FILE NUMBER: N.S.S. 18340 - 381/30 VOL. 1

SECRET SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

DAMAGE BY ENEMY OR OTHER ACTION

H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

DORMANT X S/S

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. BY
				11/3/45	mc			
Pers Staff	Per Requisition C.R. JUN 6 1945							
Pers (N) DPR 15				17/6	C.		JUN 18 1945	
Pers (N) DPR 5	JUL 17 1945							
Sea NB		21/7	[illegible]	23.VII	[illegible]		JUL 23 1945	
NCR				28.1.63	[illegible]			

VOL. 1 N.S.S. 18340 - 381/30 SECRET SERIES

1385-1 Vol 7
TD6033F

DO NOT DESTROY

C.R.232.1/54.1M.

H.Q. 10 S.P.
30M—8-43 (1518)
N.S. 815-7-10

FOR INSTRUCTIONS RE HANDLING FILES AND CORRESPONDENCE SEE BACK OF COVER

NOTICE

1. The BRANCH SECRETARIAT must be informed when you pass a file by hand.

2. Secretariats or File Rooms must inform Central Registry by C.R. Pass Slip when a file is passed from hand to hand from one Branch Secretariat to another.

3. Do not hold files longer than absolutely necessary. This is what causes False Dockets. Files are urgently required by many Branches. If action cannot be taken inside of 48 hours B.F. FILE.

4. Place file number on all outgoing letters.

5. Send all incoming correspondence to Central Registry for registration and filing BEFORE TAKING ACTION.

6. Do not pass loose papers.

7. Do not deface file covers.

File No. Lx 8340-381/30

H.Q. 18 Re
250M—6-44 (746)
N.S. 7570—H.Q. 18

DORMANT

Referred to	Remarks	Taken off Charge
Staff	135396 22.9.44	
E&E (S)	24.10.44	
E&E (N)		
Staff	20.11.44	NOV 21 1944
D&P	Per Requisition C.R. JAN 10 1945	JAN 13 1945
E&E	Per Requisition C.R. JAN 23 1945 RB	FEB 1 - 1945
Staff DSO (1)	Per Requisition C.R. FEB -2 1945	
E&E	Per Requisition C.R. JUN 9 1945	FEB 6 1945
Pers (E)		JUN 18 1945
Pers (W)	DPP/L Per Requisition C.R. JUL 17 1945	JUL 23 1945
Bulland	18-1-63	

File No.....

H.Q. 18 Revised
250M—6-44 (746)
N.S. 7570—H.Q. 18

Vol.....

Referred to	Remarks	Taken off Charge

FILE NUMBER: N.S.S. 18340 - 381-30 F.D. 920

SECRET FALSE DOCKET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

Damage by Enemy or other Action

~~DAMAGE CONTROL REPORTS~~.

H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

~~MAIN FILE CHARGED E.&.C. 23.1.45. x~~ GN

Referred	For Remarks	Date of Pass	Initials	Date of P.A.	Initials	Date of B.F.	Central Registry	Inspected in C.R. By
Staff	On main file 4572 JAN 31 1945							
IR	Memo [illegible]	3/2	C	[illegible]	[illegible]		FEB 4 - 1945	[illegible]

NAVAL SERVICE / MINUTE SHEET

[redacted] FILE NO. LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (WITH INITIALS & DATE)
STAFF	
1. D. N. I. 15.6	For approval to release particulars in the attached letter to next of kin of H.M.C.S. "MATANE" casualties, please.
2. D. O. D. 16/6	For confirmation of the information given in letter to next of kin, one folio down, please.

A.B. Luke

12-6-45. Lieut. Cdr. (S) A.B. Luke, R.C.N.V.R.,
for DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL RECORDS.

3 PERS (N) DPR/5.

DEPT. NUMBER

SAMPLE

- NAVAL SERVICE -

FILE: N.S. ....., PERS.(N)

.... June, 1945.

Dear Mr. (Mrs.).....:

Further to my letter of the (date), the Department is now able to release further information regarding the mishap which resulted in your (relationship)'s loss and I am accordingly passing on the following particulars which will, no doubt, be of interest to you.

Your (relationship)'s ship, H.M.C.S. "MATANE" was on anti-submarine patrol duty in company with other ships of the Royal Canadian Navy, in the vicinity of Ushant Island, which is near Brest, France, when she was hit by a glider bomb from an enemy aircraft. Three other ratings besides your (relationship) lost their lives at this time and several were wounded. The ship itself sustained considerable damage and had to be towed back to her base.

Yours sincerely,

SECRETARY, NAVAL BOARD.

Mr. Mrs. .....,
Full Name & Address.

Naval Service -------- Minute Sheet

FILE NO. 18340-381/30 .....LETTER NO.

F.D. 920

F D 920.

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)
I.R.	C. in M.O.'s letter C.S.178-21-5 dated 18 Jan. 1945 re H.M.C.S. "Matane" action Damage Report (letter no. 04572) has been removed and placed on main file 18340-381/30 Vol. 1. J.A. Ford for the D.S.D. 2/2/45.

Naval Service -------- Minute Sheet

FILE NO. 18340-381/30 Vol 1. LETTER NO.

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)
E&C (C.N.E.C.)	Referred please as this appears to be reply to your signal timed 152305/Nov. – three folios down. [signature] for Sec. D.S.D. 2/2/45.

REFERRED

TO	INIT	DATE
CNEC	✓ [initials]	3/2
DNC		
DNED		
DSR	✓ [initials]	5/2
DEE		
EX. A		
CUR.		
B.A.		
D.SEC.		
P.A.		

Chief Naval Engineering and Construction
FEB 4 1945
Naval Service Headquarters.

CANADA

Department of National Defence

Naval Service

AIR MAIL

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No C.S.148-21-5

Ba231/5

18th January, 1945.

FROM: Canadian Naval Mission Overseas,
Kings House, 10 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1.

TO : The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

04572

18340-381/30

5 FD920.

H.M.C.S. "MATANE" - Action Damage Report

With reference to the above ship's action damage report forwarded under MA-0-5 of 23rd August 1944, paragraph (7), and N.S.H.Q.'s signal 152305/November, enclosed is a copy of H.M.C.S. "MATANE"'s MA-0-5 dated 12th January 1945, which gives all the information available regarding the supply of telephones for damage control purposes.

