
 23⁴⁵ P May, in latitude approx
 46° 03' North 52° 24' West



This further the opinion of the Board that this explosion
 was the result of an explosion

6-2 0 2 - 1 to C-W
 moon
 bow of Valleyfield

6-2 0 0 0 0 0 to V.
 either (a) V 2 0 was head
 (b) - 00. 6 4

o i - o r f o r h o o
c t - o - a - p
m o - o o u:

(a) ~~o o o o~~

1 t e p a o - o
a l d o e } o f
- b d o e } set

(b) o i - o - " o 1 7,

4.000 v L L d" o
slightly eastern
valleyfield, } o h
c y h t e b
c p h l 1) sw2 c
- a n b y o f
m

(c) o i - o m i 1

a o o o o r v
c l c o t R x c
- sub detection is unreliable
1 f

o 2030 P zig zag c 2 - 7. - Halby

(d) ~~o zig zag o h b o o 100~~

~~1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9~~

1 3 o h - o e = a c
o t o r x v y o i o

general

$\sigma_2 = 60 \text{ mm}$


40

(a)

1 - 2 primers

(a) of 7070801342


7 2 32° F. L - N 0040 P
 - 0200 P 7th May 44
low



1) - i - o 2 6 L - C o 6
 1 co Hiff / i - 6 L 2
 - 2 2 - 2 6 | St Warren
 VR of Vall. / C. 2 2
 - 2 6 o post humas 2

2) ~~2~~ 2 2 4 9 L
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(1) - L o c o v 1 leigh light
 aircraft L - Y 3 [8' L] →
 L o o w v a l l c u

(2) 4 6
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Board of Inquiry - Loss of HMCS VALLEYFIELD. 1943-1947

FILE/DOSSIER :

REFERENCE NUMBER / NUMÉRO DE RÉFÉRENCE:

File.RG24-D-1-c. Volume/box number: 4107. File number: 1156-381/65. Textual records. [Access: Open]. Government. Finding aid number: 24-86

PAGE(S) : **187**

DATE : **29/09/2016**