Secretary,
Canadian Naval Mission Overseas.

FEB - 1 A.M.

DS/D
DWT
1/2

JAN 30 1945
N. S. H. Q.
Central Registry
Mail Opening
5

ENCLOSURES CHECKED
IN N.C.R.

SECTION	NO.	INIT.
Mail	1	KR
Index		
Routeing	1	[illegible]
Remarks		

MAIN FILE
CHARGED TO 8/C
SIGNE
23.1.45
REC'D CENTRAL REGISTRY

(C O P Y)

12th January 1945

MA-O-5

FROM: The Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. "MATANE".

TO : Canadian Naval Mission Overseas,
Kings House, 10 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1.

- -

ACTION DAMAGE REPORT

- -

Submitted:

With reference to your C.S.1481-21-5 dated 30th December'44, it is regretted that no information can be supplied, regarding the two portable damage control phones, mentioned in "MATANE's" action damage report of 23rd August'44, as this report was drawn up by Lieut. Cdr. F.W.T.Lucas, RCNVR, before the writer joined the ship. On receipt of your letter the question was investigated and it was impossible to find any authority for the supply of these phones.

2. It is submitted, however, that the supply of these phones would be a desirable and beneficial addition to aid in dealing promptly with any damage sustained, in which normal communications were affected.

(Sgd)
Lieutenant,DSC,R.C.N.V.R.,
COMMANDING OFFICER.

S. 1320 H
15000M-11-43 (2871-2-3)
N. S. 815-9-1320-H
K. P. 95441

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: CNMO

From: NSHQ

18340-381/30

REFERENCE COMMANDING OFFICER "MATANE" REPORT, DAMAGE ACTION, NA-O-5, 23RD AUGUST, 1944, PARAGRAPH 7. REQUEST YOU ADVISE AUTHORITY FOR SUPPLY OF TWO PORTABLE DAMAGE CONTROL PHONES ALLOWED FOR THIS TYPE OF SHIP AS N.S.H.Q. HAS NO INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.

CNS
ACNS
DOD
DSD
D OF P
CNEO
D SEC SUP
DMT

1523052

PASSED TO CANAVSERV FOR CNMO AT 160400

T/T CODE 15/11/44 HP 3896
DRAFTED BY C.N.E.O. (GLS/ERT)
N.S. S.18340-381/30 VOL. 1 (E&O)

202215

S. 1320f.
15M pads 200 11-40 (8013)
N.S. 815-9-1320f.

NAVAL MESSAGE

For [illegible]
Cy[illegible]
Coding Office
only.

DRAFTED BY C.N.E.C. (GLS/ERT)

N.S. S.18340-381/30 Vol. 1 (E&C)

Originators Instructions: (Indication of Priority, Personal, NOTWT For Exercise).	INTERCEPT GROUP
TO: C.N.M.O.	FROM: N.S.H.Q.

REFERENCE COMMANDING OFFICER "MATANE" REPORT, DAMAGE ACTION, MA-O-5, 23RD AUGUST, 1944, PARAGRAPH 7. REQUEST YOU ADVISE AUTHORITY FOR SUPPLY OF TWO PORTABLE DAMAGE CONTROL 'PHONES ALLOWED FOR THIS TYPE OF SHIP AS N.S.H.Q. HAS NO INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.

1o

152305Z

Time noted

17.11.44
D.S.R.

noted
18/11

Book or Table to be used for		Initials of Cypherer or Coder.	Time of Receipt in Cypher or Coding Office.	Date.
Cyphering or Coding.	Recyphering or Recoding.			
	NOV 21 A.M.			15.11.44

NOV 15 44 PM

N.S.H.Q.

NAVAL MESSAGE

N.S. 18340-381/30
Vol. "1" (E & C)

(NAVAL SERVICE)

ACMD/MS

MEMORANDUM TO C. N. E. C.: (14.11) (1) D.S.R.

Instructions regarding additional communications to Boiler Room are noted.

With reference to the protection of the auxiliary machinery from shock, the statement made in Section IV, paragraph 3 of the Commanding Officer's Report is incorrect. The actual provisions made are:-

(1) Main Engines - Fabricated Steel bed plates.

(2) Air pumps, feed pumps, etc. of all bronze construction, except steam cylinders; no resilient pads.

(3) Main generators, main circulators, fan engines, steering gear etc., of all steel or bronze construction as far as possible and mounted on resilient pads, with resilient washers between feet and holding down bolt heads.

Matane was one of the earlier ships of the class to complete and rigid/resilient mountings were not then available. Later ships have these mountings.

Judging by the other damage sustained, no resilient mounting yet devised would have withstood the effect any better. It is to be noted that the Starboard generator continued to run till flooded and that the port generator and port main circulator, on the damaged side, appear to be the only auxiliaries put out of action.

Chief Naval Engineering and Construction
NOV 14 1944
Naval Service Headquarters

(A.C.M. Davy)
Captain (E) R.C.N.
DIRECTOR NAVAL ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT.

RJM 15/11/44

O T T A W A, 14th November, 1944.

Noted 14/11

FILE NUMBER **N.S.S.** 18340 - 381/30 **F.D.** 493

SECRET FALSE DOCKET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

DAMAGE by ENEMY OR OTHER ACTION

~~DAMAGE CONTROL REPORTS~~

H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

MAIN FILE CHRGD. STAFF 22-9-44 TG

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	DATE OF B.F.	INSPECTED IN C.R. BY
Ed[illegible]	WITH PAPER 27 / 138698 OCT 18 1944		DDB.	26.10.44	OCT 27 1944		[illegible]

SECRET

R 87/0050

18340-381/30

135396

From: The Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. "Matane".

Date: 23rd August, 1944. File: MA-0-5.

To : The Admiralty,
Whitehall, London S.W.1.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The following action damage report is submitted in accordance with C.A.F.O.2489/42 and C.C.N.O.132.

T.W. Lucas
Lieut. Commander, R.C.N.V.R.
Commanding Officer.

STAFF		INITIALS	Date
	C.N.S.		
3	A.C.N.S.		23/10
	O.J.A.F.		
1	D.W.T.		
2	D.O.D.		9/10
	D. of P.		
	D.N.I.		
	D.T.D.		
4	D.S.D.		
5	O.I.C.		
	H.Y.D.		
	INDEX		
REFER TO			

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S.IC			
KARDEX	6		14/10
STAT.	3		12/10
INF.	4		13/10
DOR			
SEC			16/10

REFERRED		
TO	INIT	DATE
CNEC		
DNC		14/11
DNED		
DSR		
DEE		7/11
EX. A.		
CUR.		
B.E.		
D.SEC		
P.A.		

Noted on Kardex
H.M.C.S. Matane
Initials

Chief Naval Engineering and Construction Officers
OCT 24 1944
Naval Service Headquarters

INDEXED IN
By

SEP 22 A.M.

135396

SECTION I.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

The following excerpt is taken from Senior Officer, 9th Escort Group's report of proceedings dated July 25th, 1944.

(i.e. Cdr Layard of HMCS MATANE)

July 15th: 1330 - H.M.C. Ships MATANE, SWANSEA and STORMONT sailed from Moville and proceeded Southward 16 knots.
2330 - On arrival at K2 Buoy was joined by HMCS. MEON from Liverpool.

July 16th: 0500 - On approaching the Smalls thick fog was encountered, which persisted almost without a break until after rounding Land's End. At about 1700 received C.-in-C., Plymouth's 161611B ordering 9th Escort Group to patrol in areas Z245, 240 and 239.
1800 - After passing the Wolf, Group turned to Southward and shaped course for patrol area.
2200 - Reached the northern edge of Z245 and commenced A/S patrol at 11 knots. Ships stationed at 2 mile intervals.

July 17th: Continued A/S patrol without incident.
2245 - Intercepted Signal from 14th Escort Group saying that they were being attacked by Enemy Aircraft.

July 18th: 0030 - Received C.-in-C.'s 172324B, ordering 9th and 12th Escort Groups to exchange areas as convenient a.m. on the 18th.
0200 - Received C.-in-C.'s 180106B ordering 9th E.G. to move into areas Z234 and 235.
0400 - Reached Northwestern edge of Z245 and commenced A/S sweep. 0800 - Altered course to 064° and increased to 16 knots to comply with C-in-C's 172324B, that is, to exchange stations with E.G.12.
0850 - Received C-in-C's 180740B correcting the previous signal which now meant that the 9th E.G. should exchange stations with the 14th and not the 12th E.G.
0940 - Altered to 240° to close 14th E.G. which was patrolling in an area west of Ushant.
1145 - Received C-in-C's 181040B ordering 9th E.G. to join 14th E.G. for a concerted search.
1251 - Took station on 14th E.G., prolonging his line to the South; both groups then proceeded to carry out an East and West sweep through the area at 13 knots, with ships stationed 2 miles apart. After dark, distance apart of ships was increased to 3 miles, and speed reduced to 8 knots.

July 19th: 0200 - Received C-in-C's 182340B ordering 14th and 9th E.G.s to new patrol areas.
0230 - Altered course to 360° for new area, namely Z230, 225, 229 and 224.
1345 - Received C-in-C's 191237B ordering 9th E.G. to establish a gamma search about centre position 49°18' N. 03004'W.
0341 - Altered course 084°and increased speed to 16 knots.

July 19th: 1550 - Sighted 2 Aircraft circling close to the surface bearing 0[illegible]°.
1600 - Altered course to 070° to close and investigate.
1622 - Reduced to 11 knots to sweep through position where smoke float dropped by aircraft had been seen. Wellington Aircraft and 2 or 3 Spitfires still in the vicinity but unable to establish communication with any of them, either by V/S or R/T.
1645 - Received C-in-C's 191606 ordering 2 ships to be detached to search for survivors. This signal explained the presence of fighter and other aircraft in the vicinity. No sign of survivors.
1700 - Altered course to the Northward to keep in touch with aircraft. 1800 - Received signal cancelling orders for the search for survivors. 1835 - Turned to course 170° and started gama search.
1900 - American Liberator closed and reported two enemy fishing vessels 50 miles distant, detached SWANSEA to investigate but at 1920 recalled her as aircraft report was considered too vague and the distance anyhow too great. It subsequently transpired that these fishing vessels contained refugees from the Channel Islands.
2225 - SWANSEA obtained A/S contact and carried out two Hedgehog attacks. This target was classified and plotted as wreck number 20 in position 49o22.5' N. 03°38'W.
2345 - Continued patrol.

July 20th: 1135 - Received C-in-C's 1004B ordering 9th E.G. to an area West of the approaches to Brest to intercept submarine believed to be in the vicinity.
1145 - Altered course to 235° and increased speed to 16 knots.
1155 - Aircraft sighted ahead, believed to be a Ju. 88 or 188.
1500 - Reported an enemy aircraft had been sighted and went to A.A. action stations.
1622 - Mosquito Aircraft arrived to provide Fighter cover.
1811 - Reached northern edge of area and commenced A/S search.
1850 - Mosquitoes left.
2055 - When in position 48°14'N. 05°33'W. explosion occurred astern of MEON which at first was believed to be caused by a gnat. Action alarm gongs were rung and shortly afterwards aircraft were sighted and it was realized that air attack was imminent. Conditions were ideal with high clouds, and having no air-warning radar sets we[illegible] were taken entirely by surprise. An aircraft, angle of sight about 60°, was seen approaching from fine on the starboard quarter at a height of about 10,000 feet. Almost as soon as sighted, the glider bomb was seen to detach itself, hover for a few seconds under the aircraft, and then dive down on to the ship. The starboard Oerlikons immediately came into action and the engines were put to full ahead, but almost before this order could take effect, the bomb arrived, hitting the ship a glancing blow just before "Y" gun and bursting in the water close alongside. There was a large escape of smoke and steam, which made further observation of the attack very difficult. It is considered, however, that the attacking force consisted of three aircraft, each carrying two bombs. Two were seen to fall astern of MEON, one appeared to get out of control and fall a very

July 20th:
long way short of SWANSEA, a second one fell close to the port side of MATANE and one between SWANSEA and STORMONT. During the attack the aircraft were free to manoeuvre as they wished, well out of range of our 4" guns and the only hope was to be able to hit the bombs with Oerlikon fire as they approached. SWANSEA claims to have hit and deflected one which was heading for her.

On examination it was found that the damage was not as severe as was at first anticipated. The bomb which came in at a very steep angle from the starboard quarter (estimated at about 70°) hit the edge of the carley float on the roof of "Y" Gun ammunition hoist, passed through the combing of the gun deck on the port side, through the ladder on to the quarter-deck, through the small bulwark at the break of the upper deck, into the water where it burst alongside. The effect was to blow a large hole in the port side abreast the after end of the engine room which immediately flooded. Luckily both bulkheads remained intact which confined the flooding to one compartment only. In the circumstances casualties were extremely light; two men who were standing in the path of the bomb on the port side of the ammunition supply shelter were never seen again. Everyone in the Engine Room suffered more or less seriously from steam scalding and one man was either killed or trapped and drowned and his body was only recovered on return to harbour. The fact that the bomb burst under water undoubtedly saved the lives of all the after guns crews and supply parties as there was no blast or splinter effect at all. As it was, the Officer of the Quarters at "Y" Gun was the only casualty, with a severe foot wound.

As soon as it was apparent that the attack was over, the Medical Officers of SWANSEA and STORMONT were transferred to attend the wounded, and MATANE was taken in tow by MEON. Steps were taken to shore up the foremost and after bulkheads of the Engine Room. In a very short time the diesel dynamo was running, and lighting and general electrical services were re-established throughout the ship, and it was not long before the galley was again in working order and hot meals were able to be obtained. It is interesting to note that Type Q.H.3, part of which was thrown from its bracket on the the deck of the Chart House from explosion, when replaced and switched on, was found to be in perfect working order.

In reply to the "Help signal" sent out by SWANSEA, fighter cover was on the spot about 20 minutes after the attack and remained until dark. Towing proceeded without difficulty or incident in flat calm weather throughout the night.

July 21st: 0630 - Stopped while further medical stores and equipment were transferred from SWANSEA. The weather now started to deteriorate with a wind and sea from the Northeast and though there was no sign of the bulkheads yielding, some anxiety was felt on account of the weakened upper deck which began to work rather badly. In order to increase the freeboard aft all upper deck depth charges were jettisoned.

1000 - Meon reported shadowing Aircraft which did not respond to her Type 242. This was reported to C-in-C. and shortly afterwards fighter cover arrived; about this time Tug RECOVERY arrived but was of little use as she reported her engines defective and unable to steam more

July 21st:

than 5 knots. MATANE remained in tow of MEON until about 1500.when the tow parted. STORMONT was then ordered to pass her towing haw_ser; which was done extremely smartly and quickly and the tow was once more resumed. The weather now changed again with very heavy rain, but decreasing wind and sea. No further incident occurred.

2145 - When just past the Eddystone, the tow was transferred to Tug RETORT, and later on, on passing through the Gate at 2308 a Dockyard Tug took over and berthed MATANE at No. 1 Jetty South Yard.

SECTION II.--GENERAL

(a)

1. Projectile was glider bomb estimated to contain about 500 to 1,000 pounds of explosive, with wing spread of approximately 10 feet and small tail assembly, driven by jet propulsion motor. The motor was recovered intact and turned over to the Bomb Disposal Officer, Plymouth. Small portions of wing and tail assembly were also recovered. These appeared to be constructed from an aluminum alloy of a porous nature and were painted light gray.

2. Level release at an altitude from 8,000 to 10,000 feet.

3. Bomb struck carley float on top of Shelter over "Y" ammunition hoist; motor, wings and tail were stripped off at this point. Bomb then passed through the combing of "Y" gun-deck on the port side, demolishing a heavy reel in passage, demolished the ladder leading from "Y" gun-deck to the quarterdeck, passed through the small bulwark at the break of the upper deck and burst in the water abreast of the Engine Room.

4. The distance from the point where the bomb first struck, i.e. top of "Y" Gun shelter, to the point where it exploded in the water approximately six feet from the ship's side in way of Station 83 is 30 feet. The angle of glide about 45°, the path of the bomb being from aft forward at an angle to the ship's course of about 60°.

5. The bomb first passed through and carried away the end section of a twenty-man carley float of the kapok-filled copper-sheeting type. It then struck a heavy wire reel and completely demolished it and passed through the combing of "Y" gun-deck which is made up of 15 lbs. plate. It then carried away the ladder from the quarterdeck to the weather deck and carried on through the bulwark at the break of the foc's'le deck. The plating at this point is 25 lbs. to square foot.

6. The hull damage centers at Station 83 port side above and below the water line. The O.B. here was blown inward creating a hole in the plating approximately 8 feet long and 4 feet above and below the water line. In addition all seams were opened aft to Station 86. The after Engine Room levels head and forward as far as frame 74. All plates on the port side within the space confined by these frames were badly dished if not totally destroyed and all frames from 86 to 72 were bent and distorted. There is a slight dent in the keel plate at St. 82-83 but so far no damage has been discovered to vertical keel.

7. The O.B. at "D" stroke is corrugated as far forward as Station 54. Several plates on the upper deck have also buckled slightly. The exptent of this damage has not yet been fully ascertained.

8. There is no evidence of blast effect, all structure damage being related to underwater explosion.

9. The only evidence of splinter damage is a few ragged edges on the beading of the bulwark on the port side of the ship at the break of the fo'c'sle deck. There are also in this immediate vicinity a few shallow gauges in the plates approximately 2 in. long and 1 in. wide and at the deepest point approximately 3/16 in. deep.

10. The only plating perforated by splinters was the beading mentioned in Para. 9 above. The thickness of this is $\frac{1}{8}$ in. and the largest piece of metal removed 4 in. long and about 2 in. wide.

11. The detonation appears to have been complete. The largest fragments of the bomb proper recovered were approximately 1 foot square of $\frac{1}{8}$ in. aluminum alloy.

12. Complete flooding of Engine Room resulted in stoppage of machinery and temporary loss of power, light and telephone communication. All armament continued in action, being trained by hand.

13. The A.R.L. plot on the bridge was shifted inboard approximately one foot. Also the Gyro repeater in the plot broke away from its support and crashed on the deck. Outside of Engine Room gauges and instruments there has been no evidence of damage to any of the ship's instruments.

14. No evidence of any incendiary effects found.

15. Around the area where the bomb struck, and also evident in the fragments picked up, there is a very persistent odor strongly resembling pediculosis pubis, the latter used in Naval Sick Bays for the extermination of body parasites.

(b)

5. All tanks aft of the Engine Room, i.e. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 were 95% full as were Tanks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The four wing tanks adjacent No. 1 and 2 Boiler Rooms and immediately forward of the Engine Room contained oil as follows: #7 Tank 25%; #8 Tank 10.4%; #9 Tank 58%; #10 Tank 58%.

9. Engine Room completely flooded.

10. No. 2 Boiler Room. The rate of flooding was about 6-8 tons per hour gradually decreasing as the weight on the bulkhead 71 was relieved by shoring.

SECTION III - DAMAGE CONTROL

1. The ship had been brought to the first state of readiness immediately prior to the explosion and damage control parties were at their action posts. All "X" and "Y" doors, hatches and scuttles were closed as were ventilation trunks.

2. Flooding was localized in the Engine Room compartment. Immediately following the explosion shoring was undertaken in No. 2 Boiler Room and in the lobby immediately above the after 4 in. magazine. As time permitted, additional shoring was undertaken in the Depth Charge Store and the after 4" magazine. There was no serious leakage of water through bulkheads and the ship was able to be towed at an average speed of 8 knots within 30 minutes of the explosion. During the passage home a small amount of flooding occurred into No. 2 Boiler Room; this was easily reduced by ship's pumps and was eventually completely stopped by additional shoring.

3. No action necessary as the ship settled on an even keel.

4. Nil.

5. Damage control stores were adequate for the type of damage sustained It is, however, recommended that an extra allowance of hand saws be provided to enable a larger number of men to be simultaneously employed cutting shores to the right lengths. It would also have facilitated the restoration of lighting and power throughout the ship if a sufficiency of electric rubber-covered cable of small dimension had been available, already cut in convenient lengths of about 20 feet for hooking up from the main emergency cables to the various distribution boxes. As it was, the necessary cable had to be obtained by cutting the leads from extension hand lamps. A further two emergency fuse panels could also have been utilized, two only being carried on board.

6. Adequate.

7. With the flooding of the Engine Room, telephone communication throughout the ship ceased for approximately half an hour until restoration of essential services was accomplished by the use of secondary power. In this particular case it is not considered that failure of communication in any way affected the promptness of dealingwith the damage. The two portable damage control 'phones allowed for this type of ship had not been received since none had been available at the Naval Stores in Londonderry. However, as already mentioned, this did not materially affect the promptness of dealing with the damage.

8. Problems of damage control in H.M.C.S. "Matane" had previously been exercised at every possible opportunity. The work was divided under two headings: that of damage control under the charge of First Lieutenant, who was responsible for providing suitable personnel for damage

8. cont'd.
control parties, allotting time for exercises and supervising the necessary arrangements prior to damage such as location of equipment, closing of watertight doors, etc. Lieut.(E) Anderson, 2nd Engineer Officer, undertook the duties of damage repair officer. His duties included the provision and maintenance of tools and equipment, the actual training of personnel and to take charge of the damage control parties at the scene of the damage after it had occurred. This arrangement was based on the fact that the First Lieutenant was action Officer of the Watch and would not be available to supervise damage control and repair while the ship was still in action. Two damage control parties were organized--a forward party under the direction of the Chief Stoker who made his headquarters in the wardroom and an after party under the direction of the Shipwright who made his headquarters in the Engineer's Workshop. It was intended that these parties would work together to deal with damage in any part of the ship and they were trained as one unit. The separation before damage occurred was in order to reduce casualties in the event of the ship being hit. In the actual event no casualties were suffered by either party and they were in a position to take prompt and effective action to reduce flooding and restore essential services.

SECTION IV -- MACHINERY

1. When the explosion occurred the Engine Room was immediately filled with steam from the several steam & exhaust lines severed by the blast. At the same time all lights went out in the ship due to grounding of port Dynamo and all electric cables on the port side of the Engine Room being cut and grounded.

In the darkness and with the inrush of water it was impossible to estimate the damage to machinery but the starboard Main Engine appears to have suffered no structural damage since the engine turned easily throughout the tow back to port.

After the ship was docked, the following damage to machinery became evident:-

Main Engines

Port - The whole of the cylinder block has moved upwards and inboard causing the fracture of all supporting columns at the bottom and top flanges. In addition, the way-shaf is badly distorted due to the port main condenser being thrown bodily against it, and the brackets supporting the way-shaft and carrying the guides for the slide valve rods are all fractured. The cylinder blocks in the vicinity of the bolted joints are also fractured as is the framework of the turning engine. All piston and valve rods are bent. It has not yet been possible to examine thoroughly the engine bead and crank shaft, although the latter is suspected distorted and the bed plate possibly strained. It will therefore be necessary to have a new port engine complete with reversing and turning engines and thrust block.

Starboard - No structural damage visible. This is supported by the fact that the engine turned freely when being towed at slow speeds.

Sect[illegible]V. 1. con't.

[illegible]eterioration of corrodible parts has taken place due to immersion in sea water.

Aux. Machinery

All auxiliaries are intact, but have suffered from corrosion and rusting, with the exception of the following:

Port Dynamo Engine: Steam engine is a total wreck and will need replacing.

Port Circulating Engine: Cast iron distance piece supporting steam cylinder fractured, requires replacing.

Main Condenser

Starboard - Intact, and to all appearances in good condition. May need repair when tested.

Port - Has been torn from its supports and the shell badly indented. A new body and tubes will be required but it is probable that the tube sheets and end covers will be serviceable.

Steam and Exhaust Pipes

All main steam and exhaust pipes on the port side have been damaged. Some will need repair and the remainder will have to be replaced by new.

All other main steam and exhaust pipes in good condition.

The auxiliary steam and exhaust pipes on the port side have been badly damaged, especially in the vicinity of the dynamo engine and will need replacing. Other steam and exhaust pipes will need repair, and some replacements.

All auxiliary and exhaust pipes elsewhere intact.

Bilge Pipes, etc.

All these on the port side on the outboard side of the port main engine are badly damaged and will need replacing.

Underwater Fittings

Even on the port side these appear intact and no damage is anticipated on the starboard side. There are quite a number of bent valve spindles, but as far as can be seen at present, no other major damage to these fittings.

Miscellaneous fittings, including valves, pressure gauges, telegraphs, etc.

All damaged on the port side and will need replacing. Others can probably be refitted, except for certain instruments damaged by immersion in sea water and beyond repair.

Boiler Rooms

All in good condition with the exception of No. 2 Boiler, where about 18 in no. port wing tubes are distorted and will require replacing. Boilers were at full pressure for some time after the explosion and have otherwise been accepted as being in good condition generally. Some boiler casings have been distorted by temporary shores to bulkheads.

Shafting and Propeller

Apparently all in good condition. Alignment of both shafts will be tested in due course.

Sect IV. 1. con't.

Main Dynamo

Both port and starboard dynamos have been totally submerged in sea water and in all probability the insulation is so seriously damaged that replacements will be necessary.

Main Switchboard

Very badly damaged and beyond economical repair. New required.

Main Supply Cables.Port Side

Damaged and will require re-wiring.

Starboard side will probably be required to be re-wired owing to salt water deterioration, but dependent on tests to be carried out later.

Other Electrical circuits, lighting, etc. in Engine Room and vicinity will require re-wiring throughout.

D.G. Coils on port side damaged and will require re-wiring from Diesel Engine Room to Electrical Store.

The above machinery damage report is based on a visual examination only. There may be other small additional damage which will be revealed on general refit work and replacements, but it is not anticipated that there will be any further major damaged machinery or fittings.

2. The senior E.R.A. on watch at the time the bomb struck shut off the throttles and also the emergency stops closing the main bulkhead stops. It was, however, impossible to get the auxiliary bulkhead stops closed because of the intense heat from the escaping steam. All communication in the ship being out because of electrical failure, it was minutes before the boiler room received orders to shut down so that the steam issuing into the Engine Room could be stopped. All casualties suffered with the exception of two were caused by steam from the fractured port auxiliary steam line. If a quick closing emergency stop valve was to be fitted in the auxiliary steam lines, a repetition of this sort could be avoided. Also establishment of communication to the boiler rooms from some point in the ship outside the engine room would be of considerable value should the engine room be put out of action.

3. There were no provisions made to protect the machinery from shock.

SECTION V.- GUN ARMAMENT

1. After the explosion "Y" Gun became heavy to train probably due to distortion of the pad on which the gun is mounted. It was not sufficient to reduce the gun's efficiency markedly.

SECTION VI - TORPEDO ARMAMENT

Nil.

SECTION VII - ELECTRICAL

1. The electrical system was in a high state of efficiency at the time of the action.
The electrical organization of the ship was as follows:
P.O. L.T.O. and 1 S.T. at Hedgehog.
E.A. and 1 S.T. Damage Control.
1 S.T. - H.P. Board.
1 S.T. - L.P. Board and Gyro Compass.
1 L.T.O. and 2 S.T.s-- Depth Charge Party.

2. Nil.

3. Due to failure of mechanical end of Port Dynamo and grounding of cables on port side of ship caused by inrush of water, the High Power board was put out of action immediately and subsequently totally immersed. There was no evidence of incorrect functioning of any of the equipment. The L.P. side continued to operate satisfactorily on battery supply.

4. Steam to generators failed completely due to severed steam pipes.

5. When the port generator was put out of action, the load was momentarily carried by the starboard dynamo but as the water rose rapidly the whole system failed completely due to immersion. The average action load was approximately 250 Amp., peak load of 300 Amp. with four Oerlikon guns and 20" Projector in use.

6. The effect of the damage was to paralyze the ship for a period of approximately 60 minutes until the emergency diesel generator could be put into operation and affected circuits isolated.

7. To make certain that no damage had been suffered by the Diesel generator, it was started up, allowed to run for a few minutes and then shut down.
First of all, the permanent emergency leads running from the change-over box in the diesel compartment to the emergency connections at the top of the diesel hatch were hooked up.
Two emergency cables were then strung from the diesel hatch emergency cables to the emergency connections over the watertight door in bulkhead 54. The permanent section box main leads were pulled out of M.J.I.S.3 and short leads strung from bulkhead 54x connections substituted in order to have a supply to all six 70-ton pump connections.
Another set of leads were hooked up to the diesel hatch connections, the main junction box leads pulled out of S.J.1 and the emergency cables substituted. S.J.1 is situated on bulkhead 54 in the Sick Bay flats. A second set of emergency leads were hooked up between the connections on the forward side of bulkhead 54 to the emergency connection on the forward side of bulkhead 54 beside S.J.1 in the Sick Bay flats.These connections have a permanent hook up down below to the

Sect. VII.Para.7.Con't.

emergency connections in the Canteen flats where another set of leads were strung across to R.J.1 on bulkhead 58 in the Canteen flats to replace the permanent section box leads which were pulled out.

The emergency fuse panel hanging in the Sick Bay flats was hooked up to the connections on the forward side of bulkhead 54 beside S.J.1 and the other fuse panel which was hanging in the after minesweeping flats was taken down to the Canteen flats and hooked up to R.J.1 so that additional connections could be made later.

The Diesel generator was then started up. This put on all the forward lighting, 70-ton fresh and salt water pumps, and low power M-G set about an hour after the attack.

The forward lighting was absolutely essential for the equipment in the sick bay as well as the officers' cabins which were used for the casualties.

After the lights came on, short leads were connected from the fuse panel in the Canteen flats to replace the permanent main junction leads in G.J.1 which were pulled out so that complete ventilation could be restored in the ship. An additional set of leads were run from the fuse panel in the Canteen flats to the gyro-room for the gyro.

A set of leads were run from the fuse panel in the Sick Bay flats to the 10" signal projectors fuse box in the Galley flats so that the 10" signal projectors could be utilized. Additional sets of leads were run from the fuse panel in the Sick Bay flats to replace the permanent leads pulled out of N.J.I.S.I.D.I. and M.J.I.S.I.D.1 and the two distribution boxes for No. 1 and No. 2 Boiler Rooms lighting, and N.J.I.S.I.D.3 situated in the starboard minesweeping mess, M.J.I.S.I.D3 in the port minesweeping mess, for the lighting in these messes, after minesweeping spaces and E.R.A.'s workshop. A set of leads were also run back from the fuse panel to "G" Oerlikon box in the starboard minesweeping mess for a supply to the Oerlikon gun motors.

Emergency lamps were used to light the tiller flats for hand-steering while being towed.

8. It is suggested that junction boxes N.J.1 and M.J.1 which feed all the after lighting be resituated in the minesweeping flats. They could not be utilized because they were completely immersed when the Engine Room flooded.

It is also suggested that emergency connections be fitted over the watertight door in Bulkhead 33 and permanent emergency cables be fitted between emergency connections at the top of the asdic instrument room hatch and those fitted down in the instrument room itself so that a supply could be run forward for the asdic alternators with little or no trouble.

SECTION VIII -- COMMUNICATIONS

Nil.

SECTION IX.

Nil.

SECTION X.

Nil.

SECTION XI - VICTUALLING DEPARTMENT

Force of explosion damaged galley stove. Repairs were immediately undertaken by victualling staff and a hot meal was served from the galley within two hours.

SECTION XII - MEDICAL

No damage was caused to Sick Bay or First Aid posts and Medical Officers in H.M.C.S. "Swansea" and "Stormont" were embarked in "Matane" immediately after action ceased and medical organization was adequate for dealing with casualties. It is recommended that a greater supply of blood plasma be carried as some of the seriously injured would have been lost had it not been for additional supplies of plasma transferred from "Swansea".

+ + + + + + + +

DRM'MM

N.S.C. 18340-381/30 Vol "1"
(E.&C.)

(NAVAL SERVICE)

MEMORANDUM TO C.N.E.C.

Re: Damage Report H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

Reference is made to the action damage report submitted by the Commanding Officer H.M.C.S. "MATANE" dated 23rd August, 1944, file reference MA-O-5, on this file.

2. The fact that within an hour or so after the damage had been sustained the emergency system had been rigged up to supply the oerlikons, the 70 ton pumps, the gyro, the fresh and salt water pumps, the low power motor generator sets and much of the ship's lighting, speaks very well for the ship's officers and men and for the electrical system, normal and emergency.

3. The report mentions in several places that failure of high power caused a loss of communications. (reference page 7 paragraph 12; page 8, paragraph 7; and page 11, paragraph 2 of the report). Phones are sound powered and since they were back in action a half hour after the damage (reference page 8, paragraph 7) they were possibly never actually out of commission.

4. Paragraph 2, page 11 mentions a lack of communication to the boiler rooms. Communication to the boiler rooms is by voice pipe only from the engine room. It is suggested that the report be referred to D.N.C. for comments on this point.

5. Paragraph 5, page 8 states that a further 2 emergency fuse panels could have been utilized, two only being carried on board. Frigate Alterations and Additions number 118 calls for the fitting of four portable emergency fuse panels, 2 with heavy fuses for power circuits and 2 with lighter fuses for lighting circuits; this Alterations and Additions number also calls for the supply of various lengths of light rubber cable. Evidently this A.&A. had not yet been carried out on H.M.C.S. "MATANE".

Chief Naval Engineering and Construction Officer
NOV 11 1944
Naval Service Headquarters

6. Paragraph 7, page 8 states that the 2 portable damage control phones allowed for this type of ship had not been received. The damage control equipment at present allowed to Frigates does not call for damage control phones, but this Directorate has recently submitted a proposal to you for the fitting of an electrical damage control tool chest with two telephones (reference my memorandum to you of 1st November, 1944, N.S. 29-44-1 Vol 51).

7. Paragraph 8, page 13 suggests that junction boxes N.J1 and M.J1 be re-situated in the minesweeping flats and that two additional emergency bulkhead terminals be fitted in bulkhead 33.

The fitting of additional emergency bulkhead terminals appears justified, and a submission to you covering this will be made.

The proposal to move the 2 junction boxes to upper deck level does not appear justified. The upper level would be the best position for all junction boxes in case of flooding, but it is probable that locations for all junction boxes and section boxes on the upper deck could not be found.

(P.T.O.)

It is submitted that when a Frigate has all the approved emergency fuse panels and cable, the flooding of one compartment would not delay the return of power to the remaining compartments appreciably, since the few boxes involved would soon be isolated. Emergency connections are available in all section boxes and distribution boxes and if a junction box has been rendered unusable, it is only necessary to make emergency connections to two or three section boxes instead.

E.G. Cullwick

(E.G.Cullwick)
Electrical Commander, R.C.N.V.R.,
Director of Electrical Engineering.

OTTAWA:
7th November, 1944.

CANADA

Department of National Defence

Naval Service

AIR MAIL

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. C.S. 148-21-6

SECRET

2nd August, 1944.

FROM: Canadian Naval Mission Overseas,
Kings House, 10 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1.

TO : The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.

COPY TO: Commander-in-Chief, C.N.A.,
H.M.C. Dockyard,
HALIFAX, Nova Scotia.

H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

Forwarded herewith as requested in C. in C. C.N.A.'s 281955/July, repeated to N.S.H.Q., is the preliminary report of damage sustained by H.M.C.S. "MATANE" as a result of action damage caused by a glider bomb.

2. The bomb skipped over the foc'sle deck from St'b'd to Port, near the break of the Foc'sle and exploded in the water on the port side at a point near the engine room. A hole was blown in the port side extending approximately from station 73 to 82. The force of the explosion also crumpled the foc'sle deck in three places, near stations 61, 71 and 90, the latter being most severe. The damage to the deck extended down the ship's sides, affecting plating, frames and longitudinals.

3. The Port Main Engine was severely damaged and will have to be removed from the ship for major repairs or complete replacement. The Starboard Main Engine can be repaired. The port main condenser and port dynamo will have to be replaced. The port air pump, circulating pump and reversing engine, as well as the evaporator have suffered major damage. Extensive repairs and replacements will have to be made on all other auxiliary machinery in the engine room compartment due to the effects, first of the action damage, and secondly, of the long immersion in sea water.

2........

for file

18340-381/30

29929

STAFF	INITIALS	Date
C.N.S.		30/8
A.C.N.S.		29.8
D.I.A.F.		
D.W.T.		12/8
D.O.D.	seen	
D. of P.		
D.N.I.		
D.T.D.		
D.S.D.		
O.I.C.		25/8
H.Y.D.		
S.L.C.S.		
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REFER TO 6

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CANADA

Department of National Defence

Naval Service

AIR MAIL

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. C.S. 148-21-6

2.

2nd August, 1944.

29920

4. Shores supporting No. 71 bulkhead, between the engine room and No. 2 Boiler room, were braced against No. 2 Boiler front. Due to the possible strain on the boiler, it should be thoroughly examined with this in mind.

5. From a preliminary examination, limited due to the flooded condition of the engine room, it is considered that at least four months will be required to put this ship in a sea worthy condition and make her fit for operational duties.

6. A full report on damage will be forwarded as soon as the ship has been dry-docked and a thorough investigation of the now flooded engine room made.

A. K. Donaldson

DEPUTY Secretary,
Canadian Naval Mission Overseas.

File No..................

NAVAL SERVICE
HEADQUARTERS

----- MINUTE SHEET -----

REFERRED TO	REMARKS
~~Sec. DOD~~	CNEC & DNC.
~~D Sec Staff~~	Should see this
	at once.
178	14/8/44
① CNEC D/15/8	Director of Operations Division AUG 14 1944 Naval Service Headquarters.
② DNC ✓	17/8
(3) DSR ✓	19/8
	SKS 3 20/8.
	4 G.C. 20/8.

AUG 21 P.M.

CANADA

Department of National Defence

Naval Service

AIR MAIL

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. C.S.148-21-5

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 194

CONFIDENTIAL

BA59/2

REFERRED

9th October, 4.

FD 493/492

FROM: Canadian Naval Mission Overseas,
Kings House, 10 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1.

TO : The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

18340-381/30

Copy to: The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters, (1 copy of enclosure)
Ottawa, Canada.

138608

H.M.C.S. "MATANE" - Electrical Damage Report

Forwarded herewith for your information, the attached two copies of Electrical Damage Report of the above ship.

Secretary,
Canadian Naval Mission Overseas.

A/DEE

RECEIVED
OCT 17 1944
N.S.H.Q.
CENTRAL
REGISTRY
(Secret Section)

RECEIVED
OCT 17 1944
N.S.H.Q.
CENTRAL
REGISTRY
(Subject Section)

MAIN FILE
CHARGED TO
SINCE
REC'D CENTRAL REGISTRY
OCT 17 1944
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EXT			
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CNEC			
TO		INITIALS	

REFERRED

FROM: The Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. "MATANE",
c/o G.P.O., London.

TO : The Secretary,
Canadian Naval Mission Overseas,
Kings House, 10 Haymarket,
London, S.W.1.

H.M.C.S. "MATANE" - Electrical Damage Report

Submitted, in accordance with C.A.F.O.2489/42, Section VII Part 18 (a), (b) and (c), the following report on the electrical damage as sustained by H.M.C.S. "MATANE" on July 20, 1944, when a "near miss" glider bomb exploded in the water on the port side of the ship near the engine room.

The Engineer Officer and the Chief E.R.A. were both injured during the above action and hospitalized, and the following report is made by the present Engineer Officer after he has discussed the matter fully with those who were present at the time.

(A) (1) The port and starboard main generators were on the board. The ship was not fully closed up at action stations as the alarm had just gone before the bomb landed. The Diesel Generator was running but not cut in.
One S.T. was closed up at the high power board and one in the low power room forward for low power and Gyro duties. A P.O. L.T.O. was at the hedgehog and one L.T.O. was on the quarterdeck with two S.T.'s. The E.A. was with the forward damage control party.

(2) None.

(3) No incorrect functioning of the electrical equipment was noted.

(4) The steam line to the port generator engine was fractured by the force of the explosion. The port side of the engine room was ripped open by the explosion and the space was flooded.

(5) There was a momentary overloading of the Starboard Generator when the degaussing cable was grounded and the Port Generator went out. Load was carried by the Starboard Generator until it was submerged in sea water.
The overloading was due to transferance of loads and, almost immediately, to flooding.
Under normal conditions the average "action" load was 250 amps. A peak load of 300 amps was usually experienced when the motors for the power mounted Oerlikon guns were turned on.

(6)/...

(6) The damage sustained rendered the ship temporarily out of action. The ship was towed back to port.

(7) The diesel generator was functioning and provided current for ship's lighting, etc. This question is fully covered in the ship's report of action damage submitted on arrival in port.

(8) Nil.

(B) (1) The Engine room was flooded, putting out of action both main generators and the H.P. board. The Diesel Generator worked satisfactorily and supplied sufficient current for the Gyro, ship's lighting, signal projectors and, if necessary, for some of the Oerlikons.

(2) None
(3) None
(4) Nil
(5) Nil

(C) (1) Nil
(2) Nil
(3) Nil

Eric Kelgard, Com/Eng. R.C.N.R.
for W.F.T. Lucas,
Lieut. Cdr. R.C.N.V.R.
COMMANDING OFFICER.

FILE NUMBER: N.S.S. 18340 - 381/30 VOL. "I"

SECRET SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

CROSS REFERENCE

DAMAGE BY ENEMY ACTION in Other Action

H.M.C.S. "MATANE"

2 S/S

REFERRED	FOR REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. BY
Staff	[illegible] AUG 9 1944						AUG 18 1944	
E&C	29929	15/8						
Staff		21/8		30.8.44			AUG 30 1944	
Staff	132 [illegible] 2 1944							
E&C		23.10					NOV 20 1944	
Staff		20.11.44		21/11			NOV 21 1944	
DEP	Per Requisition C.R. JAN 10 1945			10/1/45			JAN 13 1945	
E&C	Per Requisition C.R. JAN 23 1945			31.1.45			FEB 1 - 1945	
Staff DSD	Per Requisition C.R. FEB - 2 1945							
E&C		3/2		6.2.45			FEB 6 - 1945	

TITLE/TITRE : ***HMCS MATANE***
FILE/DOSSIER :
REFERENCE NUMBER / NUMÉRO DE RÉFÉRENCE: ***RG24-D-1-c, Volume number: 6790, File number: NSS8340-381/30***
PAGE(S) : ***44***
DATE : ***23/06/2026***